

rmia  
ul



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2007 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation



A  
D E F E N S E  
O F  
HUMAN LIBERTY,  
In ANSWER to the  
PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS  
which have been alledged against it;

And particularly to

CATO'S LETTERS ON That Subject.

In which DEFENSE

The Opinion of the Antients, concerning FATE,  
is also distinctly and largely considered.

---

By JOHN JACKSON,  
Rector of *Rossington* in the County of *York*, and Pre-  
bendary of *Wherwell* in the County of *Southampton*.

---

Non est igitur natura deorum præpotens neque excellens, siquidem ea subjecta est ei vel necessitati vel natura, qua cælum, maria, terræque regantur. Nihil autem est præstantius Deo, ab eo igitur necesse est mundum regi. *Cic. de Nat. Deorum, lib. 2.*

Fato quædam agi verum est; & quod quædam in nostra potestate sunt, hoc quoque verum esse monstratum est. Quare qui omnia Fato fieri dicunt merito reprehenduntur ab iis qui probant esse aliquid in nostra potestate. Demum qui omnia in nostra potestate constituunt, nec quicquam Fato relinquunt, falli deteguntur. Quis enim ignoret esse aliquid in Fato & extra nostrum jus? Sola igitur vera illa ratio est, fixaque & stabilis sententia, quæ docet quædam Fato fieri, alia porro ex hominum Arbitrio & Voluntate proficisci. *Chalcid. Com. in Plat. Tim. c. 7, Sect. 188.4*

---

LONDON: ●

Printed for J. NOON at the *White Hart* in  
*Cheapside* near the *Poultry*. M. DCC. XXV.





THE

P R E F A C E.



*S* Liberty of thinking and judging for ourselves is the Privilege and Right of all Mankind, as being rational Creatures; and a free impartial Enquiry after Truth is, in Matters of Philosophy, the great Principle of natural Knowledge, and in Matters of Religion and Morality, the Ground and Foundation of true Virtue and sincere Piety; so this Liberty ought to be labour'd after by ourselves, and encouraged as much as possible in all others.

B  
146  
J

## The P R E F A C E.

*On which Account I do not blame the late Author of \* Cato's Letters for applying his Reason and Understanding to the Search of the most nice and difficult Truths; or for any Designs or Endeavours (after a full and fair Examination of things) to inform the Minds of others in that Knowledge which appeared to him to be founded in Truth and Reason.*

*But as it is certain (and his own good Sense could not but convince him) that a Thing or Matter, tho' true in itself, is not worth the studying, and much less the publishing abroad, if it is of no Use or Benefit either to ourselves or others: So, much more, if our Enquiries lead us into Notions which are not only of no Use but of great Hurt and Mischief unto all; such as not only do*

---

\* The Letters contained in the following Treatise, when first published, were subscribed *Diogenes*, and were written by the late Mr. *Trenchard*, as we are inform'd by the Editor of *Cato's Letters*.



## The P R E F A C E:

*not tend to promote the Service of God, and the Interests of Religion, the Good of Society or any useful Knowledge whatsoever; but on the contrary do manifestly and directly subvert the Foundation of all Morality and Religion, destroy the essential Difference of Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil; and take away the Ground, and Reason, and Obligation of all both divine and human Laws, and contradict all our Knowledge and Experience concerning the Works of Nature and Providence; we should at least suspect such Notions to be erroneous and false, and that their appearing to us to be true, may be the effect of some Prejudice or corrupt Judgment in us; and therefore should be very cautious of giving our Assent to them, and wish at least that after further Examination these Notions may be found to have no Truth in them, which,*

*if*

## THE P R E F A C E.

*if they should prove true, every Thing almost besides must be false.*

*And supposing it, after all, possible for an unprejudic'd Mind to think such Notions to be true, or not to perceive the Falshood of them; yet 'tis evident that (as being pernicious to every rational Nature) they can have no right to be defended; and therefore no wise or well dispos'd Man wou'd, I think, publish to the World, what tends only to corrupt and mischief it, and to take away those natural, moral, and civil Obligations, on which the good Order, the Peace and Welfare of it are entirely built and supported.*

*Of this Nature, and attended with these Consequences, I take the following Speculations of the foremention'd Author on the Necessity of the Actions, both of God and Men, and his Defenses of it to be; which Notion I think,*

## The P R E F A C E.

*think, and shall endeavour in the following Sheets largely to prove, very weak and groundless in itself, and opposite to the Supposition of God's being a real and moral Agent, Creator and Governor of the World, and of Man being a rational, moral and accountable Creature; and which by true and immediate Consequence destroys the very Essence of Virtue and Vice, Religion and Piety, and overthrows the Ground and Obligation of all the Laws of God and of human Society.*

*And as such a pernicious Scheme cannot be too much opposed and confuted; so the Defense of human Liberty of Action, which presupposes the Free-agency of the divine Nature, and on which the Nature and Distinction of Good and Evil, all Piety and Worship towards God, Justice, Righteousness,*

## The P R E F A C E.

ness, *and all social Virtue towards Men, is wholly and entirely founded, cannot but be acceptable to all sincere Lovers of Truth and Virtue, and Professors of true Religion and Godliness,*



LETTER



# LETTER I.



THE Author of *Cato's Letters* on the Subject of *Liberty*\*, introduces his Thoughts with an Enquiry into the *Origin of Good and Evil*; and he conceives *moral Good, or Virtue*, to be nothing but *the Relation of Mens Actions to one another, either dictated by Reason, by the Precepts of Heaven, or the Commands of the Sovereign acting according to his Duty.*

In these Words our Author does not set out with an Accuracy suitable to his great Genius; for *Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil*, in the *moral Sense* of them, are not founded in the *Relation of Mens Actions to one another*; but *antecedently* to any such Relation, they are founded in the *essential Difference* of Things, and their *necessary A-*

---

\* *Cato's Letters*, Vol. IV. p. 168, &c.

*agreements and Disagreements*, consider'd with the several *Circumstances* of them, and as being natural Objects of every *rational Agent*.

Supposing indeed *Society*, Mens Actions must in many Cases have a *Relation* to one another; but this *Relation* is not the *Origin* of the *Virtue* or *Morality* of Actions, any more than the *Relation* of a *Cone* to a *Globe*, or of a *Square* to a *Circle*, is the *Origin* of their different Natures. Mens Actions may be either *good* or *evil*, although they have *no Relation* to other Men: It will always be *virtuous* and *good* in Men to employ and improve those *rational* Faculties which God has given them. To study the Works of Nature, and contemplate the Being and Perfections of God, with a suitable Sense of his wise and good Providence, and of the manifold Blessings of Life which we derive from thence, always was, and always will be, *morally good*. *Temperance*, *Sobriety*, and *Contentment* in his Condition, will always be a Duty and Virtue in every Man, tho' he were *alone*, and there was no other Man in the World: And *Cato* is aware that the *Morality* of Mens Actions is to be extended farther than the *Relation* which they bear to each other, by adding, towards the Conclusion of this Letter, that it consists also in the *Relation* of their Actions *to the Supreme Being*. (p. 174.)

Therefore, though a great part of Mens Actions relates to one another, consider'd as having a Property, and certain natural Rights, and are  
more

more or less *virtuous* or *vicious*, as they affect this natural Property, and bring greater or less Good or Evil to Men; and so, many Virtues and Vices are of a *social* Nature, and have an immediate Respect to the mutual Relation of Men to each other, infomuch that without such a Relation, those Virtues and Vices cou'd not be exercis'd: Yet nevertheless, the proper Origin of *Virtue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*, abstractedly consider'd as such, is founded, not in the *external* Relation of Mens Actions, either to each other, or even unto *God*; but in the *essential* Difference of Things and their *Circumstances*, as they relate to, or are Objects of a *rational* Nature. As *Reason* consists in the Perception of the natural and unalterable Congruity and Incongruity of Things, and of their *Circumstances* and *Relations* to each other; so Actions are *good* or *evil* as they are agreeable to *Reason* or not; or as they are *reasonable* or *unreasonable*: And therefore those Actions call'd *Justice* and *Charity*, *Obedience*, &c. and their Contraries, have, as being moral *Virtues* and *Vices*, (tho' relative to others,) the same Foundation with other Virtues and Vices that are *not relative*; namely, the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of them to natural Reason, in those particular Circumstances in which they are exercis'd; which *Reason* is the Rule of their Morality antecedent to the Consideration of *Society*: And though Society, or the Relation of Men to each other, gives Occasion to the *Existence* and *Exer-*

*case* of such and such *Actions*, so that they cou'd not be perform'd without such a *Relation*; yet it plainly does not give *Existence* to the *Morality* of them; and the formal *Ground* of these relative *Actions* being *virtuous* or *vicious* is not this *Relation*, (tho' that is the *Ground* of their being *relative* *Actions*) but is the same with the *Origin* of other *Virtues* and *Vices*; namely, the internal *Relation* which they bear to the *Mind* endued with *Reason*; or their being essentially and unalterably agreeable or disagreeable to the eternal and immutable *Principles* of *Truth* and *Reason*. In short, *Justice*, &c. is a *relative* and *social* *Virtue*, and therefore supposes *Society* and *Relation* to others as necessary to its *actual* *Existence*; but the *Reason* why the *Action* call'd *Justice* is a *Virtue*, is not because it bears a particular *Relation* to other *Men*; but the *Reason* is (as is just now observ'd) because it is an *Action* proceeding from rational *Principles*, such as *Reason* dictates in the present *Circumstances* and *Relations* of *Things* to each other: And as the *Nature* and *Properties* of a *Triangle* are the same, whether a *Triangle* actually exists or not; so the *Nature* and *Properties* of *Justice*, &c. are the same, whether any *Men*, or *Society* of *Men*, exist or not: The *Morality* of these *Virtues* consists not in the *Relation* which they bear (*a posteriori*) to *Society*, but in the *Relation* which they bear (*a priori*) to the essential and unalterable *Truth* and *Reason* of *Things*.



To make this Matter still plainer by an Example: To deprive another of his *Life*, or any Part of his *Estate*, or on the contrary, to be the Cause of any great Good or Benefit to another, (if Virtue and Vice proceeded merely from the Relation of Mens Actions to one another) wou'd be always the one morally *evil*, the other *good*: Yet this is not so; and Men can neither be truly said to be *vicious* in the one respect, or *virtuous* in the other, if the Actions do not proceed from *Design* or *Choice*, or acting *voluntarily* upon Principles of Reason; if Men either *ignorantly*, *undesignedly*, or *unavoidably*, do either the one or the other; or if in the former Case they act *with Reason*, or in the latter Case *without Reason*. The Observation of the Heathen Philosopher on this Head deserves Consideration: “ \* The *involuntary* “ killing of a Man, as not proceeding from *Choice* “ and Will, and a Power of acting or not acting, is *pardon'd*: But the taking away the Life “ of another *deservedly* and *justly*, is ever *praiseworthy*.”

Wherefore, if *Cato* in saying that *Virtue is a Relation of Mens Actions to one another, either dictated by Reason, &c.* means only, that *social Virtue* is an acting according to *Reason* in a State of

---

\* Φόβῳ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσῃ, ὡς μὴ κατὰ εὐνοίαν, μηδὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶψ' ἡμῶν κ' ἢ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐχθρῶν γινώσκῃ, συγγνώσκεται, ὁ ὅ κατ' εὐνοίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν Σανυτοῦ καὶ ἰταλιῶται. Simpl. in Epict. c. 1. p. 14.

Society, or social Relation of Men to each other; there wou'd be no other Fault than calling that by a *general* Name which is *particular*. But if he means either that *all* *Virtue* and *Vice* is founded merely in the Relation of Mens Actions to one another, as dictated by Reason, &c. or as contrary to it, and that there is no other *Virtue* or *Vice* besides, this (as I have shewn) is plainly an Error: Or if he means that *Virtue* and *Vice* are in the Nature of Things nothing but the consequent *Benefit* or *Hurt*, *Pleasure* or *Pain*, which arise from Mens mutual relative Actions; which *Pleasure* or *Pain* will generally (tho' not always) follow, the former from that which is agreeable, the latter from that which is disagreeable to Reason; if he supposeth *Virtue* and *Vice* to consist in this only, without regard to the Actions being the Result of the *free Determination* of the rational Mind; then his Notion is still more erroneous; and, as I shall prove hereafter, is of very fatal Consequence to Society, and inconsistent with the Supposition of the *Dictates* of any *Reason*, of any *Precepts* of *Heaven*, of any *Duty* either in *Sovereign* or *Subject*, or of any \**Virtue* or *Vice* whatsoever.

---

\* Οὐκ ὡς πράξεις ἐν ἑαυταῖς ἔχουσιν τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων εἰδοποιεῖνται. Simpl. in Epict. c. 1. p. 14. Actions *in themselves* are neither good or evil, but are either the *one* or the *other* from *Choice*, and a Power of acting *freely*.

2. *Cato* proceeds to observe, that “ the common Light of Reason has told all Mankind, that there cannot be an Effect without a Cause, and that every Cause must be an Effect of some superior Cause, till they come to the last of all, which can be no otherwise than self-existent; that is, must have existed from all Eternity.” (p. 169.)

All this is very right, excepting only that *Self-existence* and *Eternal-existence* are not the same, as they are here suppos'd to be: For *Self-existence* relates to *Causality*, and *eternal Existence* relates to *Duration* of Existence. To be *self-existent*, is evidently the same as to exist *necessarily*, by *Necessity* of Nature absolutely, without any *Cause* or *Original*; it is to have no *Cause* of Existence; and the Consequence of *necessary* or *Self-existence*, is *Eternity* of Existence; but mere *Eternity* of Existence does not, I think, infer *necessary* or *Self-existence*. Supposing that God, as having eternal Power and Will, cou'd or did *eternally* act, or produce Beings, these Beings, tho' *eternal*, wou'd not be *self-existent*. But,

3. *Cato* goes on to consider the Actions or Effects of the first self-existent Cause, or God, and says, “ Some think that he must act from the *Necessity* of his own Nature: For since his Being is *necessary*, they think that his *Will* and *Attributes* (which are *Parts* of his Being, essential to it, and inseparable from it) and consequently his *Actions*, which are the *Results* of  
“ that

“ that *Will*, and of those *Attributes*, must be “ *necessary* too.” (p. 170.)

If this and what follows (which I shall also consider) did not appear to be the real Sentiments of this Writer, I should dismiss it (with the absurd System of the *Materialists*, which he mentions and gives up) without taking any notice of it: For certainly nothing can be more unreasonable and absurd, than what is here proposed, and afterwards at large defended, by this Author.

That a *necessarily-existent* Being must act *necessarily* is no Consequence; and there is no Connection at all between the *Necessity* of God's *Existence*, which is *no Act*, and the *Necessity* of his *Actions*: And the true Consequence of such a Supposition is, that he does not *act at all*; and so the Supposition is a Contradiction in Terms. *Necessity* is contradictory to *Agency*, which latter always supposeth *Will* and *Choice* in the Agent, otherwise he is *no Agent*, but is merely *passive*; and the Consequence of this is, that what *Cato* calls the *Actions of God*, wou'd be *no Actions*, and God *no Cause*, but all wou'd be *Effect*, without any *original Cause* at all, directly contrary to his own Maxim; *that there cannot be an Effect without a Cause*.

Secondly, it wou'd hence also follow, that whereas *Cato* says, and very truly, *that every Cause must be an Effect of some superior Cause, till we come to one which is self-existent*; it wou'd, I say, follow, in direct Contradiction to his own just

reasoning, that, if God acted *necessarily*, or from the Necessity of his Nature; *i. e.* if his *Actions* were as necessary as his *Nature*, all the Effects or Beings produc'd or resulting from this *Necessity*, would be *necessarily-existent*; and so every thing would be equally *necessarily-existent*; and consequently there would not be any one *superior* or *self-existent* Cause; which *Cato* himself sees and owns is contrary to the common *Light of Reason*. he is so sensible that God cannot be an Agent or proper Cause of any Thing, cannot be said to act without *Will*, that he is forc'd expressly to allow that God has *Will* with other Attributes, and that his *Actions* are the Results of his *Will* and of those Attributes: But then he argues, that because his *Being* is necessary, his *Will*, &c. (which are Parts of his *Being*, &c.) and consequently his *Actions* which are Results of that *Will*, &c. must be necessary too; than which there never was a greater or a weaker Fallacy offered by a Man of Sense. The Fallacy lies in the Word *Necessary*. The *Being* of God (*Cato* argues) is necessary, *i. e.* he means *necessarily* or *self-existent*. Very well, what then? therefore his *Will* and other Attributes, which are essential to his *Being*, are necessary, *i. e.* again *necessarily* or *self-existent*; true, and what then? therefore the *Actions*, which are Results of that *Will*, must be necessary too, *i. e.* according to this Argument, *necessarily* or *self-existent*: This, if any thing, is the Consequence; and, as I have already observ'd, is the true Result of his

C

Notion,

Notion, which makes all things equally *necessary* or *self-existent*, which he himself owns is the greatest Absurdity; and therefore, had he been aware of the Fallacy, which he here offers, he must have been ashamed of it. For not to take notice of the gross and improper way of his calling the *Attributes* of God (which are every one Attributes, not of a *Part*, but of the *whole* divine Being) *Parts of his Being*, how cou'd so acute a man as *our Author* think it to follow, that because the *Will* of God is *necessarily-existent*, the *Actions* resulting from it are *necessary*? than which there cannot be a more self-evident Contradiction. It is the same as to say, that because God is *necessarily* endued with *Will*, therefore he has *no Will* at all.

The very Supposition of God acting by his *Will* makes his *Actions* *voluntary*, not *necessary*; and *Cato's* Argument makes *Necessity* and *Will*, which are opposite and contrary in their Natures, to be one and the same, than which nothing can be more absurd. Surely it is one thing to say that God's *Will* is *necessary*, i. e. *necessarily* or *self-existent*, and another thing very *different* to say, that his *Actions* resulting from his *Will* are *necessary*, i. e. do *not* result from his *Will*, but from the *Necessity* of his Nature, which is an evident Self-contradiction. If *Cato* had understood the Word *necessary* in one uniform Sense, and had meant by the *Actions* being *necessary*, the same as the *divine Nature* being *necessary*, then he cou'd not have avoided seeing the Consequence to be

be, that all things are *self-existent* alike : But to mean by *necessary*, as apply'd to God's *Being* and *Attributes* one Thing, (*i. e.* not Necessity of *Action* or *Effect*, but of *Existence* only without Cause) and as apply'd to the *Actions* of God a quite different Thing, (*i. e.* Necessity of *Action* or *Effect* proceeding from a Cause) and then to argue consequentially from the one to the other, is a Fallacy not becoming a serious Man in a serious Argument, and therefore I shall conclude was not designedly, but unknowingly offered.

To proceed ; *our Author* adds, as another Argument for the *Necessity* of God's *Actions*, “ that he  
 “ cannot conceive how a Being, who has the Prin-  
 “ ciples and Causes of all Things within itself,  
 “ could exist without having seen every Thing in-  
 “ tuitively from all Eternity, which must have ex-  
 “ cluded *Choice* and *Preference* in his *Actions*, which  
 “ implies *Doubt* and *Deliberation*.” (p. 170.) He subjoins to this Purpose in the last Paragraph of this Letter ; “ He (*viz.* God) sees all Things at  
 “ one View, and nothing can happen without  
 “ his *Leave* and *Permission*, and without his *giv-*  
 “ *ing* Power enough to have it effected. (p. 174.)

That God, as having the Principles and Causes of all Things within himself, must see every Thing intuitively from all Eternity, is, I grant, very true ; but as Intuition does not imply *Action*, and is not the efficient Cause of *Action*, so how it excludes *Choice* and *Preference* in God's *Actions* I cannot see. Had *Intuition*, which is *necessary*,

imply'd *Action*, the Consequence would be that all *possible* Things which God had in View, must have existed at once, and from all *Eternity*; which no one is so weak as to affirm to be fact. Contrary therefore to *Cato's* Reasoning I think the Truth to be, that God, seeing all things from *Eternity*, saw, amongst the infinite Possibilities of Things, infinite Variety of Things and Circumstances of Things, perfectly equal in themselves; and having within himself infinite *Power*, and *Will* to exert that Power into *Action*, as he *will'd*, and *when* he *will'd*; he freely *chose* one System rather than another, and at one Time rather than another. That God should create just such a particular Quantity of *Matter*, and no more; and such a Number of *Planets*, *Comets* and *fix'd Stars*, and no more; and at one particular *Time*, and in one particular *Place*, rather than another; and that their *Orbits*, *Distance* and *gravitating Powers* should be just what they are, and no other: Nay, that God should place *equal* Quantities of Matter in *equal* Forms *here* rather than *there*; that he should cause the Propagation of Mankind to come from *two* only, rather than *more*, and in a different way from many other living Creatures: that he should create so great a Variety of Species of Things, as suppose of *Birds*, *Fishes*, *Horses*, *Dogs*, *Fruit*, &c. with a thousand Things of like Nature, and which are *indifferent* as to *Time*, *Number*, *Manner* and *Place*, can be rationally deduced from no other Principle but

*Choice*



*Choice* and *Will*\*. That all these Things should be *necessary*, and could not *possibly* have been otherwise, is very absurd to affirm: for *Necessity* has plainly no Relation to *Time*, *Number*, or *Place*; whatever is *necessary* at all, is equally necessary in all *Time*, in all *Numbers*, in all *Place*.

If *Necessity* therefore was the principle of God's Actions, it must have produced all possible Things in all possible *Time*; and then, since God's Knowledge and Power are *eternal* and *infinite*, the Effects *necessarily* proceeding from them must be *eternal* and *infinite*. To suppose *Matter* to exist *necessarily*, is to suppose it to be *necessarily eternal* and *infinite*, which is absurd. For nothing is more evident than that there cou'd be no *Necessity* for *Matter* to exist at one *Time* and not at another, in one *Place* and not in another; and therefore if its Existence was *at all necessary*, it must be *necessary* in all *Time*, and in all *Place*, *i. e.* must be *necessarily eternal* and *infinite*: But it is evident that its Existence was not *necessary* in all *Time* (for we can conceive it to exist at a *particular Time*, and even not to exist at all, without a Contradiction, which we could not

\* It is every whit as absurd to suppose the Works of God's Creation to be the Effects of *Necessity*, as it would be to suppose the Effects of humane Art to be *necessary*; as absurd as to say, that a *House*, or *Bed* is *made*, or an *Harp* is *tun'd* by *Fate* or *Necessity*, as *Alex. Aphrodisius* puts the Cases. Πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, τὸ οἰκίαν, καὶ τὸ κλινὴν καθ' εἰμαρμένῳ λέγειν γεγοῖναι ἢ τὴν λύραν ἡρμούσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένῳ. De Fato p. 23.

do, if its Existence was *necessary*) nor in *all* Place (for we can not only conceive it not to be in *all* Place, but in Fact know certainly that it is not) and therefore it was plainly not *necessary* at *any* Time, and in *any* Place, *i. e.* it was not at all *necessary*.

Again, another Argument that *Matter* must be *necessarily infinite*, if it is *at all* necessary, may be deduced from the Nature of *Power*: *Operating Power*, if not hinder'd or limited by a *superior Power* or by *Will*, will exert all its Force; but God's Power being *omnipotent*, no superior Power can hinder or limit the Force of it; and therefore either the Force and Operations of it are not *limited* at all, *i. e.* are *infinite* as the Power is, or they are *limited* by his *Will*.

Again; as *Limitation* of Power in Actions is a Consequence of *Will* and *free Agency*, so *Variety* is a Consequence of this *Limitation*; if the Existence of *Matter* was *necessary*, as it would be (as I have proved) *necessarily infinite*; so in Consequence of this *Infinity* it would be *uniform* and *invariable*, without any *Difformity* or *Variety* whatsoever, even in so much as a Mode or Circumstance of Existence: No one Part of Matter could have *different* Qualities from another, nor could there be any *Distinction* in the Nature of Things; and therefore it is unquestionably true and certain that it is God's *Choice* and *Will* that limits the Exertion of his Power, and distinguisheth Things into their several Kinds by  
distinct

distinct Qualities and Modes of Existence, and determines the particular *Time*, and *Place*, and *Number* of them: And the great *Variety* of Things, and of their Properties, and the apparent *arbitrary* Disposition of them, is such a Demonstration of their being the Effects of a wise and powerful *Free-agent*; that to suppose every Thing to be the Effect of *Necessity*, is to suppose the Operations of *Necessity* to be the same as the Operations of *Will*; and Things to be produced and ordered in the same *various* and *arbitrary* Manner by *Necessity* as by *Will*; and so is to confound the Distinction of Things the most opposite that can be in Nature, and to make *Necessity* and *Will* one and the same. *Cato* must therefore have said that there could not be any thing more or less existing, than actually does exist; that nothing could possibly be *otherwise* than it is; that there is and can be no *Variety* in Things or Properties of Things; that there is not nor can possibly be any *determinate* Quantity of *Matter*, or *determinate Place* or *Duration* of the Existence of it; that it is impossible for God to create two Pieces of Matter of equal Quantity and Form, as suppose two *Cubes*, or two *Globes* of an Inch Diameter (it being evident that being of the same Form and Quantity, there can be no *Necessity* why one should exist *here* or *there* or *any where*, rather than the other) and a thousand other Absurdities contrary to all the *Sense* and *Reason* of Mankind *Cato* must have

affirm'd and held; or else acknowledged that God created all Things by the *free Determination* of his *Will* by the free Exertion of his Nature into Action.

But now if, upon the Hypothesis of *Will* and *free Agency* in God, the Reason be ask'd why God *chose* one Scheme of Creation rather than another (supposing, as hath been proved, another could possibly exist) it is easily answered; that the Reason was either because it was the *best*, or as *good* as any other amongst the infinite Variety of possible Systems which he had in his View: And God, as *Cato* observes, *having all Things in his View at once*, need not doubt (which always supposes Imperfection of Knowledge) which of (suppose) equally good Systems to *choose*; and if one was the *best* System, he could not doubt or deliberate in the *Choice* or *Preference* of it: and its being the *best*, tho' it is a Reason why God would infallibly *choose* it, is none at all why he could not *choose* it, or why it is *necessary*; the being *best*, no way excluding *Will* and *Choice*\*. Supposing a *Will* in God (as *Cato* does allow) what Reason can there be why, by that *Will*, God, the best Being, should not *choose* what is

---

\* *Seneca*, speaking of God and the fix'd Laws of his Providence, says, *Liceat illi hodieque decernere & ex ea lege Factorum aliquid derogare; an majestatis diminutio fit, & confessio erroris mutanda fecisse: necesse est enim ei eadem placere, cui nisi optima placere non possunt, nec ob hoc minus liber & potens est, ipse enim est necessitas sua.* *Quæst. Nat. Præfat.*

best? on the contrary, supposing God to be endued with *Will*, he will infallibly always apply it to the *Choice* and *Preference* of what is best. So weak and wholly destitute of *Truth* is every Part of *Cato's* Argument.

But *Cato* argues against *Choice* in God, as implying *Doubt* and *Deliberation*: In which he is also mistaken; for the Reason why God cannot *doubt* or *deliberate* is, not that he hath no *Will* or *Choice*, but because his Knowledge and Wisdom is absolutely *perfect* and unerring: And tho' *Choice* does not imply *Doubt* and *Deliberation*, yet on the other hand it is true that *Doubt* and \**Deliberation* do imply *Choice*, and so this is an Argument that Men are endued with *Choice* and *voluntary* Agency, which quite destroys the Scheme of *Necessity*.

\* As all *Deliberation* and *Consultation* about our Actions would be absurd and ridiculous, if they were not in our own Power; so is it, if possible, more absurd to suppose that we are by Nature necessarily endued with a Power of *Deliberation* and *Consultation*, and necessarily deliberate and consult about Things in which we have no *Choice* or can act *voluntarily*, "Wherefore (as *Alex. Aphrodisius* observes) "we never deliberate about "Things in *Æternity*, nor about Things confessedly *necessary*; nor "about Things, which, tho' not necessary, are yet in the "Power of others only; nor yet about Things done by our "selves, which are *past*: but we deliberate about those Things "only, which are and will be in our own Power to do.

Διὰ τοῦτο, ἔτι περὶ τῶν αἰδίων βουλευόμεθα, ἔτι περὶ τῶν ὁμολογούμεως γινόμενων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης — ἀλλ' ἔδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν μὴ γινόμενων, ἐπ' ἄλλοις δὲ τισιν ἔντων βουλευόμεθα — ἀλλ' ἔδὲ περὶ μὲν ἡμῶν μὲν πρακτῶν παρεληλυθότων δὲ, βουλευόμεθα — βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ μόνων τῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν τε πραττομένων, καὶ μελλόντων. De fat. p. 55, 56.

I must farther take notice that our Author, whilst he is arguing against the *voluntary* Agency of God, directly maintains it in saying, *that nothing can happen without God's Leave and Permission*, which is very absurd upon the Supposition of all Things being from *Necessity*: If they are *necessary* they are *independent* of any *Leave* or *Permission* of God, and God can no more hinder their Existence and Effects, than his own Existence; and therefore the supposing Things and their Effects to exist by God's *Leave* and *Permission*, is saying they exist by his *Choice* and *Will*, as plain as can be express'd in Words, and so *Cato* herein contradicts himself.

Another Argument which is us'd for the *Necessity* of God's Actions is, *that all his Actions must be instantaneous Emanations of himself*; (p. 174.) which, I grant, is true, if they are *necessary*, but not otherwise; and whether they are *necessary* or not is the Question: but however our Author might easily perceive the Consequence of his Argument to be, that all Things are *eternal*: And another unhappy Consequence is, that *Necessity* being one and the same in every Thing, all humane Actions must also (if necessary) be *instantaneous*; and *Necessity* must as much exclude *Doubt*, and *Deliberation*, and *Suspension* in Men, as in God: And therefore if Men can *doubt*, *deliberate*, and *suspend* (as *Cato* would not, I suppose, deny) it must proceed from *Will*, not *Necessity*. If *Necessity* could cause *Deliberation* in Men, it would in

God also; and it is not sufficient to say, that Men's *imperfect* Knowledge is the necessary Cause of their *Deliberation* and *Suspension* of Action; for tho' the Sense of their imperfect Knowledge makes them *deliberate* and *suspend* many Actions, yet they can equally *suspend* where they have the clearest and most perfect Knowledge. But wherever *Necessity* operates, there is no *Suspension*; there is no *Suspension* of Rays issuing from the *Sun*, or in a *Balance*, whether it should move when a *Weight* is in one of the Scales; or in the *Pulse* and *Heart* whether they should beat; or of any of the Effects of natural and necessary Causes: And *Life* and *Intelligence* can alter nothing in the Case, for unless there is *Will* in this Life and Intelligence, *Necessity* must operate equally in Things with or without *Life* and *Intelligence*.

“ 4. *Cato* could not apprehend how *Reason*  
 “ and *Wisdom* can be analogous in God to what  
 “ are call'd by the same Names in Men: For  
 “ Judgment in them, as far as it regards their  
 “ own *voluntary* Operations, is only the Balance  
 “ of the Conveniences or Inconveniences which  
 “ will result from their own or others Thoughts  
 “ and Actions, as they have Relation to Beings  
 “ or Events out of their Power, and which de-  
 “ pend upon other Causes: But if a Being can  
 “ have no Causes without itself, but produces  
 “ every Thing by its own Energy and Power,  
 “ sees all Things at once and cannot err, as Men  
 “ may,

“ may, nor consequently deliberate and debate  
 “ with itself; he thinks it must act singly, and in  
 “ one way only; and where there is no *Choice*,  
 “ or which is the same Thing, but *one* Choice,  
 “ he conceives there is always *Necessity*.” (p.  
 170, 171.

Answ. *Reason* and *Judgment* in *God* and in *Men* are not different in *Kind* or in *Nature*; if they were, then what is most contradictory to our Ideas, might be *true* or agreeable to the divine Reason; then *two* and *two* may not be equal to *four* in *God's* Judgment; and that which to humane Reason is the plainest and greatest Absurdity, Impossibility, or Enormity, may, to the Reason of *God*, be *true*, *possible*, and *right*; which Supposition destroys the Foundation of all *Reason*, *Truth* and *Right* amongst *Men*: They do not therefore differ in *Nature* or *Kind*, but only in *Degrees of Perfection*. The *Reason* and *Wisdom* of *God* is founded on clear, infallible and perfect Knowledge; but that of *Men* upon confus'd, fallible and imperfect Apprehensions of Things. *Wisdom* and *Judgment*, whether in *God* or *Men*, so far as they regard *Actions*, is the Knowledge and Application of Means proper and effectual to obtain the Ends intended by them: *God*, knowing the *Natures* and *Powers* of all Things, cannot err in his Judgment, and in effecting his Ends; but *Mens* Knowledge being erroneous and very imperfect, makes them often err in their Use and Application of Means, and in effecting the Ends they  
 aim



aim at. But as, no Doubt, in the Nature of Things, several Means are equally effectual to produce the same End; God, who sees all Things, *chooseth* out of this Variety which he pleases: And Men also, who in many Cases see that several Means are equally and certainly effectual to certain Ends, *choose* to make use of which they please. The Conscioufness of their imperfect Knowledge makes them, it may be, *deliberate* before they *choose* (which is otherwise in God whose Knowledge is perfect) but the *Choice* and *Action* following is nevertheless *free*, whether it be with or without *Deliberation*.

*Secondly*, God's acting uniformly, doing always what is *good* or *best*, is exactly all one whether we suppose him to act *necessarilly* or *freely*, and so can be no Argument for *Necessity*.

A Mind endued with perfect *Freedom*, which consists in having a perfect Knowledge of the eternal and immutable *Relations* and *Difference* of Things, and an unbiassed or unrestrain'd Power of *Action* upon such a Knowledge, will always as invariably *act one Way*, i. e. always do what is right and good, and best in the whole, as if it was impell'd by *Necessity*. The Agreeableness of some Things to *Reason* will always as infallibly induce God to *prefer* and *choose* them, and the Disagreeableness of other Things, to reject and refuse these, as if *Necessity* was the Cause of all his *Actions*. As *Seneca* (noted above p. 13.) well observes, God's being always pleas'd with, and  
doing

doing what is *best*, is no Argument that he is therefore *less a Free-agent*. If Men had the same Perfection of Knowledge and Power that God has, their Actions, proceeding from their Will, would be as invariable and uniform as God's are; and as much in one Way of moral Goodness, as if Necessity impell'd them to act. The Reason is; because a *rational* Mind cannot be equally or *indifferently* inclin'd to all *different* Things; *Vertue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*, which are opposite in their Natures, and the one essentially agreeable to Reason, the other essentially disagreeable to it, cannot appear equally *eligible* to a Mind endued with *Reason*; and therefore the Mind, if not impos'd upon, will certainly always *choose* the one, and *reject* the other: And 'tis certain that in this Respect, the more uniformly Men act, with the more *Freedom* they do act; and the less uniformly, with the less *Freedom*; because they act with the less clear and steady Perception of the essential Difference of Good and Evil. Every *Vice* darkens the Mind, and proportionably takes away its *Freedom* and Power of exerting into good Actions, as it deprives it of the Sense of the Difference of *Good* and *Evil*. Where the Mind is balanced with an equally clear Perception of the Nature of Good and Evil, of the Agreeableness of the one to a rational Mind, and of the Disagreeableness of the other, having withal a Power of Action, and being inclin'd by nothing to either side but by  
the

the Nature of the Things themselves; here is a State of perfect *Freedom*, and in this State the Mind will always uniformly *choose* by its *Will* (as uniformly as if impell'd by *Necessity*) that which is *right* and *good*, and agreeable to *Truth* and *Reason*. But if the Perception of the Nature and Agreeableness of Vertue, and of the Nature and Disagreeableness of Vice is diminished in any Proportion, in the same Proportion the Mind is biased, and acts less freely in *choosing* the one and *refusing* the other. It is a great Mistake to think that *Freedom* of Action consists in the Mind's being of itself *indifferently* inclin'd to Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil: Since these are *different* in their Natures, and the one essentially agreeable, the other essentially disagreeable to Reason; it is impossible that a *rational* Mind, under a clear Perception of this Difference, should be equally affected towards both of them, and be *indifferently* disposed to choose the one or the other. *Moral Freedom* therefore does not consist in a Power of doing contrary Actions with the same *Indifference*, but in the Nature of Things it consists in being endued with *Reason* and the Perception of the Difference of *Good* and *Evil*, and in Consequence of that *Reason* having a Power of *choosing* and *doing* either the one or the other; which Power is greater or less in Proportion to the clear, regular, and uninterrupted, or to the weak, decay'd and disordered Sense with which the Mind is possessed concerning them; so that we may either conceive the Mind

(thro'

(thro' Love and good Endeavours) so well dispos'd, and to have such a clear and strong Sense of the moral Difference of Things; as regularly and with great Constancy to *choose* and perform Works of Vertue and Goodness: Or on the other Hand, we may conceive the Mind (thro' excessive Carelessness, natural Ignorance, vicious Habits, or disordered Imaginations) to be by Degrees so corrupted and depraved in its Sense of Good and Evil, as to act with little or no Freedom, either in doing the one or the other, being almost necessarily impelled by such Motives as excite the *Appetites* and *Passions*. In Actions resulting from Minds thus disposed we may see something like *Necessity*. But in this Case the Mind is not in a *natural* State, is enslav'd thro' Accident or its own Fault, and may be recovered to a State of Nature and Freedom again, by being restored to its Understanding, and the right Use of its *Reason*. The Words of the renowned *Platonist Plotinus* are very observable on this Head.

“ \* The Soul obtains a *greater* Power (over its  
 “ Actions) as it becomes more *good*, and a *less*  
 “ as

---

\* Πλείω δὲ κρατεῖν (τὴν ψυχὴν) ἢ ἀμείναν· ἐλάττω δὲ ἢ χειράν· ἢ γὰρ κρέσσει σέματός τι ἐνδοδύσα ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ὀργίζεσθαι, ἢ ἀνάγκασθαι (lege ἠνάγκασται) ἢ πέναις ταπεινῆ, ἢ πλάτοις χαῖν⊕, ἢ δυνάμει τύραν⊕. ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τέτοις ἀντέχεν ἢ ἀγαθὴ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ ἠλλιάσει αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἠλλιᾶθη. — ὅταν γὰρ ἔν ἀλλοιωθῆισα παρὰ τῶν ἔξω ψυχῆ πράξι τὴ καὶ ὀρμῶν, οἷον τυφλῆ τῆ φερεῖ χραμένη, οὐχὶ ἐκίστιν τῆ πράξιν, οὐδὲ τὴν διάσειν, λεκτέον, καὶ ὅταν αὐτῆ

“ as it grows more *evil*. For either yielding to  
 “ the Constitution of the *Body*, it is *compelled*  
 “ unto Lust or Anger; or it acts *meanly* in a  
 “ State of *Poverty*, or *insolently*, if *rich*, or *ty-*  
 “ *rannically*, if *in Power*. But the Soul that is of a  
 “ *good Nature*, if in the very same Circumstances,  
 “ resists and overcomes (the Temptations of)  
 “ them, and changeth them rather than is chang-  
 “ ed by them. ——— When therefore the Soul,  
 “ suffering a *Change* from external Means, exerts  
 “ itself, and does any thing, being led as it were  
 “ by a *blind Impulse*, we cannot say that either  
 “ the *Action* or *Disposition* of it is *free*: And so  
 “ in like manner, when *of itself* becoming  
 “ *worse*, it no longer makes use of the *right* and  
 “ *governing* Principles of Action. But when its  
 “ *own Reason* is the pure and active governing  
 “ Principle that moves it to act, this *Exertion*  
 “ alone is that which we can say is *in our own*  
 “ *Power* and *voluntary*; and this is *our own Ac-*  
 “ *tion*, which proceeds not from *external Im-*

---

αὐτὴ καὶ αὐτῆς χρείων ἕστα περιττὸν οὐκ ὀφθαίς πανταχοῦ οὐδὲ ἡγε-  
 μωνέσασαι τῆς ἐρμῆς ἢ (lege ἦ) χρωμένη. Λόγον δὲ ὅταν ἡγεμονία  
 καθαρόν καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὸν εἰκείον ἔχουσα ἐρμῆ, ταύτῳ μόνον τὴν ἐρμῆν  
 φατέον εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἐκούσιον, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον, ὃ  
 μὴ ἀλλοθεῖν ἦλθεν, ἀλλ' ἐδόθεν ἀπὸ καθαρεύσεως τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς  
 πρώτης ἡγεμονίης καὶ κυρίας, ἀλλ' οὐ πλάνῳ ἐξ ἀγνοίας παθέσσης. ἢ  
 ἴτιον ἐκ βίας ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὡ προσελθοῦσαι ἀγασσι καὶ ἔλασσι· καὶ εἰκ  
 ἴτε ἔργκι (lege ἔργα) εἰῶσι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παθήματα τῆς ἡμῶν.  
 Ennead. 3. lib. 1. p. 234.

“ pulse, but from the *internal* Motion of the un-  
 “ corrupted Soul itself, from the primary, pre-  
 “ siding and governing Principle of it: And not  
 “ from the Soul led *passively* into Error thro’  
 “ Ignorance, or overcome by the *Violence* of its  
 “ Lusts, which *drag* and *draw* it, and make  
 “ every thing we do to become not properly  
 “ *Action* but *Passion.*” And to the same Pur-  
 “ pose *Simplicius* says; \* “ When the *rational* Soul  
 “ gives itself up to the *Body*, and to unreason-  
 “ able and corporeal *Passions*, it is moved (as it  
 “ were) by mechanical Impulse, and its Moti-  
 “ ons are not *free* and *in its own Power*: But  
 “ when it *acts* according to its own Nature,  
 “ then it is moved by an *inward self-moving*  
 “ Principle, *freely* and of its own Accord, and  
 “ is indisputably endued with free Will.” Again;

---

\* Ἡ λογικὴ ἢ ψυχὴ, ὅταν μὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐνδῶ τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ τοῖς ἀλό-  
 γοις καὶ τοῖς σωματικοῖς κινήμασι, καὶ αὐτὴ νευροσπασεῖται, καὶ  
 ᾤθεῖται, καὶ ἔκ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐφ’ ἑαυτῇ ἔχει τὰ κινήματα· ὅταν ἢ κατὰ  
 τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν ἐνεργεῖ, τότε ἐλευθέρως καὶ αὐτεξουσίως ἐνδῶ ἐφ’  
 ἑαυτῆς κινεῖται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης, τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ὁράται ἀναμφιλόκα-  
 τως. — Ἐ μὲν τοὶ εἰς τῆτο χρῆ κρίνειν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτεξουσίον,  
 καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῷ δυνατῷ, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν αἱ γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ  
 ἀεὶ σιωπηρήμεναι ψυχαί, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρέμεναι, καὶ αὐτεξουσίον  
 ἔχουσι τὴν αἴρεσιν· ἔ γάρ ἐστιν αἴρεσις ἢ ἠναγκασμένη· καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ  
 ἀεὶ ἔχουσι αὐτῶν οὐδέ ποτε πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπεσυρόμεναι· αἱ ἢ ἡμί-  
 τεραι ψυχαὶ ἀγαθὰ μὴ οὔσαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὀρέγονται, καὶ κακὰ γινώ-  
 μεναι, τῶν κακῶν μεταβάλλει ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας εἰς ἀρετὴν,  
 ἐπιμελούμεναι, καὶ ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς εἰς κακίαν ἀμελούμεναι, καὶ ἑκάτερον  
 κατὰ αἴρεσιν αἰκίαν, οὐ κατὰ ἀνάγκην, ποιούσιν. in Epict. p. 8,  
 9, 22.

“ We ought not in all Cafes to judge of our *Li-*  
 “ *berty* and *Freedom* of Action, by our having a  
 “ Power of doing (indifferently) contrary  
 “ Things: for thofe Minds which are always in-  
 “ clin’d to and *choofe* that which is *good*, do ne-  
 “ verthelefs *freely choofe* it; this Choice is not  
 “ *forc’d*: and they perfevere always in that which  
 “ is *good*, without being drawn afide unto *Evil*.  
 “ And thus our Minds, if they have good Dif-  
 “ pofitions, *defire* that which is good, if evil  
 “ ones, that which is evil. By taking care alfo  
 “ they return from Wickednefs unto Vertue,  
 “ and by Neglect they fall from Vertue into  
 “ Vice; and do both by their own *free Choice*,  
 “ not by *Necelfity*.

Towards the Conclusion of this Letter (p.  
 173.) *Cato* very juftly and ingenioufly taxes the  
*Cheats* and *Impoftures* which have been introduced  
 into Religion, and with a reasonable Indignation  
 cenfures the *Rogueries* and *Perfecutions* proceeding  
 from them: but then all this is faid with a very  
 ill Grace by one who is arguing for all Actions  
 being the Results of *Necelfity*; according to which  
 Argument, all thefe *Cheats*, and *Forgeries*, and the  
*Mifchiefs* and *Perfecutions* ingrafted on, and  
 fupported by them, are not culpable, becaufe  
*necelfary*; and are in reality no more *Rogueries*,  
 or can juftly be complain’d on, than the Mifchief  
 and Devaftations caus’d by *Storms* and *Tempefts*,  
*Inundations*, *Earthquakes*, *Fire* or *Plague*, or any of  
 thofe *material* Inftuments by which humane  
 E 2 Miferies.

Miseries are effected, can be call'd *Rogueries*; they being, as these are, according to *Cato's Scheme*, the *natural* and *necessary* Effects of *natural* and *necessary* Causes: And all the *Malignity* of Men must at last be supposed by this Hypothesis to be not a *moral*, but a *natural* Evil only, and must centre at last in the *Malignity* of the *divine Nature* necessarily producing it.

To this Purpose *Hierocles* observes \* ;  
 “ We will not say that our *Purposes* of Jus-  
 “ tice, and our *Judgments* and *Desires* pro-  
 “ ceed from an over-ruling *Necessity*, for if  
 “ so, we should not impute *Virtue* and *Vice*  
 “ to *ourselves*, but to that *Necessity*.” And  
*Plotinus* says, that the Consequence of the No-  
 tion of *Necessity* is †, to attribute to God the  
*Commission* of all Evil. And *Origen* in *Eusebius* says,  
 that the \*\* *Maintainers* of this *Doctrine* of *Ne-*  
*cessity* do absolve Men from all Manner of Crimes

\* 'Ου ἦν — τὰς δίκης προαιρέσεις, καὶ κρίσεις, καὶ ὁρμὰς ἀπὸ κρείττονος ἀνάγκης ἐγγίνας. Φάσομεν· ἔτω ἦν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας οὐχ ἡμᾶς αὐτὰς, ἀλλ' ἐκένω αἰτιασαίμεθα. De Fat. p. 26.

† Τῷ παντὶ τὴν τῶν ἀχρῶν ποίησιν ἀνατιθέναι. Ennead. 3. lib. I. c. 4.

\*\* Καί τι δεῖ λέγειν ἡμᾶς περὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἀμαρτανομένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν μυρίαν ὅσων τυγχανόντων, ἥς τις οὐ τῶν γενεῶν προΐσάμενοι τούτων λόγων, ἀπολύοντες παντὸς ἐγκλημα-  
 τος, ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ προσγράφεσι πάντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ ψευκῶς (lege ψευκῶς) πραττομένων τὴν αἰτίαν. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 11. p. 282.



committed by them, and make God the Author of all the Evil and Wickedness of the World.

And Eusebius\* himself insists upon this Argument at large; viz. that the Assertors of the Necessity of humane Actions are guilty of Impiety; because this Doctrine, supposing Men to do nothing of their own free Choice, absolves them from the Guilt of all their Wickedness, and chargeth Providence with it, making it, under the Name of Necessity and Fate, to be the Cause of all the Filthiness and Enormities, the Cruelty and Murders which are committed by Men. And concludes that this Notion makes God and no one else the Author of all Evil, and that Man cannot justly be charged with Sin, but only God that made him:

To conclude; according to Cato's Scheme of Necessity; that Malignity, that moral Malignity, which he calls Roguery, and which he is apprehensive prevails strongly in humane Nature, could not possibly exist. For if God (as he constantly affirms) is good, and his Goodness re-

\* Ὡς οὕτω (ὁ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ ἄσρων φορᾶς ἀναπτῶν τὰ πάντα) τοῦ ὀυσεβεῶς ἐκπέφυγε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐπεὶ τα πῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμαρτανομένων, τοὺς μὲ πλημμελοῦντας ἀπολύει, ὡς μηδὲν πῶν ἀτόπων ἐξ οἰκείας γνώμης διαπεπραγμένους, ἀνάγει ἢ τὴν αἰτίαν πῶν κακῶν ἐπὶ καθόλου πρόνοιαν, ἀνάγκην αὐτὴν καὶ εἰμαρμένην ἀποκαλῶν, καὶ πάσης τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀιχρεργίας καὶ ἀρρητοποιίας, ἀμότητός τε καὶ μισαιφονίας αἰτίαν εἶναι λέγων — αὐτὸς (scilicet ὁ Θεός) ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ ὁ πάντων κακῶν ποιητικὸς, καὶ οὐκ ἔτ' ἂν οἴκη ἡμαρτηκῶς. λέγοιτ' ἂν ὁ ἀνθρωπῶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τούτω ποιητὴς Θεός. Præp. Evang lib. 6. c. 6. p. 251.

sults, not from his *Will* and *Choice*, but from the *Necessity* of his *Nature*; then it will follow, that as *Necessity* (if that alone is the Cause of all Things) cannot produce any Effect that is not in the Cause whence it proceeds, so consequently God being *necessarily* good, without *Will* or *Choice*, all Things proceeding from him by the same *Necessity* by which he exists, will be *necessarily* in like Manner good also: And as there is no *Evil*, whether *moral* or *natural*, in God, so there can be none in the Beings *necessarily* derived from him; and no Account of the Difference and Existence of *Good* and *Evil* (whether natural or moral) can ever be given upon the Hypothesis of *Necessity* \*.

But on the other Hand, supposing *Goodness* to be the Result of the perfect *Rectitude* of God's *Will*, then there is plainly a physical Possibility of the Existence of *Evil*; and supposing Things to be produc'd not from the *Necessity* of the divine Nature, but from the *Will* and *Free-agency* of God; then it will also follow that since God

\* \* To those who made humane Actions subject to *Fate* or *Necessity*, *Chalcidius*, by way of Objection, puts the *Question*; viz. *constituant quid esse Fatum velint. Virtutemne divinam? sed non esset causa malorum. An vero animam malignam? sed demum a malitia nihil boni fieri potest; & Fato dicuntur etiam bona provenire, dicent fortasse mixtam quandam esse substantiam; at qui fieri potest, ut unum & idem quid malitia simul & bonitate sit præditum, intemperantiamque & castitatem creet, cæteramque virtutum vitiorumque importet contrarietatem. In Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. 264.*

cannot produce by his *Will* Beings equally perfect with himself, there must be in the *Will* of every Being produc'd by him, a less Rectitude than in his *Will*; and consequently a greater Possibility of *Evil*: And since farther upon the Supposition of God's acting by his *Will*, he can produce all possible Variety of Beings, and endue them with all possible Variety and Degrees of Perfection, the least perfect Beings will have the least Perfection of *Will* and greatest Possibility of doing *Evil*; and from the Use of this *Will* and Actions resulting from it, consider'd with the Circumstances of this present State, all the *moral* Good and Evil that is in human Nature may be reasonably accounted for.





## LETTER II.



IN this Letter we are told, that *Good and Evil are Objects of God's Will, which alone can constitute Right or Wrong\**.

In this Observation *Cato* shew'd that he had either a strange Head, or a strange Inclination to run counter to the common Reason of Things. The *Actions* of God proceeding upon the Ideas of *Right* and *Wrong*, he will have to be *necessary* tho' they are truly, as I have shewn at large, the Results of his *Choice* and *Will*: But here he will have the *Ideas* and Nature of *Right* and *Wrong*, which are truly *necessary*, to be Objects of his *Will*; meaning, as he explains himself,

---

\* *Cato's Letters*, Vol. IV. p. 175, &c.

that God's *Will* alone constitutes the Nature of Right and Wrong; the Consequence of which is (and which Consequence he insinuates) that they are not of a fix'd and immutable, but of an uncertain and changeable Nature; that there is no essential Difference between them, and what we esteem *Right* or *Wrong*, may be otherwise with God: And so, that God's Actions may be *right* and *just*, tho' contrary to our clearest Notions of *Justice* and *Equity*: Which Opinion is not only very absurd in itself, but of dangerous and fatal Consequence, as making the Nature and Difference of Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil, precarious, uncertain and mutable. But besides, all this while *Cato* did not consider, that tho' the Notion of God's *Will* being the only Ground of *Right* and *Wrong* does (as he intends it) confound the Distinction of Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil; yet *his* Notion of God's *Will* entirely confutes and overthrows the Consequences he would draw from the Supposition of its *constituting Right or Wrong*. For when he says God's *Will* alone constitutes *Right or Wrong*, he really means in Contradiction to his own Words, that their Natures result not from God's *Will*, as that signifies *Choice*, but from his *Will*, as it signifies really in Opposition to *Will*, *Necessity*: And thence he might see, that whatever results from God by *Necessity*, cannot be different in God from what it is in Beings produc'd *necessarily* by him; where the Effect is *necessary*, it must be

first in the Cause; and so contrary to his Reasoning, the Ideas of *Right* and *Wrong* must be the same *in God*, as they are *in us*.

The Truth is; *Right and Wrong* are indeed *Objects* of God's *Will*, as *Truth* and *Falshood* are of his *Understanding*; but his *Will* no more *constitutes the Nature* of the one than of the other: They are *necessary* and *immutable* in their Natures, as *necessary* as the Nature of God is, and are *constituted* not by his *Will*, but by his *Existence*. Supposing a *perfect* Being, as God is, to exist; the essential Difference of *Truth* and *Falshood*, *Right* and *Wrong*, the one as the *Object* of God's *Understanding*, the other as the *Object* of his *Will*, immediately and necessary follows; and they are as *immutable* in their Natures, as the Nature of God is: God can no more by his *Will* alter the Nature of *Right* or *Wrong*, or the *Objects* of any of his *moral* Attributes, of his *Justice*, *Holiness* or *Veracity*, than he can make a *Globe* to be a *Cube*, or give one the Properties of the other; or make *two* and *one* to be equal to *four*, or not equal to *three*; or than he can alter his own *Essence*, or cease to be what he is.

*Cato*, in order to support the Absurdity of *Right* and *Wrong* being *constituted by the Will of God*, and to shew that his Dealings with Men do not (as he expresses it) *quadrature with the Notions which we form of Justice amongst one another*; alledges several Instances of God's providential Dispensations out of the History of the old Testament. As,

1. *God's punishing all Mankind for the Sin of their first Parents, which they could not help.* (p. 175, 176.)
2. *His punishing all Israel with a Pestilence for the private Sin of David, which without Doubt many of them condemn'd.* (p. 176.)
3. *His bringing Plagues upon the Ægyptians, because he had hardned Pharoah's Heart.*  
ibid.
4. *His destroying all Mankind at the Deluge for Crimes which he could have prevented.* ibid.

In answer to the preceding Observations, I desire,

*First*, To know to what Purpose these Instances are brought; if the Facts are true, can they be solved upon the Scheme of *Necessity* better than upon the Notion of *Free-agency*? just the contrary is evident to Sense and Reason; for,

I. In the Nature of Things there could be no absolute *Necessity* for God to make the *Immortality of Men* to depend upon the Obedience of the *first Man*; tho' he might have Reason to *choose* by his *Will* that it should be so. The first Supposition is plainly absurd, the latter, tho' not clearly known to us, yet is no way contradictory to *Reason*, as I shall shew presently.

II. Tho' there may be wise and good Reasons for God by his *Will* to cause temporal Calamities to fall upon a People for the Crimes of their Rulers; yet 'tis highly absurd to suppose it *necessary* to be so. And

III. Tho' God may justly inflict a *voluntary* Punishment upon Men for their *voluntary* Wickedness; yet it is no more *right* or \* *just* to destroy them for *necessary* Actions, or doing what they could not help, than it is to destroy them for being *fat* or *lean*, *sick* or *weak*, *blind* or *lame*, or for any *bodily* Infirmity, which it was not in their Power to prevent.

\* *Lucian* represents *Socrates* speaking thus to *Mimos*; οὐκοῦν ὁσῶς πῶς αἰὶνα ποιεῖς κολάζων ἡμᾶς ὑπερτάτας γενεαίους ἢ ἢ κλαθῆναι προσέταττε, καὶ τούτους ἴμισιν τοὺς διακονησαμένους ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγμεταῖς; εὐ γὰρ ὅθι ἐκεῖνο ἐπέειπεν ἔχει τις ἂν ὡς ἀντιλέγειν δυνατὸν ἢν ταῖς μετὰ πάσης ἀνάγκης περυσσεταγμένοις. “ Do not you see how “ *unjustly* you act in punishing us who are only the Servants of “ the Decrees of *Fate*; and in rewarding those who are only “ mere *Instruments* in doing that Good which ought to be ascribed to others? for no one can say it is possible to withstand those things which are wholly ordained by *Necessity*. *Dial. Mort.* p. 155. *Edit. Par.*

Again he argues in the Person of *Cyniscus* the Fatalist: “ He (*Mimos*) “ ought neither to punish or reward any one — “ because we Men do nothing by our own *free Mind*, but “ every thing by the Compulsion of an unavoidable *Necessity*. Οὐδένα οὔτε τιμᾶν οὔτε κολάζειν αὐτῷ προσήκει — ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐκόντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι πεισῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τινι ἀνάγκῃ ἀφῦκτω κεκελευσμένοι. *ibid.* p. 678.



*Secondly*, the preceding Examples of the divine Dispensations are not inconsistent with our Notions of *Justice*; for, according to the plainest Notions of *Justice*, God might (without doing *Wrong*) leave mortal Man in a State of *Mortality*, by withdrawing an extraordinary and supernatural Favour, which he made to depend on one Man's Behaviour, without telling us the Reason of his Conduct: In the mean time, where is the *Iniquity* (according to our Notions of Right and Wrong) of God's dispensing mere Favours on what Conditions he pleases; or where is the *Punishment* or the *Injury* done to Man in being subject to Death?

His second and third Instances only shew that in God's providential Government of the World, we cannot always see the *Reasons* of his Dispensations, tho' we may see that they are not *contrary* to *Reason*. To suppose God by an immediate Act of his Power to inflict Pain or Death upon any of his Creatures without any Reason, or in such Cases where it is evident there can be no Reason, is, no doubt, contrary to the Notions which he hath given us of *Right* and *Wrong* (and to which Notions he appeals in his Word for the Equity of his own Proceedings) and is derogatory to his *Goodness*. But when we consider that we derive our Nature and the Duration of its Existence merely from God's *Will*; and in Consequence see that God may (without any *Wrong*) give us any determinate Continu-

ance of Life; it is impossible to say there is or can be no *Reason* for God to make the Continuance or temporal Happiness of any Number of his Creatures to depend upon things which are not in their Power: And God may as well have *Reasons* for making the Lives and Happiness of Men in many Cases to depend upon the Actions of other Men, as upon *natural Causes*; upon the Disposition of the *Air*, upon *Storms* and *Inundations*, and many other *natural Causes*: We are sure that the one is the *Act of God*, as much as the other; and we can no more say he does *Wrong* in the one than in the other; because we cannot on the one Hand see the *Reasons* of his *Providence*, and the Grounds of the Dependance, which he has made one Part of the Creation to have upon the other Parts, and of the Connection of Things *present* with things *past*, and in *Futurity*: But we can on the other Hand very clearly see that the Author of our Beings may *determine* the Continuance of our Lives, and consequently make them depend upon what immediate Causes he pleases, and take them away by what other Instruments he thinks fit, as well as by the ordinary Course of Nature, without doing us any *Wrong*. Therefore, as God may (consistently with our Notions of *Right*) make any particular Men's *Lives* or *temporal Good* to depend upon *Earthquakes*, *Fire*, *Water*, &c. so I see no Reason why he may not make them depend upon the Actions and Behaviour of other Men,

who

who in his Providence are made Instruments of bringing great *Good* {or *Evil* to a *Nation* as such. And as God does no *Wrong* to Men, but is on the contrary *good* and *beneficent*, in being the Author of *Society*; so, from the Nature of Society, there is such a *Dependance* between the Actions of *Governors*, and the *Good* or *Evil* of their *Subjects*, that it cannot be, but as they receive much *Good* from their *Virtues*, so they must be subject to *Evil* from their *Vices*: And God's *causing* a People to suffer for the *Wickedness* of a Prince against himself, seems to be no more than his *permitting* them to suffer by the Armies of other Princes for the Crimes of their King committed against other States; and there seems to be no more in these divine Proceedings, than in making any of the *natural* Elements to be Causes either of great *Good* or *Evil* to Mankind, which yet for Reasons before-mentioned, cannot be shewn to be inconsistent with our Notions of *Right* and *Wrong*; or to be any Arguments that *Right* or *Wrong* is alone constituted by the *Will* of God.

One thing more I must observe with Respect to the third Instance; that *Cato*, in order to make God's punishing the *Aegyptians* seem the more inconsistent with our Notions of *Justice*, says, that God *brought the Plagues upon them* because *he had hardened Pharoab's Heart*: Which is a very ill-natur'd Expression, as thereby insinuating that God first by an Act of his irresistible Power

Power *hardned Pharoah's Heart*, and then made that *Hardning* the Cause of *bringing Plagues* upon him and his People: which, if it was indeed the Case, it could not, I think, be reconciled to our Notions of *Justice*. But the Matter is either very *ignorantly* or very *unfairly* propos'd by *Cato*. If he had attended to the *Stile of Scripture*, he could not but know that any extraordinary Event or Action of Men is frequently in Scripture ascrib'd to *God*; and *God* is said to do what he either permits to be done in extraordinary Cases, or what happens in Consequence of any extraordinary Act of his Providence: And it is in the Example before us said expressly several Times that *Pharoah hardned his own Heart*, in Opposition to the *divine Command* to let the *Jews* go; which *Command* would have been *unreasonable*, and impossible to have come from *God* upon the Supposition of his having by an immediate Act of his Power *hardned Pharoah's Heart*, and thereby hinder'd him from obeying it.

But the Cause (as plainly appears from the *Text*) of *Pharoah's hardning his own Heart*, was the Event's of *God's merciful Providence* to him, in removing the *Plagues* from him presently after they were inflicted. *But when Pharoah saw that there was Respite, he hardned his Heart, and bearkned not unto them, as the Lord had said.* Exod. viii. 15.

Again, upon the removing of the *Plague of Flies* it is said; *And Pharoah hardned his Heart*

at this Time also, neither would he let the People go. *ſ. 32.* Once more; And when Pharaoh ſaw that the Rain, and the Hail, and the Thunders were ceaſed, he ſinned yet more, and hardened his Heart, he and his Servants. Chap. ix. *ſ. 34.* Pharaoh, hoping every Plague was the laſt, as ſoon as it was removed, returned to his obſtinate Reſolution of refuſing to let the People go; and thus God is ſaid to *harden his Heart*, by doing that which in the Event was a Motive for Pharaoh to continue in the Hardneſs of his Heart, which he had brought upon himſelf by his *Sins*; until God by repeated Plagues overcame the Hardneſs and Oppoſition of his *Will*, and brought it to yield to his Commands. Therefore *Cato* had either not at all conſidered the *Stile of Scripture*, and the Expreſſions of the Text in this particular Relation; or if he had, he was very *unfair* to put the Inſtance as he does; and to take Advantage of a mere \* *Figure of Speech* and known way

---

\* *Origen* obſerves in this very Inſtance; *Tropum* vero vel *figuram* Sermonis ejus qui ſcriptus eſt *De Induratione*, etiam ex communi conſuetudine exponere puto, quod non videatur abſurdum: frequenter enim benigniores quique domini ad eos ſervos, qui per multam patientiam & manſuetudinem dominorum inſolentiores improbioreſque fiunt, dicere ſolent: Ego te talem feci; ego te perdiidi; mea patientia te peſſimum fecit; ego tibi cauſa hujus tam duræ & peſſimæ inſolentiæ exiſto, qui te non ſtatim per ſingulas culpas punio pro merito delictorum. Neceſſe eſt enim nos *tropum* vel *figuram* Sermonis advertere, & ita demum virtutem Dei intelligere, nec inferre calumnias verbo, cujus interiorem ſenſum diligentius exploremus.

way of Expression, especially in the Scriptures, and Eastern Forms, and to set it against not only the *Reason* of the thing, but the plain *literal* Sense and Expression of several other Places explaining the *figurative* one.

But the *fourth* Example which is alledged is most unreasonable of all; *viz.* *God's destroying* (as he says) *all Mankind at the Deluge for Crimes which he could have prevented.* Which is very absurd to affirm, either upon Supposition of *Necessity* or of *Will*, being the Ground of the *divine*, or of *humane* Actions. Supposing this Event of the Deluge to result from the *Necessity* of the divine Nature, God could no more *prevent* the Event, than the Operations of the *Necessity* which produced it; and if the *Crimes* of Men which caused it, were *necessary* Effects of *necessary* Causes, neither could he *prevent* them, for the same Reason. But it is natural for this Author to talk as if God's Actions were *voluntary*, at the same Time that he is arguing for the *Necessity* of them; and tho' he had laid aside his natural Notions of God and

*De princip. lib. 3. p. 716.* Græca Orig. apud Philocalia extant his verbis: Οὐκ ἄτοπον ἔστι καὶ ἀπὸ συνήθειας τὰ τοιαῦτα παραμυθισαῶν· πολλάκις τῶν χρηστῶν δεισποτῶν φασκόντων τοῖς ἀπὸ τὴν χρηστότητα καὶ τὴν μακροθυμίαν ἐκτριβομένοις δικέταις· τὸ, ἐγὼ σε ποιηρὸν ἐποίησα, καὶ ἐγὼ σοὶ ἄιτιον γέγονα τῶν τηλικέτων ἀμαρτημάτων· εἴ τι τῆ ἕως ἀκῆσαι, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ λεγομένου, καὶ μὴ συκοφαντῆν, μὴ κατακένοντας τοῦ βεβλήματος τοῦ λόγου. Philoc. c. 21.

Religion, yet he could not lay aside the Language wherebv they are expressed; and Truth issueth from his Thoughts and Pen at the same time that he is using both against it. It is nothing but Cant and Jargon to talk of Mens committing *Crimes*, and of God *preventing* any thing, if all Things are the Result of *Necessity*, and nothing proceeds from the *Will* or *Choice*, either of *God* or *Men*. But the Supposition of God's *preventing* Men's *Crimes* is equally absurd, if their *Crimes* were not *necessary* but *voluntary*: For if God, as a *moral* Governor of the World, has endued Men with *Will* and *Free-agency*, and made the Determination of their own Minds acting by this *Will* to be the Principle of their Actions; then it is evident, that as they are *moral Agents*, and their *Crimes* and *Vertues* depend only on the *Free-agency* of their own Minds, God cannot absolutely *prevent* the *Crimes* of Men: He cannot *prevent* them so long as they have *Will* and free Power to *choose* either *Good* or *Evil*; he might indeed have prevented the particular *Crimes* for which they are punished by altering their Natures, or placing them in other Circumstances; but a Power or Possibility of committing *Crimes* cannot be prevented, so long as Men have *Will* and Power of Action; and if he takes away their *Will* (which is the only Way whereby he can prevent them) he at the same time takes away the Foundation of their *Crimes*, and makes it impossible for them to do either *Good* or *Evil*: And his destroying

Men for their Crimes in this Case, is the same and no more than breaking a Stone to Pieces for falling upon or hurting any one, which is as much a Crime in the Stone, as any Action of Men can be.

In the remaining Part of this Paragraph, *Cato* descants very ingeniously upon the various and wonderful Works of Providence, from whence, if some great Prejudice had not lain in the Way, he could not but see and confess that they are the Effects, not only of an *intelligent*, but of a *rational, wise and free-agent*; which is abundantly demonstrated from the *various Forms, Orders, Number and Motions* of Things, in all which there appears the greatest *Arbitrariness* of the Author of them; and in none of which there appears to be any *Necessity* that they should be just what they are, and impossible to be in any Respect otherwise. But to proceed;

Our Author, in order to ridicule and expose the Notion of humane *Liberty* (which he calls a *new Scheme, which Men have form'd at the Expence of denying all that they see or can know.* p. 177.) says, that these Formers of the *new Scheme have made Man the Primum Mobile, and his Mind the first Principle or Spring of all his Actions, independent of the Author of his Being, and of all the second Causes, which evidently influence and concur to determine his Resolutions and his Actions.* (p. 177, 178.)

Here is much more of *Art* than of *Reason* or *Argument* in what *Cato* offers.



1. This *Scheme of Liberty*, which he calls *new*, is far *older* than *Cato*, and is so *old*, that it began (as far as appears) with humane Nature, and has been the constant Opinion of both the learned and unlearned part of Mankind in all ages (a few only excepted.) It hath been the concurrent Sentiment (as I shall fully shew hereafter) of the greatest as well as most reasonable and learned Part of Men, that the *Mind* is (what *Cato* here ridicules, under the Term of *Primum Mobile*) ἀυτοκίνητον, a *self-moving* Agent, Principle and Spring of Action. But

2. It is very unfair to say, that the Maintainers of *Liberty* make the *Mind independent of the Author of its Being*; as if they thought that God in his *moral* and providential Government did no way, by his *invisible Presence* to the Mind (as well as by his *revealed Word*) excite, move or influence it in its Operations, not by *forcible*, but by *rational* Motives: That his Spirit did not concur to form good Resolutions in the Soul, and to hinder bad ones; and was not a Means, a *persuasive* and *rational*, not *necessary*, Means of the Mind's exerting itself into virtuous Actions. Who ever deny'd the Influence, as well of the *Spirit of God*, as of *external* and *second Causes*? as being *Motives*, not indeed to *compel*, but to *incline* the Mind, and to be *Reasons* why it should proceed to act by its *Will*, but not be driven by *Force* or *Necessity*.

The Heathens by the Light of natural Religion, were sensible of this; and therefore \* *Homer* introduceth the Deities working upon the Minds of Men by their visible Influences; *exciting Inclinations*, and *diverting the Intentions* of them; which *Plutarch* explains thus, *viz.* “ † *Homer* does not by these Expressions “ make God to take away the *Liberty* of Acti- “ on, but only to influence it; nor to be the “ *efficient Cause* of the Exertions and Operati- “ ons of the Mind, but only of the *Objects* which “ excite them. ——— moving the *efficient* and “ *voluntary Power* of the Soul to act by the “ Impression of sensitive and intellectual Ideas “ upon it; or on the other Hand dissuading and “ diverting it from *Action*.

The Words of the great *Philosopher Hierocles* are very apposite to the present Purpose? *viz.* “ \*\* All Things conducing to the Acqui-

\* Τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·

Ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων τρέψῃ φρένας ———

† Ὅκ ἀναίρουντα ποιεῖ (Ὅμηρος) τὸν Θεόν, ἀλλὰ κινουῦντα τὴν προαίρεσιν· οὐδ' ἐρμῆας ἐργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγῆς. ——— τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς τισι καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ ἐπινοαίαις ἐγείροντες, ἢ τῶναντίον ἀποσρέφοντες καὶ ἰσάντες.

\*\* Πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν σιωπελοῦντα διὰ βραχείων ὑπέγραψεν ὁ λόγος, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοκίνητον, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ σιωπῆν. Ἐἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αἵρεσις τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν θέσθαι ἔχοντες, τῆς παρ' ἐκείνους σιωπῆς ——— πάντως πρὸς, χρῆζομεν. In *Pythag. Carm.* p. 233.

“ sition of that which is good, are briefly; the  
 “ *self-moving* Power of the Soul, and the *Assis-*  
 “ *tance* of God. For tho’ it is in our Power to  
 “ *choose* that which is good, yet since we derive  
 “ this Power from God, we altogether stand in  
 “ need of his Assistance.” But how does it ap-  
 pear (as *Cato* argues) to the *Senses* and *Under-*  
*standing*, either that *God* himself, or any *second*  
*Causes*, compel and force the Mind into Action?  
 On the contrary, I think, that *Cato* in denying  
 humane *Liberty of Action*, does, much more than  
 his Adversaries, *deny all that he sees or can know* :  
 as great a Philosopher as himself is of this Opini-  
 on, who says, “ \* They who deny *Free-will* are  
 “ ignorant of the *voluntary Agency* of the Soul,  
 “ and take away the very formal *Essence* of it;  
 “ for they take away that *self-moving* Faculty in  
 “ which the Nature of the Soul primarily con-  
 “ sists. For if it is a *self-moving* Being, its Appe-  
 “ tites and Desires are excited inwardly *from it*

---

\* Οἱ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἀναιροῦντες, καὶ τὸ αὐτεξέσιον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγνοοῦσι, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφ’ οὗτο φθείροντες· τὸ γὰρ αὐτοκίνητον αὐτῆς ἀναιροῦσι, καθ’ ὃ μάλιστα ἐστίαται. ἢ ἔτε γὰρ αὐτοκίνητός ἐστιν, ἔνδοθεν ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐγείρεται πρὸς τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ὀρμὰς, καὶ ἐκ’ ἑαυτῆς ποθεῖ ἐλκομένη ἢ ἀθεκμένη, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα. ἢ ἔτε ἕξωθεν κινεῖται, οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτοκίνητος. ἢ ἔπειτα τὴν ζωτικὴν ἐκτένεια τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀπάρνησιν οὐ προσλογίζονται οἱ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἀναιροῦντες. Τίς οὐκ ἔχει σωμαίωσιν τοῦ θέλειν, καὶ μὴ θέλειν, καὶ τοῦ αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, καὶ τοῦ σωμαίωσθαι καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι; ὥσπερ πάντα ἔνδοθεν εἰσι καὶ κινήσεις ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἕξωθεν ὀλισμοὶ ἢ ὀλκαὶ τινες, ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶσι ἀψύχων. *Simp. Com. in Epict. p. 26.*

*self,*

“ *self*, and it is not under any *external Compulsion*,  
 “ like Bodies: But if it is moved by external  
 “ Force, then it has no *Self-motion*. Further;  
 “ they who deny *Free-will*, do not at all confi-  
 “ der the vital Efficacy of the Mind, and its  
 “ Power of *Assent* and *Dissent*. For who is  
 “ not conscious to himself of his having a Pow-  
 “ er to *will* or *not to will*, to *choose* and to *re-*  
 “ *fuse*, to *consent* and to *deny*? all which are *in-*  
 “ *ternal Self-motions* of the Soul, and not *exter-*  
 “ *nal* Force and Impulse, such as moves inani-  
 “ mate Beings.” And nothing is more agreeable  
 both to *Sense* and *Reason*, than what *Cato* sup-  
 poseth to be contrary to both, namely, *That Al-*  
*mighty God hath given to Man a Rule to act*  
*by, and annexed Rewards and Menaces to the Ob-*  
*servance or Non-observance of this Rule; has given*  
*a free, uncontroul'd and impartial Liberty to him*  
*to determine, without being coerc'd or restrain'd by*  
*any other Power to do or not to do an Action, or to*  
*choose Good or Evil to himself.* (p. 178.)

All this is a very fair and just Representation  
 of the Notion of *humane Liberty*; and is well  
 and elegantly expressed; and is so agreeable to  
 the natural Notion of *God*, as being a *wise, just*  
 and *moral* Governor of the World, and of *Men*,  
 as being *rational Agents*, and capable of *Vertue*  
 and *Religion*; that I cannot but wonder any seri-  
 ous Man of Sense, that ever at all considered ei-  
 ther *God's* Nature and Perfections, or his own,  
 should doubt of the Truth and Certainty of this  
 Notion.

In the next Particular, *Cato* is mistaken in laying it to the Defenders of *Free-will*, that they say that *God's Justice* obliges him to this Conduct. (p. 178.) We do not ascribe the Existence of our Natures, and the Faculties of it to any Obligations in God, in which his *Justice* bound him; but to his *Will* and *Choice* directed by his *Wisdom* and *Goodness*. We deny not but God might have exerted his *Power* and *Knowledge* (consistently with *Justice*) in making the whole Creation either altogether *unintelligent* or *intelligent* without giving any part of it a *Will* and *Power of Action*. But then we say, that as to have made all things *unintelligent*, would not have been so great an Exertion of *Power* and *Knowledge*, as to make some Things *intelligent*; so also that the giving *Intelligence* without *Will* and *Free-agency* is not so great an Exertion of them, as the giving with *Intelligence*, *Reason*, and the *Faculty of Will*, and *Power of Action*: This is a greater Perfection than any other; and God could not be a *moral* Governor (*i. e.* indeed a Governor properly at all) if he had not endued his Creatures with *Will* and a *Power of Action*: And there is as much Difference of *Power*, *Knowledge* and *Authority*, and consequently of *Glory* and *Honour* following it, in God's governing the *rational* Part of the Creation endued with *Liberty*, and the other Part which is *unintelligent* or *irrational*; as in a *King's* governing a Nation of *learned* and *civiliz'd* Men, and an *Herd* of *Cattle*, or direct-

ing the Position and Order of a *Set of Chess-men*.

The next Argument which *Cato* alledges against the Notion of *humane Liberty* is, *that it takes away* (he says) *and robs God of most of his Attributes*. He argues (p. 178.)

I. That God's *Prescience or Knowledge* (from all *Eternity*) of every Event which does or can happen in the Universe is deny'd at once: His Reason is, for whatever is contingent in its own Nature, and may or may not happen, cannot be foreseen. No, the true Conclusion is, that *contingent Things* cannot be *necessary*, cannot come *necessarily* to pass; but since *contingent Things* as *certainly* come to pass as if they were *necessary*, they may with *Certainty* be *foreseen* by him who sees the Causes preceding, and by means of which the Agent *voluntarily* effects them; where is the Difficulty or Unreasonableness of this? he adds, *when any Being sees that a Thing will be, it must be*. But this is mere Fallacy built on the Confusion of the different Terms *Will* and *Must*, as if they were Consequences, the latter of the former, or there were no Difference betwixt *Certainty* of Event, and *Necessity* of Event: It is true indeed that what *must* be *will* be, but not *vice versa*; it only follows from what *will* be that there is a *Certainty*, but not that there is a \* *Necessity* of Event. This therefore

---

\* *Celsus* argued as our Author here does; Θεός ὃν προέπει, καὶ πάντως ἔχουσι γένησθαι τὰ προσηρημένον. " That whatever was foretold

therefore is nothing but an old Quibble, which so far imposed upon *Epicurus*, tho' a Man of fine Parts, as to make him deny that Axiom\*, of every Proposition being either true or false; for (as *Cicero* represents the Case) “ † He was afraid, if he granted this, that he must in Consequence grant that every Event proceeded from Fate (or Necessity.)” For (arguing like *Cato*) he thought, “ That if either Part of a Proposition was true from Eternity, that then it was certain: And if certain, then necessary also; and so he thought this Argument made for Fate or Necessity.” The same Quibble the *Stoic Dio-*

foretold by God, must without all peradventure come to pass.” To which *Origen* replies; Ἐὰν γὰρ τὸ, πάντως, ἀκρίτως ἀντὶ τοῦ, καταναγκασμένως, οὐ δάσομεν αὐτῶν· ὁμοίαν γὰρ ἢ καὶ μὴ γένηται· εἰ δὲ τὸ, πάντως, λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἔσαι, ὅπερ οὐ κωλύεται εἶναι ἀληθές, κ' ἂν ὁμοίαν ἢ τὸ μὴ γένηται· οὐδὲν λυπεῖ τὸν λόγον.

“ If by the Word, without all peradventure, *Celsus* means necessarily, I do not allow it; for it is possible that it may not come to pass: but if he means by the Word, the same as that it will come to pass; nothing hinders it from being true, tho' there is a Possibility of its not coming to pass; and so his Argument is nothing to the Purpose. *Cont. Cels. lib. 2. p. 74.*

\* One of the *Argumenta palmaria*, top Arguments of the ancient Fatalists was, as *Plutarch* tells us, Τὸ πολυβύλλητον τοῦτο, ἔστι πᾶν ἀξίωμα ἢ ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ ψευδές.

† *Epicurus* veretur ne si hoc concesserit (scilicet omnem enunciationem, aut veram esse aut falsam) concedendum sit Fato fieri quæcunque fiant: si enim alterutrum ex æternitate verum sit, esse id etiam certum, & si certum, etiam necessarium: ita & Necessitatem & Fatum confirmari putat. *Lib. de Fato.*

*dorus* made use of; arguing “ \* That that only  
 “ could come to pass, which either actually *was*,  
 “ or *would* come to pass: And whatsoever *will*  
 “ *be*, that he says must *necessarily* be: and what-  
 “ soever *will not be*, he denies that *that can be*.”  
 To which *Chrysippus* the *Stoic* replies; “ That  
 “ what *will not be*, may *be*; as that this Gem  
 “ may *be* broken, altho’ it never *will* be broken:  
 “ And that it was not *necessary* for *Cypselas* to  
 “ reign at *Corinth*, altho’ it was foretold a  
 “ thousand Years before by the Oracle of *Apol-*  
 “ *lo*.” And *Cicero* himself argues on this  
 Head, “ † That had *Epicurus* granted that every  
 “ Proposition was either *true* or *false*; he need-  
 “ ed not have been afraid that it thence would  
 “ follow, that all Things come to pass by *Fate*

\* Ille (sc. Diodorus) id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut futurum sit verum: & quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri *neesse* esse: & quicquid not sit futurum, id negat fieri *posse*. Tu (scilicet Chrysippus) & quæ non sint futura, posse fieri dicis: ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiam si id nunquam futurum sit: neque *neesse* fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quanquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset. *Lib. de Fato*.

† Licet Epicuro concedenti omne enunciatum aut verum aut falsum esse, non vereri, ne omnia *Fato* fieri sit *neesse*: non enim æternis causis naturæ necessitate manantibus verum est id quod ita enunciatur. Descendit in Academiam Carneades: nec tamen sine causis: sed interest inter causas fortuito antegressas, & inter causas cohibentes (forte, continentes) in se efficientiam naturalem. Ita & semper verum fuit, morietur Epicurus, cum duo & septuaginta annos vixerit, Archonte Pitarato: neque tamen erant causæ fatæ, cur ita accideret: sed quod ita cecidisset, certe casurum, sicut cecidit, fuit. *Ibid.*



“ (or Necessity:) For that which is *true* does  
 “ not come to pass by a *necessary* Chain of *eternal*  
 “ Causes. For Example, *Carneades* went down  
 “ into the Academy; and not without a Cause:  
 “ But then there is a Difference betwixt an ante-  
 “ cedent *contingent* Cause, and a *natural* efficient  
 “ Cause. So also this Proposition was *always*  
 “ true, *viz.* *Epicurus* will die when he is seventy  
 “ two Years of Age, in the Magistracy of *Pita-*  
 “ *ratus*; but notwithstanding there was no *Fa-*  
 “ *tality* (or Necessity) that this should so happen:  
 “ but because it did so happen, it was *certain* to  
 “ happen as it did.

And *Origen* observes to this Purpose; “ \* But  
 “ if any one will understand that which is said  
 “ *will* be, that it *will* be, *so*, as that it *may not*  
 “ *be*; this (says he) I readily acknowledge to be  
 “ true. For God cannot lie; but of those things  
 “ which *may be* or *may not be*, he can know  
 “ which *will* be, and which *will not* be.

*Cato* proceeds (p. 178.) *it is impossible to know*  
*that any Event will come to pass, that may not*  
*come to pass.* But if it will *certainly* come to pass  
 (tho' there be a *Possibility* of its *not* coming to

\* 'Εἰ δὲ τις διηγήσεται, τὸ πάντως ἔσαι, λέγων ὅτι ἔσαι μὲν τὰδε  
 τῆς, ἐπιδέχεται ἢ καὶ ἐπίτερος γένεα, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθὲς συγχωροῦμεν·  
 πὴν μὲν γὰρ Θεὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται ψεύσαα, ἐπιδέχεται ἢ περὶ τῶν ἐπιδεχο-  
 μένων γένεα καὶ μὴ γένεα, φρονῆσαι τὸ γένεα αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ γένεα.  
 Orig. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 288. & Com. in  
 Gen. p. 9.

pass) why may not this *Certainty* be foreseen? Here is yet no Appearance of an Argument. *Cato* concludes; (ibid.) 'tis equally impossible to foresee an Effect, without knowing the Causes which produce it.

This indeed is, and the only Thing that is true and to the Purpose: And the Answer is easy, as in every Effect, whether *contingent* or *necessary*, there are Causes which produce it; so God the Author of Nature, as well sees those Causes which are Causes only of the *Certainty* of Events, or of *contingent* Events, as those Causes which necessarily produce Effects, or which are Causes of *necessary* Events.

*Origen* argues; “ \* That God when he laid  
 “ the Foundation of the World, (nothing being  
 “ produc'd without a Cause) did contemplate in  
 “ his Mind every future Event; and saw that if  
 “ this was done that would follow; and from  
 “ that another, and so on to the End of the  
 “ World, whereby he knows whatever will be,  
 “ without being at all the Cause of any Event,  
 “ which he knew would come to pass.

\* Ἐπιβάλλων ὁ Θεὸς τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς κοσμοποιίας, οὐδενὸς ἀναιτίου γινωμένου, ἐπιπορεύεται τῷ νῦν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων, ὁρῶν ὅτι ἐπεὶ τότε γέγονε, τότε ἔπεται· ἂν ᾗ γένηται τότε τὸ ἐπόμενον, τότε ἀκολουθεῖ· ἢ ὑποσάντῳ, τότε ἔσαι· καὶ ἔτσι μέχρι τέλους τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιπορευθεὶς, οἶδεν ἂν ἔσαι, οὐ πάντως ἕκαστον τῶν γινωσκομένων αἰτιῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμβῆναι τυγχάνων. Apud. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6<sup>o</sup> p. 287. & Com. in Gen. p. 8.

This is the reasoning of the most learned Men of former Ages; and the whole Confusion of *Cato's* Thoughts in this his grand (tho' trite) Argument against *Liberty* is owing to his not distinguishing betwixt Things *certain* and Things *necessary*, and not considering the distinct Nature of God's Knowledge of these different Objects; tho' there is not a clearer Distinction betwixt any two Ideas whatsoever.

Will any one in his Senses say that because it was certain yesterday, that I should write these Words to Day; it was therefore *necessary*? and that this Truth is of the same Nature with *necessary* Truths; with the Truth of three Angles, of a Triangle being equal to two right Angles, and all other either *self-evident* or *demonstrative* Truths? Or is the same with the Truth of the *Ascent* of light, or the *Descent* of heavy Bodies, or any other *necessary* Effects of *natural* Causes?

If then the Distinction of *certain* and *necessary* Truths is plain and undeniable, it unavoidably follows that God can foresee Things whose Events are *certain* only and not *necessary*: That he can as well foresee Things that *certainly will* be (tho' they are *contingent* and *may not* be) by foreseeing the Causes which will *certainly* produce them; as he can foresee Things that *necessarily must be*, by foreseeing the Causes that *must* produce them. God's Foresight neither makes *necessary* Events *necessary*; nor *certain* Events *certain*: And as some Things are *necessary*, not because

cause God *foresees* them, but because they are necessary in their *Nature*, *prior* in order of Ideas to this Forefight; so<sup>r</sup> other Things are *certain*; not *necessary*; not because God foresees the *Certainty* of them, but because antecedently to this Foreknowledge, they are *certain* in their Causes; and which would be exactly the same, the one *certain*, the other *necessary*, whether God foreknew them or not, or supposing he did not foreknow them.

'Tis *Origen's* Argument, “ \* As (saith he) if  
 “ any one seeing another, who thro' Ignorance  
 “ is rash, and precipitately and irrationally walks  
 “ in a *slippery* Path, foresees, that he will slip  
 “ and fall, is not the *Cause* of his Fall; so we  
 “ are to understand that God foresees what every  
 “ one *will* be, and perfectly knows the  
 “ Causes of what he *will* be, of both his *Vices*  
 “ and his *Vertues*: But nevertheless (he adds)  
 “ his Foreknowledge is not the *Cause* of  
 “ them.

---

\* Ὡσπερ ἢ εἰ τις ὄρων τινα ἀπὸ τὴν ἀμαθίαν προπετῆ, ἀπὸ τὴν προπέτειαν ἀλογίως ἐπιβαίνοντα ὁδοῦ ὀλισθηρᾶς, καὶ καταλάβοι πεσῖσθαι ὀλισθήσαντα, οὐκ αἰτίου τοῦ ὀλισθεῖν ἐκείνου γίνεται. ἔτα νοητέον, τὸν Θεὸν προεωραχότα ὁποῖου ἔσαι ἕκαστου, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν ἴσεοδαι καθαρῶν, καὶ ὅτι ἀμαρτήσεται τάδε, ἢ κατορθώσει τάδε καὶ εἰ χρῆ λέγειν, οὐ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων. Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 287. & Com. in Gen. p. 8.

The great Philosopher, as well as Orator, *Cicero*, thus reasons on this Head of Argument, “ \* It  
 “ does not at all (says he) follow from every Pro-  
 “ position’s being either *true* or *false*, that there  
 “ are *eternal* and *immutable Causes*, which ren-  
 “ der it impossible for any thing to happen other-  
 “ wise than it *will* happen: There are *contingent*  
 “ efficient Causes of *certain Truths*, as *that Cato*  
 “ *will come into the Senate House*, which are not  
 “ interwoven with the Nature of Things (or  
 “ mundane material Causes) and yet the *Truth*  
 “ of that which *will* come to pass, is as immu-  
 “ table as that which is already come to pass:  
 “ Nor does *Fate* or *Necessity* at all follow.

Again; as my *Knowledge* of any Event which happened to day, no way influenceth the *Existence*, or *Certainty*, or *Necessity* of it; but it is what it is, independent of my Knowledge: So in like Manner God’s *Foreknowledge*, which is to him, to whose Thoughts all Things are present, the same as *Knowledge*, no way influenceth the Existence of any Event, which whether *present* or *future*, *is* or *will* be the same, whether he

---

\* *Tully’s* Words are; Nec si omne enunciatum aut verum aut falsum est, sequitur illico esse causas immutabiles, easque æternas, quæ prohibeant quicquam secus cedere atque casurum sit. Fortuitæ sunt causæ quæ efficiant, ut vere dicantur, quæ ita dicuntur, *veniet Cato in Senatum*, non inclusæ in rerum natura atque mundo; & tamen tam est immutabile venturum, cum est verum, quam venisse: nec ob eam causam *Fatum* aut *Necessitas* extimescenda est. *Lib. de Fat. p. 354.*

foreknows it or not. Supposing God did not *foreknow* any Event, it was equally *true* and *certain* from all Eternity, that the Event which *now* is come to pass would come to pass: Whence it is evident, that the *Truth* and *Certainty* of it does not depend on any *Foreknowledge*, supposing it to have been *foreknown*. Therefore, as it is evident to *Sense* and *Reason*, that some *Truths*, as all *self-evident* Propositions, and mathematical *Demonstrations*, are in their Natures (*a priori*) *necessary* and *independent* of God's *Power* or *Will*; and his Knowledge does not make them to be more or less *necessary*: And other Effects are also *necessary* ( but *a posteriori* only) so long as the immediate Cause of them continues; such as the *Rising of the Sun*, the *Return of the Seasons*, and a thousand such like Events, which are *necessary* in their immediate Causes so long as they are permitted to *operate*, which depends wholly on the *Power* and *Will* of God: and his *Foreknowledge* of these Events does not make them *necessary*, nor are they *necessary* because he *foreknows* them, but they are *necessary* from the Nature of the Cause which immediately produces them, which Cause God being the Author of, must *foresee* the Effects of it: so also it is equally evident that there are other *Truths* or Events proceeding from rational Agents, or humane Actions, which are not *necessary* in either of the former Senses, but are *contingent only*, i. e. such as might possibly not have been, or might have been otherwise, even whilst  
the

the immediate Cause which produced them did exist; such are all the Effects of *Will* and *Choice*; and these also having Causes, which as *certainly* produce them, as the others are *necessarily* produc'd from their Causes, and God being the Author of these Causes of *voluntary* Effects also, must know their Effects as well as the other which are *necessary*; and this *Foreknowledge* can no more make *contingent* Events which *certainly* will be, to become *necessary*, than *necessary* Events to become *contingent*: In Truth, God's *Knowledge* or *Foreknowledge* is founded upon their *Certainty* of Existence (whether necessary or not alters not the Case) and not their Existence upon his *Knowledge*.

The Nature of no Truth is alter'd by being *known* or *foreknown*; for it is only known to be *what it is*. If I see an Object (supposing that I really see it) in a certain Place, it is certain that the Object is there; but then 'tis evident, that my seeing it is not the *Cause* of its being there, (for it would be where it is, whether I saw it or not) but the Object's being there causeth my Sensation, I see it there; *because it is there*: So God *foresees*, or rather *sees* the Actions of *Free-agents*, because they *will* be, are *certain* in Futurity, not that they *will* be, *because* he *foresees* them. It is the previous Truth or Certainty of the *future Choice* of the *Free-agent*, that is the Object of the divine *Prescience*, and the Ground of *Foreknowledge*, which yet may be infallibly true,

supposing Man to be a *Free-agent*; cannot he *certainly know* beforehand what he *will* or will *not* do, so far as any Thing depends upon his *Choice*? and if so, then a Man's *own Foreknowledge* is consistent with his *Freedom*. If we can but further suppose that God who gave Man all his intellectual Faculties, knows as much of him as he does of himself, then will God's *Foreknowledge* be consistent with Man's *Freedom*.

In like manner the great *Origen* argues, “ \* To  
 “ speak the Truth (saith he) the *Foreknowledge*  
 “ of God is not the *Cause* of Events; (for God  
 “ lays no Necessity of sinning upon him who  
 “ he foreknows will commit Sin) but the Truth  
 “ (tho' not commonly understood) is, that  
 “ that which *will* come to pass, is the *Cause* of  
 “ his *Foreknowledge*; for the Event does not  
 “ come to pass because it is *foreknown*, but it is  
 “ *foreknown*, because it *will* come to pass.

Wherefore we may conclude, with *Austin*,  
 “ † That we are no way compelled, either by  
 “ holding

\* Ἐν χρῆν λέγειν, ὅτι τὴν πρόγνωσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι γινόμενων ( οὐ γὰρ εἰσφάπτεται τοῦ προεγνωσμένου αἰμαρτησομένου ὁ Θεός, ὅταν αἰμαστάνη ) ἀλλὰ παραδοξότερον μὲν, ἀληθές ἔροῦμεν, τὸ ἐσόμενον αἰτίαν τοῦ τοιάνδε εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσται, γίνεται ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γίνεσθαι ἔμελλεν, ἔγνωσται. Apud. Euseb Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 287, 288. & Com in. Gen. p. 8. See also cont. Cels. lib. 2. p. 73, 74.

† Quocirca nullo modo cogimur; aut retenta Præscientia Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium; aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum quod nefas est, negare præscium futurorum: sed utrumque



“ holding the *Foreknowledge* of God, to reject  
 “ the *Freedom* of the Will; or, by retaining the  
 “ *Freedom* of the Will, to deny (which it would  
 “ be impious to do) the *Foreknowledge* of God:  
 “ But we maintain both, we profess both faith-  
 “ fully and truly; the one, that we may *believe*  
 “ aright; the other, that we may live well.

That which seems to have led *Cato* and others,  
 both Antients and Moderns, to think that nothing  
 is the *Object of Knowledge*, but *necessary* Truths  
 or Events, is, the taking all Knowledge to be  
*scientific*; or understanding it in the Sense of  
*Science, Demonstration* or *Intuition*, and so imagin-  
 ing that every Object of Knowledge is a *self-evi-*  
*dent, intuitive, demonstrative* or *natural* Truth,  
 all which are indeed *necessary*. But this Notion  
 of *Knowledge* (tho' indeed Men have no other  
 which is properly *Knowledge* in them) is a great  
 Mistake when apply'd to the *Knowledge* of God;  
 and the Knowledge which God hath of future  
*contingent* Events, or of humane Actions, is of  
 another Nature. God doth not know what *Free-*  
*agents* will do, in the same manner as he knows  
 what will be the Effects of *natural* Causes, or  
 as he knows the *essential, eternal* and *immutable*  
 Agreements and Disagreements of Things, and  
 their Proportions and Relations to each other:

---

que amplectimur, utrumque fideliter & veraciter confitemur.  
 Illud, ut bene credamus; hoc, ut bene vivamus. *De Civit.*  
*Dei lib. 5. c. 10.*

This

This is that *Knowledge* which is called *Science*, and belongs only to the Perception of *necessary* Truths or Events. But God knows the Effects of *free* Causes, or *voluntary* Agents, by the Perfection of his *Judgment*, by that *Knowledge* which is called *Wisdom*, and is of a \* different Nature from *Science*, and the Objects of which are in their Natures not *necessary*, but *contingent*, and such as tho' they *certainly* will be, yet have a *physical* Possibility of *not* being: And here I must observe that it is another Mistake to think that *contingent* Things, depending on the *Will* and *Choice* of *Free-agents*, are *uncertain*; if so indeed, it would imply a Contradiction to suppose them to be *certainly* foreknown, *i. e.* to be *certain*; but they are as certain in their Events, as those Things which are *necessary*: my *present* Writing was as *certain* a Truth *yesterday* as it is *to day*, *i. e.* it was *true* and *certain* yesterday that I should write to day: Tho' yet it is evident that it was not *necessarily true* or *certain*, because I might not have lived to day to write, or might not have wrote tho' I did live; and God's *Knowledge* yesterday of my writing to day was as *certain* and *infallible* (tho' not *scientific*) as his *Knowledge* of any other

---

\* *Chalcidius* says; Quod Deus sciat quidem omnia, sed unumquodque pro Natura sua ipsorum sciat: necessitati quidem subjugatum, ut necessitati obnoxium: anceps vero, ut quod ea sit natura præditum, cui consilium viam pandat. Neque enim ita scit ambigui Naturam Deus, ut quod certum & necessitate constrictum. *In Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. 254.*

Truth or Event the most *necessary*: And 'tis, I think, easy to conceive, that this sort of *Knowledge* or *Wisdom* (tho' in Men who cannot discern the Hearts or Wills of others it is very imperfect, uncertain and subject to Error, and so is not properly *Knowledge* in them) may be so *perfect* in God (*who searcheth the Hearts and Reins*, and knows all the Workings of the Mind, and the Motives exciting them, as well as he knows all the Operations of Nature working *natural* and *necessary* Effects) that he may with as much *Certainty* and *Infallibility* foresee the *certain* (tho' contingent) Effects of the one, as the *certain* and withal *necessary* Effects of the other. The *Possibility* of the Foreknowledge of *contingent* Events, and the Reconciliation and Consistency of such a Foreknowledge with *Freedom* or *Choice* of Action, would not have appear'd so perplexed and difficult, to be apprehended, had it been well considered, that every Event depending upon the *Will* of the Agent, has as much *Certainty* in its Nature, as any Effect proceeding from *natural* or *necessary* Causes, and that what is call'd *Chance* or *Fortune* is a mere empty Name without any Meaning: And the Objection made from the Freedom of humane Actions of the *Possibility* of God's being *deceived*, is just such a silly Quibble as the other of the *Possibility* of his doing *Evil*, because he is *freely* and *voluntarily* good: The Perfection of God's *Knowledge* in the one Case, as the perfect Rectitude of his *Will* in the other Case, makes

God as free from *Error* and *Sin*, as if it was *physically* impossible for him to commit either.

In short, any Man may have as clear and certain a Perception that his *Actions* are *voluntary*, as that any other Thing is *necessary*. I as clearly know that my *present* Writing is *voluntary* and *free*, and depends upon my *Choice* and *Will*; as that the *Beating* of my *Pulse* and *Heart* is *necessary*, and depends not upon my *Will*, but upon *natural Causes*: And there is as much Reason to believe that *all* Things are *voluntary*, as that *nothing* is so, or that *all* Things are *necessary*; and I desire any one to shew me that the one is more clear or certain than the other. If he says, that *Motives* which determine or cause the Mind to exert what I call *voluntary* Actions, are *necessary*, and therefore the Effects or Actions following the Motives are also *necessary*; this is just as true a Consequence, as that because *voluntary* Actions concur to the Production of *necessary* Effects, therefore these Effects are *voluntary*. As for Example, the *Motive* of my present Writing is a Persuasion of the *Falshood* of *Cato's* Scheme, and this *Persuasion*, I grant and see is *necessary*, I cannot help this Judgment; but still my Writing, I also see, is no more *necessary*, than the Encrease of the *Motion* of my *Blood*, or of the *Beating* of my *Pulse* is *voluntary*, tho' the Cause concurring to it was my *voluntary* drinking a certain Quantity of Spirits. Nay I can with as much Reason argue, that all *natural* Effects are *voluntary* in their

*imme-*

*immediate Causes*, or proceed from their *Choice* or *Will*, because God their *first Cause* is a *voluntary* and *Free-agent*; as *Cato* can argue from the second Causes or Motives of humane Actions being *necessary*, that the *immediate Cause*, the Mind, is a *necessary*, not a *voluntary Agent*: But there is no end of arguing, or rather trifling, with such sort of Fallacies. And if any reasonable Man could make a Dispute about the *Foreknowledge* of God, it must be not to argue from the *Supposition* of it, that all Things are *necessary*, which is contrary to all the Sense and Reason in the World; but the Question must be, since Man is a *Free-agent*, and his Actions plainly *voluntary*, whether they can be foreseen or not, or are the Objects of *Foreknowledge*. For if it can be prov'd that *contingent* Events are not Objects of Knowledge, then, as *Cato* observes, 'tis no Irreverence to the *supreme Being*, to say that he cannot do *Impossibilities*, and know Things which cannot be known, (p. 178.) But his adding, that 'tis certain he must know all Things which can be known, because they all depend upon his *Will*, (p. 179.) is very preposterous (as well as untrue) in him to affirm, who makes all Things *necessary*. If he means by *Will* *Approbation* only, viz. that God consents and approves of Things which are effected by the *Necessity* of his Nature without any *Choice*, just as he *wills* or *approves* of his own Existence; this is an egregious Fallacy and Abuse of Words; for in this Sense things no more depend upon

the *Will* of God than his own Existence does. But, if he means by *Will* the *free* or *voluntary* Agency of God, he then destroys his own Scheme of *Necessity*; and in this Sense, tho' all Effects of God's Power truly depend upon his *Will*, or his Mind *freely* exerting that Power; yet it is not true that the Existence of all Truths depends upon his *Will*; because all *self-evident* and *demonstrative* Truths are *necessary* and *immutable* in their Natures, and independent of the *Will* of God. Lastly, if he means (as he inadvertently expresseth himself) that all Things depend upon God's *Will* exerted *necessarily*, and this, because God's *Will* is *necessarily-existing*; this is so very gross, absurd and contradictory, as, I trust, *Cato*, upon Reflection, must and would have been ashamed of having ever offered it.

The preceding Argument, concerning the Inconsistency of the *Foreknowledge* of God with the *Freedom* of humane Actions, having been much urg'd by the antient *Fatalists* against humane *Liberty*, it may not be amiss to shew, briefly, what those, who maintain'd that Men's Actions were *voluntary* and *free*, reply'd to it.

That Men are *Free-agents*, and their *Actions* in their *own Power*, was always thought to be so indisputably plain and certain, that many of the *Ancients*, who could not clearly see how this *Freedom* was to be reconcil'd with the *Foreknowledge* of God, deny'd the divine *Prescience*, lest it should imply the *Necessity* of humane Actions;

others made a Doubt about it, but others thought that *Will* in Men, and *Prescience* in God, were consistent.

\* *Austin* tells us, that the *Stoics*, though they held *Fate* in all things, yet rejected *Prescience* with respect to Men's Actions, lest it should thence follow, that all things came to pass by *Necessity*. And *Cicero* relates, that † *Carneades* the *Academic* deny'd there could be any *Foreknowledge* of things future, without inferring the *Necessity* of them, which he strenuously oppos'd.

Again \*\* *Austin* affirms, that *Cicero*, “ in his “ Books concerning *Divination*, does in his own “ Person openly oppose the *Foreknowledge* of “ God; and that he seems to do this wholly to “ shew his Dissent to the Notion of *Fate*, and “ that he may not destroy the *Freedom* of the “ Will.

\* Stoici (oppugnabant præscientiam) ut non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent, quamvis omnia Fato fieri contenderent. *De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. c. 9.* Whence we may observe, that the *Stoics* held the *Freedom* of humane Actions, as will be demonstrated at large hereafter.

† Itaque dicebat Carneades, ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset — ita ne præterita quidem ea, quorum nulla signa tanquam vestigia extarent, Appollini nota esse censebat: quo minus futura. *De Fat. lib. p. 356, 357.*

\*\* In libris *De Divinatione* ex seipso apertissime oppugnat præscientiam futurorum. Hoc autem totum facere videtur, ne fatum esse consentiat, & perdat liberam voluntatem. *De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. c. 9.*

That *Cicero* denies and *ridicules* also the superstitious *Divination* of *Astrologers* and *Southsayers*, is indeed evident from these Books; but whether he wholly deny'd God's Foreknowledge of future Events depending upon the *Will* of Men, is not, I think, very clear from his Writings. He seems indeed to think, that if God does foresee all future Events, yet that he does not impart this Foreknowledge unto Men: and in one place does expressly say; “ \* that in his Opinion God cannot know “ *fortuitous* future Events.” But whether he esteem'd the future *Actions* of Men to be of this Nature, does not certainly appear; only 'tis not improbable, that being addicted most to the *Academic* Sect, he might fall in with the Opinion of *Carneades* before mentioned.

The learned *Platonic*, *Alexander Aphrodisius*, treats the Argument of *Prescience* at large in the following Manner.

“ † If any one shall say that it is agreeable to  
 “ Reason that the Gods *foreknow* Things future,  
 “ because it is absurd to affirm that they are ig-  
 “ norant of any thing that is to come, and upon  
 “ this Presumption shall endeavour to prove that  
 “ all

\* Mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videtur, ut sciat quid casu & fortuito futurum sit. *De Divinat. lib. 2 p. 272.*

† Τὸ ἢ λέγειν ἔυλογον εἶναι τοὺς Θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα πραιδέναι, ἄστοπον ἢ τὸ λέγειν ἐκείνους ἀγροῖν τι τῶν ἐσομένων, καὶ τοῦτο λαίω-  
 βήνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειράδι, εἰ αὐτοῦ, τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε  
 γίνεσθαι



“ all things are effected by *Necessity* and *Fate*, this  
 “ is neither reasonable nor true. For indeed,  
 “ when the Nature of things will admit of it,  
 “ nothing is more reasonable than that the Gods  
 “ should foreknow future Events; but when  
 “ the Nature of them is such as makes it impos-  
 “ sible for them to be foretold and foreknown,  
 “ then it is not reasonable to suppose that even  
 “ the Gods know things that are impossible to be  
 “ known. For what things are impossible in  
 “ their own Nature, retain their Nature, and  
 “ are impossible, even with respect to the Gods.  
 “ For it is impossible even for the Gods to make  
 “ the *Diagonal* equal to the *Side*, or twice two  
 “ to be five, or any thing that is not, to be :  
 “ ——— so in like manner it is impossible  
 “ to foresee that which in its own Nature is  
 “ possible *to be* or *not to be*, as that which  
 “ *absolutely* will be, or will not be. For if the  
 “ Foreknowledge of Things, which do not ex-  
 “ ist,

γίνεσθαι, καὶ καθ' ἐμπαρμένεον, ἔτε ἀληθές ἔτε ἔυλογον. τῆς μὲν γὰρ φύ-  
 σεως τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων τοῦτο χαράσσης, ἔδεν ἔυλογώτερον εἰδέναι  
 μᾶλλον τῶν Θεῶν τὰ μέλλοντα· ἀδυνάτε δ' ἔσσης τὴν ταύτην πρόσ-  
 ρησιν (lege πρῆρησιν) καὶ πρόγνωσιν ὀχρεῶς, ἔδεν τοὺς Θεοὺς ἔυλογον  
 ἔτε γίνεσθαι τὸ εἰδέναι τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων· τὰ γὰρ ἀδύνατα τῇ αὐτῶν  
 φύσει, καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Θεοῖς τὴν αὐτὴν φυλάττει φύσιν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ  
 καὶ τοῖς Θεοῖς ἢ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον ποιῆσαι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον, ἢ  
 τὰ οἷς δύο πέντε ἕναι, ἢ τῶν γεγονότων τι μὴ γεγονέναι. — Οἷς  
 ομοίως ἀδύνατον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ δικίᾳ φύσει ἔχον, τὸ δύνασθαι γίνεσθαι τε  
 καὶ μὴ εἰσόμενον πάντως, ἢ ὡς μὴ εἰσόμενον, ἔτσι προειδέναι· εἰ γὰρ ἢ

“ ist, takes away their *Contingency*, it is evident,  
 “ that if they are *contingent*, they cannot be fore-  
 “ known. And that this is so, in their Opinion  
 “ also, is manifest, from their supposing that the  
 “ Gods foreknow things future, and then ar-  
 “ guing from this Supposition, that they are  
 “ therefore *necessary*, or otherwise could not  
 “ be foreknown. But if *Necessity* of Things  
 “ is the Consequence of the Foreknowledge  
 “ and *Prediction* of the Gods, then, accord-  
 “ ing to them, if things are not *necessary*,  
 “ the Gods cannot foreknow their future Events.  
 “ Wherefore they also ascribe the same Impo-  
 “ tency to the Gods (with their Adversaries) if  
 “ it ought to be call'd Impotency and Weakness,  
 “ not to be able to do what is impossible to be  
 “ done; and give not a whit more Power to the  
 “ Deity by attributing Prediction to him; but  
 “ by taking this for granted, they make the Na-  
 “ ture

---

περὶ αὐτῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν πρόγνωσις ἀναρῆσι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνδεχόμε-  
 ναί, δῆλον ὡς εἰ σάξειτο τοῦτο, ἀδύνατος ἂν ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν πρόγνωσις  
 εἴη, ὅτι ἤν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτους τοῦτο ἕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ἐκ τῆ λαβόντας  
 αὐτοὺς ὅτι οἱ Θεοὶ προγινώσκουσι τὰ μέλλοντα, δι' αὐτοῦ κατα-  
 σκευάζουσιν τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὴ οὕτω γίνοντο  
 προγνωσόμενα. εἰ ἢ τῆ πῶν Θεῶν προγνώσει τε καὶ πραγματοποιεῖται  
 τὸ ἀναγκάσιον ἐπιτεταί, καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀναγκάσιον ἐν τοῖς  
 γινόμενοις εἴη, οὐκ ἂν κατ' αὐτοὺς οἱ Θεοὶ προγινώσκουσιν, τὰ μέλλοντα.  
 ὅσα καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆν αὐτῆν ἀδυναμίαν τοῖς Θεοῖς φυλάσσομεν, (εἰ  
 γὰρ κατ' ἀδυναμίαν χρὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον λέγειν γίνεσθαι τὰ ἀδύνατα μὴ  
 δύνασθαι) οὐ ἢ τῶ Θεῶν πλέον τι δύνασθαι διὰ τῆς προφήσεως ἀνάπτουσιν,  
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ προλαμβάνειν τοῦτο, τὴν φύσιν τῆν πῶν πραγμάτων,  
 τριάντη

“ ture of Things to be such, as neither follows  
 “ from their own Supposition, nor is agreeable  
 “ to plain Evidence of Fact. ——— But if to  
 “ foreknow Things future, is to know things to  
 “ be *what they are* (for it is one thing to fore-  
 “ know Things, and another to make them)  
 “ it is evident that he that foreknows *contingent*  
 “ Things foreknows them as being such. For  
 “ it is not Foreknowledge to say, that that  
 “ which is *contingent*, as being future, will *necessa-*  
 “ *rily* come to pass. So that the Gods may fore-  
 “ know things *contingent*, as being *contingent*, and  
 “ it will not at all follow thence, that this Fore-  
 “ knowledge makes them *necessary*. And of  
 “ this Nature are their Predictions: For when,  
 “ in giving Counsel to any one to *choose* and *do*  
 “ what he ought, they foretel the Event, they  
 “ do not foretel it as that which will *necessarily*  
 “ come to pass. ——— We therefore neither  
 “ destroy Divination nor the Foreknowledge of  
 “ the

τοιαύτην εισάγασιν, οὐδ' αὐτῶς ἀκόλωθα καὶ συνωσά τοῖς γινομένοις τε  
 καὶ ἐναργέσι λέγοντες: ——— ἐπεὶ ἡ εἰς τὸ προγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντά  
 ἔστι, τὸ ὁποῖά ἐστι, τοιαύτα, αὐτὰ γνωρίζειν ἅντα (ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ προγι-  
 νώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν) δῆλον ὅτι τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα προγινώσκων, ὡς τοιαύτα  
 προγινώσεται. οὐ γὰρ πρόγνωσις τὸ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ὡς ἐσόμενον ἀναγκάως  
 ἔσεσθαι λέγειν. ὡς καὶ οἱ Θεοὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ὡς ἐνδεχόμενα ἂν προγινώ-  
 σκειν, ἢ οὐ πάντως ἀκαταβλήσει τὸ ἀναγκάως Διὸς τὴν τοιαύτην πρόγνωσι-  
 αὐτῶ καὶ προλεγοντῶν ἀκούειν. εἰ γὰρ, μετὰ τοῦ συμβεβηκυῖν τινὰ ἀ-  
 γῆσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν ἢ χρῆσθαι προλεγοντες, οὐχ' ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐσόμενον  
 περὶ ὧν προλέγουσιν. ——— ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐτε ἀναβουόμεν ματιὰν, οὐτε τὴν  
 πρόγνωσιν

“ the Gods ; but we say, that they foretel things  
 “ to be agreeably to their Natures.

There is a great deal of Acuteness as well as  
 Caution in the Reasoning of this learned Wri-  
 ter.

*Ammonius Hermias* proposeth the Argument of  
 the *Fatalists* thus, *viz.* “ \* The Gods, say they,  
 “ either have an *absolute* Knowledge of *contingent*  
 “ Events, or no Knowledge at all of them, or  
 “ else have an *indefinite* Knowledge of them, such  
 “ as ours is. But (add they) it is impossible that  
 “ the Gods should be ignorant of any thing,  
 “ who produc’d and govern all things. ———  
 “ Neither can they have an *indefinite* or con-  
 “ jectural Knowledge of future Events only. ———  
 “ But (*they proceed*) ’tis evident and must be  
 “ own’d, that contingent Things are appointed  
 “ by the Gods, and the Events of them must  
 “ be *absolutely* known by them. ——— One of  
 “ these two things therefore (they conclude)  
 “ must

πρόγνωσιν πῶν Θεῶν ὡς ἔχει φύσεως τὰ πράγματα, οὕτως αὐτοῦς περὶ  
 αὐτῶν προλέγειν λέγοντες. De Fat. p. 135, 136, 139.

\* Ὅτι Θεοί (φασιν) ἤτοι ὀρισμένως ἴσασιν τὴν ἔκβασιν τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων, ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδὲ μίαν αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν ἔνοιαν, ἢ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἀέρισον αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν τὴν γνῶσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦς ἐνδέχεται, τὰ πάντα παραγαγόντας τε καὶ διακοσμοῦντας. ——— οὔτε ἀέρισον αὐτῶν γνῶσιν ἔχει, ὡς περὶ εἰκάζοντα περὶ τῶν ἐκβησομένων. ——— δὴλον ὅτι καὶ διατάττει ὑπὸ πῶν Θεῶν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα βεβαίως, καὶ ὀρισμένως ἐγγνώσκουσι αὐτῶν τὴν ἔκβασιν. ——— οὐδὲν οὖν βέβαιον, ἢ πάντα ἀναγκαίως καὶ ὡς εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν

“ must be said, either that all Events are *ne-*  
 “ *cessary*, and, as is fit, are known and foretold  
 “ by the Gods; and so what is called *contingent*  
 “ will be but an empty Name; or else we must  
 “ say, that some Things are neither known nor  
 “ taken Care of by the Gods: But this is im-  
 “ possible, wherefore there is nothing *conting-*  
 “ *gent*.

To the foregoing Argument *Ammonius* replies;  
 “ \* By distinguishing the several Kinds of Know-  
 “ ledge. ——— These Things being so (he adds)  
 “ we say that the Gods know all Things which  
 “ have been, are, and shall be hereafter, in a way  
 “ suitable to the Gods, that is, by a simple,  
 “ absolute and immutable Knowledge; where-  
 “ fore they also perfectly know *contingent* Things,  
 “ since all Things in the World are produced  
 “ by them ——— and they know not only their  
 “ Natures, but their Powers and Operations.  
 “ ——— They know Things *contingent* in a  
 “ manner

Θεῶν γινώσκειν τε καὶ προλέγειν, φήσομεν ἐκβαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ἐνδε-  
 χόμενον ὄνομα εἶναι κενόν, ἢ ἔτε γινώσκειν ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν, ἔτε προνοεῖν  
 τὰ τῆδε φήσομεν ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἔρχεται τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.

\* Τὰ διάφορα μέτρα τῶν γνώσεων διαίρειν ἀξιόσομεν. ———  
 τούτων ἐν οὕτως ἐχόντων ῥητέον τοὺς Θεοὺς γινώσκειν μὲν πάντα τὰ  
 γεγονότα, καὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα, τὸν Θεοῖς προσήκου-  
 σα τρόπον, τοῦτο δὲ εἶσι μίαν, καὶ ἄριστομένη, καὶ ἀμεταβίβητον γνώσιν,  
 διότι καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων περιελιφέναι τὴν ἐπίσταν, ἔτε καὶ πάντα  
 τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ παράγοντα ——— καὶ εἶον ἰσῶντας ἐκ αὐτῶν μένειν  
 πῶς οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ———

“ manner which is superior to the Natures  
 “ of them; wherefore these having an indeter-  
 “ minate Nature, *may be*, or *may not be*; but  
 “ they having a Knowledge of them, which is  
 “ more perfect than their Natures, know even  
 “ these *contingent* Events in a determinate and ab-  
 “ solute Manner. ——— Wherefore we ought  
 “ not to think that *contingent* Things will have  
 “ a *necessary* Event, because they are known by  
 “ the Gods in an *absolute* manner; for the Gods  
 “ knowing them does not make their future  
 “ Events *necessary*, but since, as being of a con-  
 “ tingent and mutable Nature, they will cer-  
 “ tainly have *such* or *such* an Event; for this  
 “ Reason it is necessary the Gods should know  
 “ what the Event will be. And the same Thing  
 “ which is *contingent* in its own Nature is not  
 “ indeterminate, but determinate in the Know-  
 “ ledge of God.

γινώσκειν μὲν τοὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα κρείττονως τῆς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων φύσεως  
 διόπερ τὰυτα μὲν ἀόριστον ἔχοντα τὴν φύσιν, δύνασθαι τε ἐκβάλλειν  
 καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν, ἐκείνως ἢ ὅτε κρείττονως τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν τῆ  
 γινῶσιν αὐτῶν προειληφότας, ἀρισμένως καὶ τὰυτα εἰδέναι. ——— καὶ  
 οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν ὅτι ἀναγκάσιαν ἐξῆ τὴν ἐκβασιν ἃ λέγομεν ἐνδεχόμενα,  
 ἀλλ' τὸ ὑπὸ Θεῶν γινώσκεισθαι ἀρισμένως, ἔ ἦν δὲ ὅτι γινώσκουσιν αὐτὰς  
 οἱ θεοὶ, ἀλλ' τῆτο ἀναγκάσιως ἐκβήσεται, ἀλλ' ἰπειδὴ φύσιν ἔχοντα  
 ἐνδεχομένῳ καὶ ἀμφίβολον πέρας ἐξῆ πάντως ἢ τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦτος  
 Θεὸς εἰδέναι ἀναγκάσιον ὅπως ἐκβήσεται καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆ μὲ φύσει  
 τῆ ἑαυτῆ ἐνδεχόμενον, τῆ ἢ γινῶσει τῶν Θεῶν, ἐκείτι ἀόριστον, ἀλλ' ἀρισ-  
 μένον. Com. in Aristot. p. 204, 207, 208, 211.

The Reasoning of these two great Philosophers proceeds upon this, *viz.* that the *Foreknowledge* of God is not so evident in itself, as that some Things (such as humane Actions) are of a *contingent* Nature; *maybe*, or *may not be*. The Question therefore is, whether these *contingent* Things are Objects of *Foreknowledge* or not; if *Foreknowledge* necessarily implies that the Things foreknown are *necessary*, being not *necessary* but *contingent*, 'tis manifest they are not Objects of *Foreknowledge*, and 'tis no Derogation to God to say that he does not foreknow what is impossible to be foreknown; and they who assert that all the Objects of God's *Foreknowledge* are Things of a *necessary* Nature, or that his Knowledge makes them *necessary*, ought to prove that God foreknows *contingent* Things. For if he does foreknow them, he must foreknow them to be what *they are*, and not what *they are not*; that is *contingent*, not *necessary*; and his *Foreknowledge* cannot alter the *Nature* of any Thing, or make Things, which are *contingent* in their *Natures*, become *necessary* by being *foreknown*. Whence it follows, that the Notion of *Fatality* has no Foundation; and it is reasonable to think, that God, who produc'd and governs all Things, and perfectly knows the several *Natures*, *Powers* and *Operations* of every Thing, may have a certain and absolute Knowledge of *contingent* Events (since whatever *will be*, 'tis now *true* that it will be, and must be either *thus* or *thus*) without al-

tering the Nature of Things, and making the Events foreseen to become necessary.

In the next Place *Cato* says, that the Notion of *Liberty* of Action reflects upon God's *Wisdom* or *Power*: Upon the first, as supposing he desires or intends to bring any *Designs* or *Purposes* to pass, and yet that he has not chosen the proper *Methods* to attain them; or upon the latter, that he cannot obtain them if he wou'd. It intrenches upon his *Providence* and *Government* of the *Universe*, by giving Part of his *Power* out of his own *Hands*, and by leaving it to the *Discretion* of inferior and weak *Beings*, to contradict himself, and disappoint his *Intentions*; and even his *Justice* itself, to which all the rest (of Gods *Attributes*) are so freely sacrificed, is attack'd upon such *Reasonings* in charging *Almighty God* with *Severity* in punishing *Crimes*, committed thro' *Weakness*, *Want*, or predominant *Appetites*, and which he could have prevented by giving others. (p. 179.)

All this may seem plausible, and impose upon a weak or unattentive Reader; but 'tis easily shewn, that there is not the least true Reasoning in any Part of it; and that the Reverse to every Line of it is the real Truth.

First; the Notion of *Liberty* does not suppose God to have us'd any improper *Methods* to bring to pass his *Designs* or *Purposes*, or to be disappointed in the Attainment of them. God, in enduing Man with *Liberty*, or a *Power* of *Action*, originally



nally intended (as is evident from the Nature of the Thing) that his Actions should be the Result of that *Liberty* or *Power*; he never intended they should be otherwise than they are, or than such as he knew would be the Effects of *Liberty*. He never did or could desire or intend to bring any Designs or Purposes to pass by Men's Actions, but such as should be effected by the *Will* or *Choice* of Men, whether *Good* or *Evil*. It was plainly God's original Design and End in the Creation of Men, to make them *moral* Agents, capable of *Vertue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*, and, in Consequence of them, capable of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, *Happiness* and *Misery*; and the proper and only Methods to complete this Design and End were, the enduing their Minds with *Reason*, *Liberty*, or a *free* Power of Action, without which they could not be, in a *moral* Sense, capable either of the one or of the other; and God never intended or desired that any one should be either *Good* or *Evil* (as indeed it was impossible he should be either) without being so, *willingly* and *voluntarily*; and this End God does attain, and always will attain.

But now on the other Hand, upon the Hypothesis of *Necessity*, God's Designs or Purposes are plainly frustrated, and his *Wisdom* and *Power* wholly taken away. It is contrary to *Wisdom* for God, who is *good* (as *Cato* allows) to intend the Happiness of all his rational Creatures, and yet

to lay many of them under a *Necessity* of being *unhappy*: It can never be a *wise* or *proper* Method of bringing Men to Felicity, to subject them under an inevitable *Fate* and *Necessity* of being *miserable*\*: And if Men's Actions, and the Consequences of them, are the Result of *Necessity*, then it is evident that God hath not *Power* to attain his Designs or Purposes; he hath no *Power* to make those *happy* whom *Necessity* renders *miserable*, or to make those *miserable* (how opposite soever to his *Nature* and Attributes their Actions are) whom *Necessity* makes happy: And in short it follows, that God hath no *Power* at all over Men, or any Thing they do, that

\* *Alexander Aphrodisius* says, that the Notion of the Necessity of humane Actions makes Men more *miserable* by Nature than the *Beasts* are, because the greatest Part of Men are made miserable by those *Vices* of which the brute Creatures are not capable. His Words are; Οἱ ἡ φάσκοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡμᾶς εἶναι τε καὶ γίνεσθαι τοιούτους, καὶ μὴ καταλιπόντες ἡμῖν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ταῦτα πράττειν τε καὶ μὴ, δι' αὐτὸν ἂν τοιοῦτοι γενοίμεθα, καὶ ἀλλοῦ τοῦτο μῆτε τοῖς κακοῖς γενομένοις ἐξεῖναι μὴ ταῦτα πράττειν ὡς πράττοντες γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, μῆτε τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, πῶς οὐκ ὁμολογήσομε κάκιστον γεγενῆσθαι τῶν ζῶων πάντων ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ——— εἰ ἢ ἢ ἢ ἀρετὴ τε καὶ ἢ κακία μόναι, κατ' αὐτοῦς, ἢ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἢ κακόν, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων οὐδέτερον τοῦτων ἐστὶν ἐπιδεκτικόν, τῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλείοσι κακοῖς ——— πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀβλιότατον ζῶον πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἔχων τὴν ἢ κακίαν καὶ τὸ μακίσθαι σύμφυτα αὐτῷ καὶ συγκεκληρωμένα. De Fat. p. 128.

they are wholly independent of him, and in no wise accountable to him.

Secondly; God, by making Men *Free-agents*, hath not (as *Cato* pretends) given any Power out of his Hands, nor do any of his Creatures contradict or disappoint his Intentions; and his providential Government of the Universe is more illustrious in ruling over *rational* and *Free-agents* by *rational* and *moral* Laws, and conferring Rewards and Punishments on *voluntary* Obedience or Disobedience, than in any other Part of the *unintelligent* or *irrational* Creation; or than it would be, if he had subjected humane Actions to *Necessity*; just as it is more glorious for a King to govern a Nation of *Free-subjects* by *wise* and *rational* Laws, with a Power to punish them for their Disobedience, and to reward them for their Obedience, than to govern a Company of *Slaves*, bound in *Chains* and *Fetters*, and thereby incapable of doing either *Service* or *Disservice*. Thus, with Respect to God's Government of the World, if Men's *Desires*, *Intentions* and *Actions* are necessary, their *Minds*, in this Case, as their *Bodies* in the other, are bound in *Chains*, and not capable of performing any *Duty*; there is no place for *pious Affections* towards God, or *Submission* to his *Will*; no Room to offer *Prayer* for Benefits, or *Praise*, or *Thanksgiving* for receiving them: And in Truth, there can be no *Worship* or *Adoration*

of

of God at all, which can proceed only from *Choice* and *voluntary* Actions.

*Alexander Aphrodisius* says, “ How can the Af-  
 “ fertors of *Necessity* maintain God’s Providence  
 “ over Men? — How can any one rightly  
 “ call that Providence which has no Respect to  
 “ the Deserts of Men, but is founded in an an-  
 “ tecedent *Necessity*? And what becomes of  
 “ Men’s *Piety* towards God, if it is not *in their*  
 “ *Power* not to do what they do do?”

Again, “ † If this is once believed (that we  
 “ have nothing in our own *Power*) it will be ab-  
 “ surd to reprehend any one, to praise any one,  
 “ to counsel any one, to exhort any one, to pray  
 “ to God, to give him Thanks for any Thing,  
 “ or to do any of those Things which ought to  
 “ be done by those who believe they have in  
 “ themselves a *Power* of doing what they do;

\* Πῶς δ’ ἂν σώζοιεν τοιαῦτα λέγοντες τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν γινομένην  
 τῶν θνητῶν πρόνοιαν; — πῶς ἂν ἔτι τῆτο πρόνοιαν τις δικαίως λέ-  
 γοι, τὴν ἔ καθ’ ἀξίαν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τινα ἀνάγκην προκατα-  
 βεβλημένην; πῶς δ’ ἂν σώζοιτο καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Θεοὺς εὐσέβεια τῶν  
 εὐσεβεῖν δοκοῦντων, διότι μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν, τὸ τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν ἕτω  
 ποιῶντων. De Fat. p. 91.

† Τῶ γ’ ἢ τῆτο πεπιστευμένῳ, ἐκ ἐπιμήσασί τινι, ἐκ ἐπαινέσασ  
 τινά, ἐ συμβεβησασί τινι, ἐ προτρέψασθαι τινά, ἐκ ἑυζαῶν Θεοῖς, οὐ  
 χάριν αὐτοῖς γινῶναι περί τινων, οὐκ ἀλλό τι ποιεῖν, εἶον τε τῶν ὀφει-  
 λομένων εὐλόγως γίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ τῆ ποιεῖν ἕκασον ὧν ποιῆσι τὴν  
 ἐξουσίαν πεπιστευκότων. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἕξω τέτων, ἀβίωτῶ ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώ-  
 πων βίῳ, καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνθρώπων ἔτι. Ibid. p. 99.

“ without which Power Man’s Life is no Life  
 “ nor the Life of Men ?

*Hierocles* says ; “ \* Prayer is not to no Purpose, if  
 “ Providence superintends humane Affairs, ap-  
 “ pointing righteous and just Retributions to  
 “ Men’s *voluntary* Actions.” *Eusebius*, in like  
 manner, argues ; “ † If not only external Events,  
 “ but our internal Desires proceeding from *Rea-*  
 “ *son*, are subject to the Influence of the Stars  
 “ and to *Fate*; and if the Minds of Men are  
 “ under the Impulse of an inexorable *Necessity*,  
 “ then farewell *Philosophy*, farewell *Religion*.”  
 And *Origen*; “ \*\* It is in vain to offer Prayers;  
 “ for, if all Events are *necessary* ——— it is *ir-*  
 “ *rational* to entreat God for any Thing.” Again;  
 “ †† From the Notion (of *Necessity*) it fol-  
 “ lows, that the Faculty of *Will* is wholly  
 “ taken away; and with it, *Praise* and *Dispraise*,  
 “ and

\* Οὐδὲ τὸ ἔυχασθαι περιττὸν, εἰ πρόνεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων ἵκνῃτο, νόμῳ καὶ οἰκῇ πρὸς ἀμοιβὰς πῶν προαιρέσεων τάττεσθαι.  
 De Prov. & Fat. p. 16.

† Ἐἰ ἤ ἄστροις καὶ εἰμαρμένῃ ἢ μόνῳ τῷ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ λογισμὸν προθυμίαις ἀναλιτέον, καὶ τις ἀπαράρητῳ ἀνάγκῃ πρὸς ἀνθρώπινα ἐκβιάζεται γνώμας, ἐχρήσεται σοὶ φιλοσοφία, ἀρῆσται καὶ ἐυσέβεια. Πρᾶξ. Evang. lib. 6. p. 242.

\*\* Ἐυχαὶ παρέλκασσι μάτῳ παραλαμβάνεσθαι εἰ ἤ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τινὰ γνώμας ——— Θεὸν ἀλογίστως ἀξίωμεν πῶς τινὰ ἡμῶν ἐαρήσασθαι. Apud. Euseb. Πρᾶξ. Evang. lib. 6. p. 283.

†† Ἐπιταὶ ἢ τοῖς ταῦτα δογματίζουσιν, ἐξ ἑλάν τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἀναίρεσθαι; διότι καὶ ἔπαινον καὶ ψόγον, καὶ πρόβητις ἀπεδικτάς, κἄλλιν τε

“ and the Difference betwixt Things that are  
 “ *commendable*, and Things that are *blame-wor-*  
 “ *thy*: and this being so, the so much pro-  
 “ claimed Equity of the Judgment of God va-  
 “ nisheth, and his Threatnings to punish those  
 “ who *commit Sin*, and the Promises of Re-  
 “ wards and Blessedness to those *who do well*,  
 “ fall to the Ground. For there is no Reason  
 “ for either the one or the other.

Secondly; from the Notion of *Necessity* it necessarily follows, that there can be amongst Men no *personal* Vertue or Vice, Good or Evil; no *Merit* or *Demerit*, and consequently no Ground for *Praise* or *Dispraise*, or for *Laws* to *reward* or *punish*; and indeed there can be no *Property*, or any Principles of Society and Government; which are evidently founded upon the Supposition of Men's having a *Power of determining* their own Actions; and, without this Supposition are unreasonable and vain.

That great Master of Reason, *Aristotle*, says;  
 “ That Vertue respects the Affections and Acti-  
 “ ons; and that Praise and Dispraise is due to  
*voluntary*

αὐ ψεκτής· ὡς εἰ ἔτις ἔχει, τὰ τῆς κεκηρυγμένης τῆ Θεῶ κείσεως  
 ὀίχεται, καὶ ἀπειλαὶ πρὸς τὴς ἡμαρτηκότας, ὡς κολαδοσηομένους. τιμῶ  
 τε αὐ πρὸς τὴς τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτοῦ ἐπιδεδωκότας, καὶ μακαριότη-  
 τῶ (lege μακαριότητες ut habet MSS.) οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι τέτων εὐλό-  
 γως ἔσαι γινόμενον. Ibid. p. 281.

\* Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις ἔσης· καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς  
 ἐκαστοῖς

“ *voluntary* Actions; but Pardon to what is done  
 “ *involuntarily*.

Again; “ The End (of what is desired) being  
 “ the Object of the *Will*; but the means to at-  
 “ tain the End being the Object of *Deliberation*  
 “ and *Choice*, our Actions conversant about these  
 “ must need be *voluntary* and *free*. But the  
 “ Practice of *Vertue* relates to those Things,  
 “ and therefore *Vertue* and *Vice* also are *in our*  
 “ *own Power*.” Presently he adds; “ And this  
 “ is the Opinion of all *private Persons*, and of  
 “ *Lawgivers* themselves; for they punish those  
 “ who do wickedly, if what they do is not  
 “ thro’ *Compulsion* or *wilful Ignorance*; but they  
 “ reward those who do well.

*Simplicius* reasons excellently on this Head of  
 Argument.

“ \* It proceeds (says he) from *Will* and  
 “ *Choice* that we are capable of *Good* and *Evil*;  
 —where-

ἐκαστοῖς ἐπιόντων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων· ἐν ᾧ τοῖς ἀκαστοῖς, συγγνώ-  
 μης, &c. *Ethic. lib. 3. c. 1.*

Ὅντ' ἢ βελητῆ μ' τῆ τέλει· βελυτῶν ἢ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς  
 τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶεν ἂν καὶ ἐκαστοῖς.  
 αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἢ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὁμοίως  
 ἢ καὶ ἡ κακία· — τοῖσδε δ' ἔειπε μαρτυροῦσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκασ-  
 τῶν, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν. κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμαροῦνται  
 τὰς δεξιὰς μοχλοῦσθαι, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ οὐκ ἄγνοια, ἢ μὴ αὐτοὶ αἰτίοι.  
 τὰς ἢ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν. *Ibid. c. 7.*

\* Διὰ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ προαιρέσεως τυγχάνομεν τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ

“ ——— wherefore that *Goodness*, which is the  
 “ proper *Goodness* of the Soul, is call'd *Vertue*,  
 “ as being properly the Result of *Choice*, and  
 “ proceeding from a *real Option*: ——— for  
 “ our *Will* and *Choice* are Things in our *own*  
 “ *Power*; the forming of our *Opinions*, our *Ap-*  
 “ *petites*, *Desires* and *Aversions* are Matters of  
 “ *Choice* and *Will*, being *internal Motions* of  
 “ the Soul itself, and not *external Coaction*:  
 “ Wherefore the Soul hath *Power* over these.  
 “ On which Account, *God*, and *Laws*, and wise  
 “ Men considering that we are endued with *Choice*  
 “ and *Will*, make a Difference betwixt *Vertue*  
 “ and *Vice*; not respecting the mere *Actions*  
 “ themselves, which are not always in our *Power*,  
 “ and which receive their *Essence* and *Difference*  
 “ from *Will* and *Choice*.

Again; the same great Philosopher observes;  
 “ \* They who deny that we have a free *Power* of  
 “ *Action*,

---

ἐναντία. ——— διὸ τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ λέγεται ὡς ἀρετὴ  
 ἕτα κυρίας, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὄντως αἵρεσιν παραγινωμένη. ——— ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἡμῶν ἢ ἡδ' ὑπόληψις, καὶ  
 ἔρως, καὶ ἔρεξις, ἕκκλησις εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν, καὶ προαίρεσιν ἀναφέρονται,  
 ἐνδεδέν ἔσαι πᾶσαι τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις, καὶ οὐκ ἔξωθεν ὀλισμοί. διὸ  
 καὶ κυρίως πᾶσαν ἐστὶ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οἱ νόμοι, καὶ  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ ἔμφρονας, εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ὡς ἐφ' ἡμῶν  
 ὄντα, ἀποβλέποντες, τὰ τε αἰμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατασβώματα, δια-  
 κρινουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς πᾶς πράξεις αὐτάς, ὅτι οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐκῆσαι,  
 καὶ ὅτι ταῖς αἵρέσεσι, καὶ προαίρεσεσι, εἰδοποιῶνται. In Epict.  
 Euch. p. 13, 14.

\* Οἱ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἀναίρετες, ἢ τὸ θέλει, ἢ τὸ μὴ θέλει, ἢ  
 αἵρεσι.



“ Action, a Power of *willing*, and *not willing* ;  
 “ that we have *Choice* and *Preelection*, *Desires*,  
 “ *Aversions*, *Appetites*, &c. such take away the  
 “ *essential Difference of Virtue and Vice* ; and  
 “ render *Praise* and *Dispraise* groundless ; and  
 “ subvert the good *Laws* that are made concern-  
 “ ing these things.

\* *Cicero* also says ; that the Consequence of Men’s Actions being *necessary*, is, in the Opinion of those who maintain the *Freedom* of them, with whom he agrees ; “ that neither *Praise* nor *Dis-  
 “ praise*, *Honours* or *Punishments* are justly dis-  
 “ pens’d. And this Supposition being *wicked* and  
 “ absurd, they think it may with Probability be  
 “ concluded, that all Events do not come to pass  
 “ by *Necessity*.

† *Aulus Gellius* notes that it was objected to those who were suppos’d to be Defenders of *Necessity* ; “ That it was unjust for Laws to punish Of-  
 “ fenders, if Men did not commit Offences *volun-  
 “ tarily*, but were drawn into them by *Necessity*.

αἴρεσιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, καὶ ὀρεξίν καὶ ἔκκλησιν καὶ ὀρμηλῶ, καὶ τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα, ἔτσι καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ψυχικὴν διαφορὰν ἀναιεῖσι-  
 καὶ ἔπαινον καὶ ψόγον οὐκ ἀπολείπουσι δίκαιον· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ  
 τοῦτο καλῶς κειμένους νόμους ἀνατρέπουσι, *ibid.* p. 26, 27.

\* Ex quo efficitur, ut neque laudationes justæ sint, nec vi-  
 tuperationes: nec honores nec supplicia. Quod cum vitiosum  
 fit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri quæcunque  
 fiant. *De Fat.* P. 360.

† Nocentium pœnas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad  
 maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur. *Noct. Attic.*  
*lib. 6. c. 2.*

*Ammonius Hermias* says; “ || Since we are Masters of some Actions, and it is *in our own* Power to choose, or not to choose them, to do, or not to do them; hence it is we say that our Choice and Actions are sometimes commendable, and sometimes blameable.

And *Alexander Aphrodisius*; “ \* [If Men's Actions are necessary] neither Reproofs, nor Punishments, nor Exhortations, nor Praise, nor any Thing of this kind will retain its Nature, but every one of these Things will be necessary as those Actions are to which they are apply'd.

Again; “ † It is agreeable to the Nature of rational and active Animals to have it in their Power to do ill or well, because they do neither of these by *Necessity*. In this Sense it is true; but not to say that all our Actions are necessary,

---

|| Ἐπεὶ κύριοι πράξεων τινῶν ὄντες, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὄν ἐλέαθ' ἢ μὴ ἐλέαθ' τὰ δὲ τινα, καὶ πράξει ἢ μὴ πράξει, τὰς μὲν ἐπαινετάς, τὰς δὲ ψεκτάς εἶναι τῶν τε προαιρέσεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων λέγομεν, Com. in. Arist. p. 184.

\* Ὅτε ἐπιτιμήσεις, ἔτε κολάσεις, ἔτε προτροπή, ἔτε τιμὴ ἔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων τὴν οἰκείαν σώσει κατ' αὐτὰς φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἔσαι καὶ τῶν ἑκάστον γινόμενον κατ' ἀναγκασμένως, ὡς περὶ ἀκείνα ἐφ' οἷς τὰυτα γίνονται De Fat. p. 87, 88.

† Κατὰ φύσιν μὲν ἢ τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τε καὶ λογικοῖς ζώσις τὸ καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ κατορθοῦν δύνασθαι, τῶ μὴδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ποιεῖν κατ' ἀναγκασμένως; καὶ τοῦτ' ἀληθές ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐ μόνον

“ *necessary*, and then to say again, that they who  
 “ act rationally, *do well*, and others *do ill*, but  
 “ still all we do is *necessary*. ——— For no one  
 “ says, that he does that which is good, who  
 “ merely does a good Thing, in whatsoever  
 “ manner he does it; nor that he commits *Evil*,  
 “ who, in what manner soever, does an evil  
 “ Thing; but in whatsoever manner he, who  
 “ is at his own *Liberty*, *chooseth* and doth that  
 “ which is *evil*, he it is that truly doth it; or  
 “ if he doth that which is *good*, then we say he  
 “ *does well*.

Again; “ \* They deserve to be pardon'd, who  
 “ commit a Fault *involuntarily*, because Punish-  
 “ ment is not intended to be inflicted for the  
 “ *mere* Fact, but for the *manner* of doing it.  
 “ ——— No *Phalaris* would be so cruel and  
 “ mad as to punish any one for what he could  
 “ not help. What then are those Things that  
 “ ought

μέντοι γε ὅτι πάντα ἃ ποιῶμεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν λέγεσθαι,  
 ἔπειτα τὸς μὴ καταθεῖν τῶν λογικῶς ἐνεργούντων, τὸς δὲ ἀμαρτάνειν,  
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ πάντα ποιῶμεν. ——— οὐ γὰρ τὸν ὁποιοῦν χαλεπὸν ποι-  
 οῦντα καταθεῖν τις λέγει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀμαρτάνειν τὸν ὁποιοῦν φεῦδόν  
 τι πράττοντα, ἀλλ' ὁποιοῦν ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ τις ὢν τῶν χειρόνων αἰρεῖται  
 καὶ πράσσει, ἢ τὰ βελτίω, τοῦτο λέγεσθαι καταθεῖν. Ibid. p. 155.

\* Ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο, τὸ συγγινῶσκειν μὴ ἀξίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀκασίως  
 τοιοῦτόν τι πράξαντας, οὐκ ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ γινόμενῳ πράγματι τῆς κολά-  
 σεως ἰριζομένης, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς πράξεως. ——— ἀλλ' οὐ-  
 δή τις Φάλαρις ἕτως ἀμῶς τε καὶ ἀνείηθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τινι τῶν ἔτω γινόμε-  
 νων κολάζειν τὸν ποιῶντα· ἐπὶ τισιν ὢν αἱ κολάσεις ἔυλογοι, οὐκ ἐπ'  
 ἄλλοις

“ ought to be punish'd and what not? namely  
 “ those Things which Men commit thro' a  
 “ *wicked Choice*.

Again; “ \* We shall be no better for know-  
 “ ing what the *Law* commands, if there are an-  
 “ tecedent Causes to which our Appetites are  
 “ necessarily subject. And thus the Benefit of  
 “ Laws commanding what we are to do, and  
 “ forbidding what we are not to do, is taken  
 “ away. ——— What are the Laws good for,  
 “ when Fatality deprives us of the Power of  
 “ obeying them? ——— the Law enjoyns what  
 “ is to be done, and what not, as supposing that  
 “ they who act have a Power of obeying the  
 “ Commands of it; wherefore it punisheth the  
 “ disobedient as Delinquents, and rewardeth the  
 “ obedient as those who *do well*. But the Voice  
 “ of *Fate* is that all Things are *necessary* and pro-  
 “ ceed

ἄλλοις τισίν; ἐπὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν μοχθηρὰν αἵρεσιν γινομένοις.  
 Ibid. p. 95, 96.

\* Ὁυ γὰρ πλέον τι ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σιωπῆσαι τῶν προσαποσπομένων ὑπὸ  
 τῶν νόμων ἕκαστι προκαταβεβλημένας αἰτίας, αἷς περιεσάσαις ἀκολυ-  
 θεῖν τὴν ἐσμένην ἀνάγκη. ἔτω δὲ ἀναίροιτ' ἂν τὸ ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρήσιμον,  
 εἰ γε οἱ μὲν νόμοι προσακτικοὶ μὲν εἰσι τῶν ποιητῶν, ἀπαγορευτικοὶ δὲ  
 τῶν ἢ ποιητῶν. ——— τί γὰρ ἔφελθ' νόμων οἷς πέθεσθ' τὴν ἐξουσίαν  
 ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης ἀφηρήμεθα; ——— ὁ μὲν νόμῳ προσακτικός ἐστὶ  
 τῶν πρακτῶν τε καὶ μὴ, ὡς τῶν πραττόντων δυναμένων αὐτῷ πέ-  
 θεσθ' κελεύοντι, διὸ καὶ τῆς μὴ πειθομένης ὡς ἀμαρτάνοντας ζημιῶς  
 τιμῶν. τοὺς πειθομένους ὡς κατορθούοντας· ἢ ἢ εἰμαρμένη πάντα τὰ  
 γινόμενα ἀναγκασίως τε καὶ δι' ὁμοίας αἰτίας φησὶ γίνεσθαι, τῶν ἢ  
 δ'.

“ proceed from the same Cause; but those Things  
 “ which proceed from the same (necessary)  
 “ Cause, cannot be rightly call'd, some *Crimes*,  
 “ and others *good Actions*.

Again; he concludes his Book in these admirable Words; “ \* These, O most divine Em-  
 “ perors! are the Heads of *Aristotle's* Opinion  
 “ concerning *Fate*, and that which is *in our own*  
 “ *Power*; according to which, if we form our  
 “ Sentiments, we shall be *pious* towards God,  
 “ returning him *Thanks* for those good Things  
 “ which we have received from him, and di-  
 “ recting our *Prayers* to him for other Things,  
 “ as having it in his Power to give or not. We  
 “ shall also be grateful to such good Princes as  
 “ you are, all whose Actions towards us pro-  
 “ ceed from your own *Choice*; and who act as you  
 “ do by taking Care to form a right Judgment,  
 “ and then choosing that which is right; and  
 “ not

ἵ. ὁμοίως γινομένων αἰτίας ἔχ' οἷόν τε τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήματα λέγειν,  
 τὰ δὲ καταθάρματα. Ibid. p. 164.

\* Ταῦτα, ὑμεῖς, ὧ θεϊότατοι αὐτοκράτορες, τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους δόξης  
 περὶ τε εἰμαρμένης καὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, τὰ κεφάλαια,  
 καθ' ἣν δοξάζοντες εἰς τε Θεοὺς εὐσεβήσομεν, τὰ μὲν εἰδότες (lege dōdentes)  
 αὐτοῖς χάριν ἀνθ' ἧν φθάνομεν ὑπ' αὐτῶν εὐπεποιθότες, τὰ δὲ αἰτέ-  
 ρημοι παρ' αὐτῶν ὡς ὄντων, καὶ τοῦ δοῦναι, καὶ τοῦ μὴ, κυρίων.  
 ἐσόμεθα δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ὑμῖν ὁμοίως ἀρχοντας εὐχάριστοι, ταῦτα  
 πράττοντας εἰς ἡμᾶς ἃ ποιεῖ ὑμῶν οἰκεία προύρσεις πράττειν ὑμᾶς,  
 κίρσει τοῦ βελτίου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν κρίσιν αὐτοῦ φροντίζειν ποιούν-  
 τας ἃ κριῖτε, ἀλλ' οὐ προκαταβεβλημένοις τισιν αἰτίοις ἐπομένους οἷς

“ not by following some antecedent Causes, by  
 “ which it is *necessary* to be led wheresoever they  
 “ carry you. We shall also be careful to exer-  
 “ cise *Vertue*, as having it in our Power to be-  
 “ come *better* or *worse* Men.

Lastly; *Eusebius* thus argues upon the Point;  
 “ There is no *Praise* due to the *Vertue* of those  
 “ who do well; no *Love* of *God*; no *Fruit*  
 “ worthy of our *Labour* and *Diligence* to be  
 “ obtained if all *Things* proceed from *Necessity*  
 “ and *Fate*. Therefore neither ought we to  
 “ blame those who lead *sinful* Lives, and are the  
 “ most *impious* and *profligate*, nor to admire and  
 “ praise those who are *vertuous* and *good*. Hence,  
 “ as I observed, the great *Glory* that is due to  
 “ *Philosophy*, perisheth, if it is not the Effect of  
 “ *voluntary* Study and *Meditation*, but of the  
 “ *necessary* Influence of the Stars.

ἀναγκάσιον ἔπεσθαι ἢ ἂν ἐκείνα ἀγγ. ποιησόμεθα ἢ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέ-  
 λειαν, ὡς ὄντες αὐτοὶ κύριοι τοῦ βελτίους ἢ χείρους γένεσθαι. Ibid. p.  
 175, 176.

\* Οὐδέ τις ἦν τοῖς ψυχδαίοις ἔπαινον ἀρετῆς, οὐδέ τις θεοφιλία,  
 οὐδέ τῶν ἐν ἀσκήσει πόνων καρπὸς ἐπαύξει, ἀνάγκης καὶ εἰμασμένης  
 τὴν αἰτίαν πάντων ἀναδεδεγμένης· οὐδὲ ἔν προσηκε καταμύμφεσθαι  
 τοῖς περὶ τὸν βίον πλημυμηλοῦσιν, οὐδέ γε τοῖς ἀσεβεσι ἐπιβροτοτάτοις.  
 ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοὺς ψυχδαίους θαυμάζειν· τίσθη ἢ, ὡς ἔφλω, οἰχήσεται τὸ  
 μέγα τῆς φιλοσοφίας κλέος, οὐκ αὐτοπροαιρέτε μελέτης καὶ ἀσ-  
 κήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων ἀνάγκης ἀπρωρημένον. Præp.  
 Evang. lib. 6. p. 243.

Again; “ \* This Opinion subverts the *Laws*  
 “ that are made for the Benefit of Men. For  
 “ to what Purpose is it, either to command or  
 “ forbid any Thing to those who are under the  
 “ Coercion of *Necessity*? Nor ought Offenders  
 “ to be punished, as being really guilty of no  
 “ Crime; nor ought they to be rewarded who  
 “ perform the most glorious Atchievements.  
 “ ——— Further this Opinion destroys all Piety  
 “ towards God; if so be neither God himself,  
 “ nor the Proclaimers of his Oracles confer any  
 “ Benefits on us when we apply with Prayer and  
 “ religious Affections; but we are bound in the  
 “ Chains of a *necessary Fatality*.

Thirdly; God's *Justice* is not attack'd (as is  
 alledg'd) by the Notion of *Liberty*; because that  
 Notion doth not suppose that God punisheth  
 any Crimes but such as are *wilful* and might have  
 been avoided: and in Proportion always to the  
*Wilfulness* and *Obstinacy* of them. Such *Weak-*  
*nesses*, *Wants* or predominant *Passions*, as by their

\* Καὶ μὴν καὶ νόμος ἀνατρέποι ἂν ἔτι ὁ λόγος, τῆς τῆ συμ-  
 φέροντος ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώποις κειμένους. τί γὰρ δεῖ προσάτιν ἢ ἀπαγο-  
 ρεύειν τοῖς ὑφ' ἑτέρας ἀνάγκης κατεγρημένοις; ἀλλ' ἐδὲ τῆς εἰμαρ-  
 τάνουτας δεήσει κολάζειν, μὴ παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν ἡμαρτηκότας,  
 ἐδὲ τοῖς πῖ κάλλιστα πράττουσι τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν. ——— ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβειαν ἀνατρέποι ἂν ἢ δὲ ἡ δόξα εἴ γε μηδὲν ἡμῖν  
 ὁ Θεός, μηδὲ μὴν αὐτοὶ οἱ τῶνδε χρησμάδοι μὴτ' εὐχομένοις, μὴτ'  
 εὐσεβῶσι συμβάλλονται εἰμαρμένης ἀνάγκαις πεπεδημένοις. Ibid.  
 P. 244, 245.

Suddenness, Surprize, or Violence not caus'd by our Fault, or to be prevented or resisted, lead us unavoidably into any Sin, will not be punish'd by him. As the Principle of the *Morality* of all Actions, whether Good or Evil, is the rational Mind freely exerting itself to do a Thing, or refusing to do it, in any Instances of a moral Nature; so every Degree of Good or Evil is proportionate to the Degree of *Freedom* with which it is done; and in Proportion also to this Degree of Freedom from whence *Vice* or *Vertue* proceeds, God has adapted his *Rewards* and *Punishments*. If the Degree of Freedom in any Agent is very great, and yet Evil ensues from his Actions, then the Punishment will be great also; if the Degree of Freedom is very little, then the Evil committed will be attended with little Punishment, and the Good that is done will be greatly rewarded. But if the Action proceeds not from the *voluntary* Exertion of the Mind; but from either an irresistible Disorder of the animal Spirits, forcibly impelling the Mind, and leaving no Room for *Deliberation*; or from unavoidable Ignorance, or from either a mechanical or compulsive Motion of the Body, (as particularly in the Case of *Madness*, *Ideotism*, *Excess of involuntary Passion*, *Surprize*, or the Compulsion of others against our Will) in such Cases every Action, let the Consequence of it be what it will, is neither personally *good* or *bad*, *vertuous*



or *criminal*; and the Person is not \* accountable for it. On these Principles the *Justice* both of *divine* and *humane* Laws is founded and exercised; and which the Opinion of *Fate* or *Necessity* wholly takes away and destroys. God can neither be *holy* or *good* in himself, if he has no *Will* to *choose* and prefer Right to Wrong, Good to Evil; and it is altogether repugnant to the clearest Notions of *Holiness*, *Goodness* and *Justice* to subject Men to *Pain* and *Misery* for what they cannot help, and for Things in which they have no Power.

It is as absurd to make *Pain* the Consequence of *evil* Actions, and *Pleasure* of *good* Actions, as *vice versa* upon the Supposition of their being *necessary*, which takes away both their *Distinction* and very *Natures*, and makes all Things, the greatest *Evil* and the greatest *Good*, alike indifferent with respect to *Morality*: And upon the Scheme of *Necessity*, the Worship of the one true God, and the most impure Idolatry; *Piety* and *Impiety*, *Profaneness* and *Godliness*, are all one;

\* Μόνον υπεύθυνον ἀπέφγγαν (οἱ Θεοί) τῶν ἐπί σοι. "We are accountable for those Things only which are *in our Power*." Arrian. *Epicr.* p. 121.

And *Alexander Aphrodisius* says; Ἐφ' ἡμῶν τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τῆς κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρίσιν συγκαταθέσεως. "That which is *in our Power* (and for which we are accountable) is done with the *Assent* accompanied with *Reason* and a Power of *judging*." De Fat. p. 73.

the one no more disagreeable to God, or contrary to his *Nature* than the other; or justly deserving either *present* or *future* Misery more than the other, as proceeding equally, not from Men's *voluntary* Actions (and consequently not being their *Acts*) but from the \* *Necessity* of the divine Nature itself. So also again, *Truth* and *Falshood*, *Mercifulness* and *Cruelty*, *Justice* and *Injustice*; and, in short, the greatest Vertues and most heinous Crimes must be equally acceptable to God; because equally (that is neither of them truly) *good* or *evil* in themselves; and equally derived from the *Nature* of God, as the *original Cause*

\* Upon the Notion of *Necessity* the *Sarcasm* of *Ænomæus* will be just. Τὶ αἰτίαι ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἡ ὑμετέρα ἀνάγκη; ἔδίκαια ποιεῖς, ὦ Ἄπολλον, εἰδ' ὄρθως ἐπιτιμᾶς τοῖς εἰδὲν ἀδικῶσιν ἡμῖν ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς εἴτ' ὅ, ἢ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀνάγκης ἀνάγκη, τὶ ἡμᾶς πίνυται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι τοιαύτῳ κατέδειξεν εἶναι τὴν ἀνάγκην; " What are we to blame, is it not your *Necessity* that is only in the Fault? You are unjust, *Apollo*, nor is it right in you to blame us who have committed no Crime. And this *Jupiter*, who is the *necessary Cause* of your *Necessity*, why does he punish us, and not himself rather, for being the Author of such a *Necessity*? *Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.*

And *Lucian*, in like manner, ridicules *Fatality*: "Εἶγε τὰ δίκαια ὁ Μίνως δικάζειν μέλλοι, τὴν εἰμαρμένῳ ἀντὶ τῆ Σισύφου κολάσεται, καὶ τὴν Μοῖραν ἀντὶ τῆ ταντάλου· πὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἠόκησαν, πειθεῖντες τοῖς ἐπιτάγμασιν; " If *Minos* wou'd distribute Justice, he should punish *Fate* instead of *Sisyphus*, and *Destiny* instead of *Tantalus*: For what Wrong have they done who were subservient to the Commands of Fate? *Jupit. Confut. p. 678.*

of them. And as there can be no *real Guilt* or *personal Crimes* committed by Men, so there can be no Foundation for the making *Laws*, to punish any Men as *Offenders*. All Law is founded upon the Supposition of Men's having a *Power* over their own Actions; and never punisheth Transgressors but upon a Supposition of *personal Guilt*, and that the criminal or illegal Fact was committed by them *voluntarily*, and with *Choice*, and might not have been committed. On this is grounded the Nature of Laws and Reason of Punishments for the Breach of them, that Men, as *rational* and *Free-agents*, may avoid doing those Things which they know are *evil*, and attended with Punishments; which is absurd, and renders all Punishment *unjust*, upon the Supposition, that they have no Power to avoid the doing of them. There is as much *Justice* in punishing *Infants*, *Ideots* and *Madmen*, for the Mischief which they do, as in punishing any others for the greatest *Enormities*, upon the Supposition of their Actions being *necessary*: And there is as much Reason to punish a Soldier for having a *Fever* or any bodily Infirmity, which renders him unfit for Service, as for deserting or running away; for if Men's Actions are not in their *own Power* and *Choice*, it is as absurd to think (besides the evident *Injustice* of the Thing) that the Terrors of *pœnal* Laws will prevent their doing *Evil*, as that they will prevent their falling into *Fevers*, &c.

The Notion of *Necessity* also renders *Vertue* and *good Actions* undeserving of *Praise* or *Commendation*, and incapable of *Rewards*: And there is as much *Sense* and *Reason* in rewarding *Men* for being *tall*, *handsome* or *strong*; or in praising and commending *Trees* for their *Fruitfulness*, or *Flowers* for their sweet *Smells*, or the *Sun* for his *Light*; as in bestowing *Commendations* and *Rewards* on *Men* for their best *Actions*.

To this Purpose *Philo*, the learned *Jew* observes; “ \* Man being endued with the Knowledge of his being a *Free-agent*, and his *Actions* being *in his own Power*; and the *Operations* of his *Mind* being, for the most Part, *voluntary*, is deservedly blam’d, if he knowingly commits *Evil*, and deservedly prais’d for his *voluntary* good *Actions*. But with Respect to other *Things*, such as *Trees* and *Beasts*, neither is the *Fruitfulness* of the one praise-worthy, nor the ill Turns of the other culpable; because the one or the other proceeds not from *Choice* and *Will*.

---

\* Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐλευθεργουῦ καὶ αὐτοκελεύσει γνώσει λαχόν, καὶ σπρωριετικαῖς χράμενος τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς ἐνεργεῖαις, ἐικότως ψόγον μὲ ἔχεν ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικεῖ, ἔπαινον ἢ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκὼν κατορθοῖ τῶν μὲ ἢ ἄλλων φυτῶν καὶ ζώων, ἔτε αἱ εὐφορίαι ἐπαινεταί, οὔτε αἱ κακοπραγαί ψεκταί, τὰς ἢ ἐφ’ ἐκάτερα κινήσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς ἀπρωιρέτης καὶ ἀκυσίως ἔλαβον. Quod Deus fit immutab. p. 300.

And *Ænomaus* says; “ \* 'Tis the same as if  
 “ any should *praise* and *reward* any one for being  
 “ *beautiful of Body*; and should *dispraise* and *pu-*  
 “ *nish* those who are *deform'd*.

As to *Cato's* again alledging, that God might have *prevented the Crimes he punisheth*, by giving *other Faculties*, i. e. by making us other sort of *Creatures* than we are; this is nothing to the *Purpose*. God's *Justice* (about which the present *Argument* is) is only concern'd in proportioning *Punishments* to *Men's Crimes*, and *Rewards* to their *vertuous Actions* proceeding from *Choice* and *Will*. The making us what we are, is a *Point* in which God's *Wisdom* and *Goodness* is concern'd, and which, I think, we have no *Reason* to impeach, or can justly call in *Question*. It is, no *Doubt*, consistent with *Goodness* and *Wisdom* in God to exercise his *Knowledge* and *Power* in the *Production* of all *Variety* of *animate* and *inanimate*, *unintelligent* and *rational* *Beings*; and his *Wisdom* as much, or much more, appears in our *Creation*, upon the *Supposition* of human *Actions* being *voluntary*, as upon their being *necessary*. So that *Cato* has fail'd in every part of his *Argument*, and every *Pretence* to support it is weak and *groundless*: and instead of *defending*, he has

---

\* "Εοικε ὅ ἄς εἴ τις τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς τὰ σώματα ἐπαινοῖ καὶ γεραίοι, τοὺς ὅ ἀίχρῶς ψέγει καὶ κολάζει. Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.

quite destroy'd (how undesignedly soever) all the Attributes of God, which properly make him God, i. e. a *moral Governor* of the Universe. And he has fatally subverted not only the Foundation of all *Religion* and *Piety*, but also of all *Vertue* and *Vice*, *Right* and *Wrong*; and has banished all *Property*, and the *Laws* upon which all humane Society is established.

In the next Paragraph *Cato*, in a most unaccountable and contradictory Manner, at the same time that he is pleading for the *Necessity* of humane Actions, says, that *they depend upon Men's Will to do them.* (p. 179.) Then surely they are *voluntary*; no, but he will prove, that Men have a *Will* to act *necessarily*, i. e. to act without *Will*, that they act *necessarily* by their *Will*, i. e. by *Necessity*, and not by *Will*. Such Reasoning, I think, was never offered either *by* or *to* reasonable Men before. But however let us hear him.

*The Will* (he says) *is directed by the reasoning Faculties* [no Doubt, it either is or should be, tho' Experience shews that it is not always directed by them] *which depend again upon the good or ill Organization of the Body — and a thousand Events, Accidents — and Objects which encompass him — all or most of which Causes, and many more which probably determine him, must be confess'd to be out of his Power.* (p. 179, 180.) All this I grant, and as much more of this kind as can be offer'd; but what is all this to the Purpose? Where is the Consequence that Men's  
*Actions*

*Actions are necessary? Thinking, judging, and reasoning well or ill, which is oft-times the Effect of Things which are out of our Power, is one Thing, and acting is another Thing. The whole of Cato's Reasoning is no more than this, namely, that external Reasons, Causes and Accidents of various sorts, which are out of our Power, necessarily affect Men's Understandings, and occasion various and different Judgments of Things, and even of the same Things at different Times to be form'd in their Minds, all which they cannot help, because they must judge (whether right or wrong) according to the Evidence they have of them: But this is no Argument at all that their Actions are necessary: Supposing Men always to act according to their Judgments of the Nature and Truth of Things (which it is certain they do not) it can only thence be truly concluded, that such as the Judgment is, such will be the Action resulting from it; but it cannot be at all truly concluded, that the Action is necessary. And every Man has within himself as clear and certain Evidence and Perception, that every Action of his is voluntary and free; as he hath, that the precedent Judgment, which he forms concerning the Objects, which are the Motives of his acting, is necessary, and not free. The Truth is, God hath not made Men mere unintelligent Machines; but hath given us (with a Power of Action) Reason and Understanding to enable us to act rationally; to be as it were a*

*Light* to shew us the *best Way*, that we may walk in it if we *will*; and that, if we lose our *Way*, or slip or fall, we may blame ourselves only for it. The *Mind* then always is or should be *directed* and *determined* to *act* upon precedent *Reason*, upon *rational* Motives, or what appears to it at the time of *acting* to be such; but nevertheless it is *directed* and *determined* by them to *act*, not by *Necessity*, but by its *Will*: And tho' the *Motives* or *Reasons* upon which the *Mind acts* are *out of our Power*, and the *Judgment* form'd upon them is *necessary*, yet the *Act* following them is not a *necessary* Consequence, but *Matter of Choice*; the *Mind* by its *Will* chooses that which either *necessarily* appears to the *Judgment* to be *right* to be *done*, or most for our present *Interest* or *Good*.

The *Argument* which is here urg'd for *Necessity*, from every *Action* resulting from a *precedent Motive* or *Reason*, which *Reason* or *Motive* is often out of our *Power*, is one of the famous \* *Objections* which the *Fatalists* of old made against the *Liberty* of humane *Actions*; and therefore it may not be amiss to let the *Reader*

---

\* *Plutarch* observes that two of the great *Objections* against humane *Liberty* of *Action* were 1. Τὸ μηδὲν ἀναίτιας γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένης αἰτίας. 2. Τὸ πολυβούλητον τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντ' ἐξίσταται ἢ ἀληθές ἐστίν ἢ ψευδές. *De Fat*, lib. p. 574.



see how the greatest, both *Heathen* and *Christian* Philosophers, reply'd to it.

*Cicero*\* tells us, concerning *Chrysippus*, (who was a rigid *Stoick*, and whom his Adversaries charg'd as holding the *Necessity* of humane Actions in Consequence of his Assertion, that all Things proceeded from Fate or a Chain of antecedent Causes) that in order "to assail the Argument from whence *Necessity* was inferred, holding at the same time that nothing happened without a *preceding Cause*, he distinguished the Kinds of Causes, that he might avoid *Necessity*, and still hold *Fate*. Of Causes, saith he, some are *perfect* and *principal*, (efficient) Causes, others are assistant and immediately precedent. Wherefore, when we say that all Things come to pass by the *Fatality* of antecedent Causes; we do not understand this *Fatality* to belong to the *perfect* and *principal* (efficient) Causes, but only to the immediately precedent assistant Causes; upon which Distinction he thus reasons; If all Things come  
" to

*Chrysippus* autem cum & *necessitatem* improbare, & nihil vellet, sine præpositis causis, evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut & *Necessitatem* effugiat, & retineat *Fatum*. Causarum enim, inquit, aliæ sunt perfectæ & principales, aliæ adjuvantes & proximæ. Quamobrem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri *causis antecedentibus*, non hoc intelligi volumus, causis perfectis & principalibus, sed causis antecedentibus, adjuvantibus, & proximis. Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclusi, sic occurrit. Si omnia fato fiunt, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis  
fiunt

“ to pass *by Fatality*. it does indeed follow, that  
 “ they come to pass with *antecedent Causes*, but  
 “ these are not the *perfect* and *principal* (efficient)  
 “ Causes of the Event, but only the assistant  
 “ Causes which are nearest to the other: Which  
 “ assistant Causes, altho’ they are *not in our Pow-*  
 “ *er*, it does not thence follow, that our *Affec-*  
 “ *tions* are *not in our Power*; but this would fol-  
 “ low, if the perfect and principal Causes were  
 “ not in our Power.

Cicero † acknowledgeth this Reasoning of  
*Chrysiippus* to be very much labour’d and obscure;  
 but what he meant, he endeavoured ingeniously  
 to explain by the rolling of a † Cylinder and Whip-  
 ping

fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus & perfectis, sed adju-  
 vantibus & proximis. Quæ si ipsæ non sint *in nostra potestate*,  
 non sequitur, ut ne appetitus quidem sit *in nostra potestate*: at  
 hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis & principalibus causis fieri  
 diceremus, ut cum hæ causæ non essent *in nostra potestate*, ne  
 ille quidem esset *in nostra potestate*. De Fat. lib. p. 360, 361.

† Apud A. Gellium lib. 6. p. 367. And *Ænomaus* charges  
 his Notion with making the human Mind (*ἡμίδελον*) half a  
*Slave*. Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.

† Revertitur ad Cylindrum & Turbinem suum, quæ moveri  
 incipere, nisi pulsa, non possunt: id autem cum accidit, *su-*  
*apte natura*, quod superest, & Cylindrum volvi, & versari Tur-  
 binem putant. Ut igitur, inquit, qui protrusit Cylindrum, dedit  
 ei principium motionis; volubilitatem autem non dedit: sic vi-  
 sum objectum imprimet illud quidem & quasi signabit in ani-  
 mo suam speciem, sed assensio *nostrâ erit in potestate*, eaque  
 quem admodum in Cylindro dictum est, *extrinsecus* pulsa, quod  
 reliquum est, *suapte vi*, & natura movebitur. Cic. *ibid.* 361,  
 362.

ping of a Top, which, tho' they could not begin to move without being impelled by an external Force, yet after Motion was given to them they would continue to move, as it were, of themselves, by the internal Power of their own Volubility, which belongs to their Nature, and was not given to them by that which was the first and immediate external Cause of their Motion. So in like manner he suppos'd, that external impulsive Causes, which were subject to Fate, or out of our Power, were the antecedent and first Causes, or Occasions of the internal Motion of the Mind, i. e. that they set the Mind on Work; but yet that our Inclinations, Purposes and Actions following were in our Power, and under the Direction and Government of the Will. From which Explanation it appears that Chryfippus meant, by the perfect and principal Cause of Action, the internal efficient Cause, or the voluntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind itself into Action; and by the assistant precedent Cause, he meant the external Cause or

---

*Aulus Gellius* also represents this Similitude of *Chryfippus* in Explanation of *human Liberty*, very elegantly and clearly, viz. Hujus deinde rei exemplo non hercle nimis aliene neque illepide utitur. sicut, inquit, lapidem Cylindrum si per spatia terræ prona atque deruta jaceas, causam quidem ei, & initium præcipitantis feceris; mox tamen ille præceps volvitur, non quia tu id jam facis, sed quoniam ita sese modus ejus & formæ volubilitas habet: sic ordo, & ratio, & necessitas fati genera ipsa & principia Causarum movet; impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum, actionesque ipsas, voluntas cujusque propria, & animorum ingenia moderantur. *Noct. Attic, lib. 6. p. 365, 366.*

*Motive* of Action; and so his Reasoning is just and right.

And that *Chryſippus* really meant that Men's *Actions* were in their *own Power* (tho' external *Causes out of their Power*, which he call'd *Fate*, concurr'd to the Production of them) and that they were the Effects of *voluntary Choice*: *Gellius*\* informs us from his own express Words; " Wherefore (says he) it is a Saying of the *Pythagoreans*; you may know that Men bring Evils " *voluntarily upon themselves*: Men's Calamities " proceeding from their *own selves*; and their " *Sins and Vices* resulting from their own *Appetites, Intentions and Purposes*. Wherefore he " says we ought not to endure or hear those " *wicked, slothful, pernicious and audacious* Men; " who, when they are convicted of a Fault or " an Offence, fly to a *necessary Fatality* for Re- " fuge,

---

\* Intert deinde (*Chryſippus*) verba hæc, his, quæ dixit, congruentia.

Διὸ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων οὕτως εἴρηται

Γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπου ἀθάνατα πῆματ' ἔχοντα.

Ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἠκέραιος παρ' αὐτοῖς γινομένων, καὶ καθ' ἑμὴν αὐτῶν, κίμαρτανότων τε καὶ βλαπτιομένων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δίκαιαν καὶ προθέσιν. Propterea negat oportere ferri audirique homines aut nequam aut ignavos, & nocentes & audaces: qui quum in culpa & in maleficio revidti sunt, perfugiunt ad fati necessitatem, tanquam in aliquod fani Asylum, & quæ pessime fecerunt, ea

“ fuge, and attribute their wicked Actions, not  
 “ to their own Temerity, but to *Fate*.

From this Explanation of the Notion of *Chry-  
 sippus* it will appear further, that the Dispute be-  
 twixt him and his learned Scholar *Carneades* and  
 others (who deny'd there were any *antecedent  
 Causes* or \* *Fatality* of Men's Actions, and affirm-  
 ed, that the *Motion* or *Exertion* of the Mind was  
 purely *voluntary*) was only a Dispute about  
 Words; each of them understanding the Word  
*Cause* in a different Sense. His Reasoning, which  
 the *Epicureans* urg'd against *Chryssippus*, *Cicero*  
 sets forth thus, *viz.*

“ † When they (the *Epicureans*) had admit-  
 “ ted that there was no Motion *without a Cause*,  
 “ they needed not (*Carneades* taught them)  
 “ grant, that all Events came to pass by *antece-  
 “ dent Causes*: For that there was no *external  
 “ and antecedent Causes* of our *Will*; therefore  
 “ the common Custom of saying, that any  
 “ one *will* or *will not* do a Thing *without a  
 “ Cause*, is an *Abuse of Speech*; for when we say  
 “ *without*

non suæ temeritati, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt. Ibid.  
 p. 366.

\* Quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animarum motus  
 voluntarii. *Cicero de Fat. p. 359.*

† Cum concessissent motum nullum esse sine causa; non con-  
 cederent omnia, quæ fierent, fieri causis antecedentibus: *volunta-  
 tis* enim nostræ non esse causas externas & antecedentes. Com-  
 muni igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur, cum ita dicimus,

“ *without a Cause*, we mean only without an  
 “ *external and antecedent Cause*, not without any  
 “ Cause at all. — An *external Cause* is not  
 “ requisite to the *voluntary Motion* of the Mind;  
 “ for *voluntary Motion* in the Nature of the  
 “ Thing is *in our own Power and Choice*: and  
 “ that not without Cause; for the Cause of  
 “ it is the Nature of the Mind itself.” Presently after he shews (which was the Point of the Dispute) what is truly and properly the *Cause* of a Thing, *viz.*

“ \* That is the *Cause*, which *effects* that, of  
 “ which it is the *Cause*; as a Wound causeth  
 “ Death; ill Digestion a Disease; Fire causeth  
 “ Heat. Therefore *Cause* is not so to be understood  
 “ as if that which is *antecedent* merely to a Thing  
 “ was the *Cause* of it; but that only is the  
 “ *Cause* which is the *antecedent efficient Cause*.

Whence it is evident, as † *Cicero* observes upon the Matter, that they who thought the

*velle* aliquid quempiam, aut *nolle* sine causa. Ita enim dicimus sine causa, ut dicamus sine externa & antecedente causa, non sine aliqua. — ad animorum motus voluntarios non est requirenda externa causa. Motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in seipso continet, ut sit in nostra potestate, nobisque pareat: nec id sine causa; ejus enim rei causa, ipsa natura est. De Fat. p. 352, 353.

\* *Causa* autem ea est, quæ id efficit, cujus est causa: ut vulnus mortis; cruditas morbi; ignis ardoris. Itaque non sic causa intelligi debet, ut quod cuique antecedit, id & causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedit. Ibid. p. 357.

† Ex quo facili intellectu est, cum utriusque patefacta atque explicata sententia sua, ad eundem exitum veniant, verbis eos non re dissidere, &c. Ibid. p. 363.

voluntary Motions of the Mind were not affected by any *Fatality*; and *Chryſippus* who held a *Fate* to belong even to humane Actions, tho' he allow'd them to be *voluntary*, and not effected by *Necessity*, really meant the ſame Thing; only thoſe *external* Motives which *Chryſippus* ſtil'd *antecedent Cauſes* and *Fate* (expreſſly declaring his Meaning at the ſame Time, that they were not the *perfect* and *principal*; i. e. *efficient* Cauſes of Action) *Carneades*, and others, the *Academics*, wou'd not allow to be properly *Cauſes* at all; inſiſting that the *efficient* Cauſe only was the true *Cauſe* of Action; “ \* and that in what Things  
 “ ſoever the antecedent Cauſes were ſuch, that  
 “ it was *not in our Power*, that the Things  
 “ ſhould be otherwiſe, theſe Things were pro-  
 “ perly effected *by Fate*: but thoſe Things, the  
 “ effecting of which are *in our own Power*, are  
 “ wholly exempt from *Fate*.” Underſtanding *Fate*, which they excluded from Men's Actions, in the Senſe of a *necessary* impuſive Cauſe; whilſt *Chryſippus* underſtood the *Fate* which he aſcrib'd to them, in the Senſe of a concurrent Cauſe or Motive of Action only: Which ſhew'd there was no real Difference in their Opinions; and that both agreed that Men's Actions were in

---

\* Conſent, quibus in rebus cauſe antecellerint ita, ut non ſit in noſtra poteſtate, ut aliter illa eveniant, illas fato fieri: quæ autem in noſtra poteſtate ſunt ab his Fatum abeſſe. De Fat. p. 363.

their principal, perfect or efficient Cause truly voluntary.

And hence we may observe, that when *Plutarch* charges *Chrysisippus* with holding, “ \* That  
 “ not the least Thing either rests or moves other-  
 “ wise than according to the Appointment of  
 “ God, whom he makes the same with *Fate*  
 “ ——— and that he makes *Fate* (which he  
 “ calls *Necessity*, &c.) an invincible and uncon-  
 “ troulable and immutable Cause.” He either  
 mistakes or strains *Chrysisippus*’s Notion too far; or  
 else *Chrysisippus* is only speaking of the *Fatality* or  
*Necessity* of external Providential Events; and  
 not of humane Actions; from which *Fatality* or  
*Necessity* *Plutarch* himself implies that he exempts  
 them; owning that, with Respect to Men’s Ac-  
 tions, he (*Chrysisippus*) “ † made *Fate*, not the per-  
 “ fect (i. e. the efficient, as hath been above ob-  
 served from *Cicero*) “ but only the precedent (i. e.)  
 “ the concurrent Cause only.

Again; *Cicero* himself answers the Argument  
 against *Liberty*, which is here made, in these  
 Words; viz.

\* Μηδὲν ἔχειοδ' μηδὲ κινεῖοδ' μηδὲ τι λάχισον, ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν  
 τῷ Διὸς λόγον· ὅτι τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ——— τὴν εἰμαρμένῃ  
 αἰτίαν ἀνίκητον, καὶ ἀκάλυτον, καὶ ἀτρέπτῳ ἀποφαίνων, αὐτὸς Ἄτροπον  
 καλεῖ καὶ Ἀδράσειαν, καὶ ἀνάγκη, καὶ πεπρωμένῃ ὡς πέρας ἅπασιν  
 ἐπιτιθεῖσιν. *De Stoic. Repug.* p. 1056.

† Οὐκ αὐτοτελή αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ προκαταρκτικῶς μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν  
 εἰμαρμένῃ. *Ibid.*



“ \* Altho’ some are more inclin’d to some Things  
 “ than others are, thro’ *natural* antecedent Causes,  
 “ it does not thence follow that there are *natural*  
 “ antecedent (efficient) Causes of our *Wills* and  
 “ *Desires*: for if so, nothing would be *in our own*  
 “ *Power*. But now we readily own that to be *acute*  
 “ or *dull*, of *strong* or of *weak* Constitutions, is  
 “ *not in our Power*: But he that thinks it  
 “ thence follows, that even to *sit* or to *walk* is  
 “ not Matter of *Will* and *Choice*, does not per-  
 “ ceive the Tendency of that Consequence. For  
 “ altho’ there are *antecedent* Causes of Men’s  
 “ being born with *quick* or *slow* Capacities, with  
 “ *robust* or *infirm* Constitutions; Yet it does not  
 “ follow, that our *sitting* and *walking*, and *doing*  
 “ *any Action* is determin’d and appointed by these  
 “ Causes.” He adds presently;

“ † *Vices* (he means *vicious Inclinati-*  
 “ *ons*, as his preceding Instances shew) may  
 “ grow from *natural* Causes; but to extirpate  
 “ and

\* Non enim si alii ad alia propensiores sint propter causas naturales, & antecedentes, idcirco etiam nostrarum voluntatum atque appetitionum sunt causæ naturales & antecedentes: nam nihil esset in nostra potestate, si res ita se haberet. Nunc vero fatemur, acuti hebetesne, valentes imbecilline simus, non esse id in nobis: qui autem ex eo cogi putat, ne ut *sedeamus* quidem aut *ambulamus* voluntatis esse, is non videt quæ quantaque res consequatur. Ut enim & ingeniosi, & tardi ita nascantur antecedentibus causis, itemque valentes & imbecilli: non sequitur tamen, ut etiam *sedere* & *ambulare* & rem *agere* alioquam principalibus (forsan naturalibus, ut supra) definitum, & constitutum sit. *De Fat. p. 344, 345.*

† Ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt: extirpantur autem  
 & cetera

“ and eradicate them, so as that he who hath  
 “ these vicious Propensities may be wholly freed  
 “ from them, is not in the Power of *natural Causes*,  
 “ but is effected by the *Will*, by *Study* and *Disci-*  
 “ *pline.*” Than which Reasoning nothing can  
 be more truly and strongly offer'd.

To the same Argument the learned *Alexander*  
*Aphrodisius* thus replies ; “ \* Those Things  
 “ which proceed from a *Cause*, do not always  
 “ proceed from an *external Cause* ; on which Ac-  
 “ count something is in our own Power, of which  
 “ we *ourselves* are the proper Cause, and not any  
 “ *external Cause*. Wherefore those Things  
 “ which in this Respect are *without Cause*,  
 “ have yet a Cause from ourselves. For Man  
 “ himself is the *original* and *Cause* of those *Acti-*  
 “ *ons* which are done by him, and this is pro-  
 “ perly to be a Man, to have a Principle of Action  
 “ within himself, as it is the Property of a Globe  
 “ to be roll'd down a steep Place. Wherefore  
 “ other Things are impelled by external Causes,  
 “ but

& funditus tolli, ut is ipse qui ad ea propensus fuerit, a tantis vitiis avocetur, non est id positum in naturalibus causis, sed in Voluntate, Studio, Disciplina. Ibid. p. 345.

\* Ου γαρ πάντως αἰεὶ τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ αἰτίαν ἔξωθεν ἔχει τῶ  
 ζῆνός τινι αἰτίαν ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τοιαύτῳ ἐξουσίαν, ἔστι πῖ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ὅτι  
 τῶν ἔτω γινόμενων ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐκ ἔξωθεν τις αἰτία. διὸ  
 ἀναιτίως τὰ ἔτω γινόμενα γίνονται, παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχοντα. ὁ ἢ  
 ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῶν δι' αὐτῶν γινόμενων πράξεων, καὶ τῆτό ἐστι  
 τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, τὸ τῶν πράξεων ἔστω τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὡς  
 τῆ σφαίρα τὸ κατὰ τῶν πρῶτος κυλισμένην φέρεσθαι. διὸ τῶν μὴ ἄλλων  
 ἔκαστον

“ but Man is not ; because it is essential to him  
 “ to have a Principle and Cause (of Action) within  
 “ himself, so as not to be impell'd by exterior Causes.  
 “ If we had one View in our judging about Actions,  
 “ it might with Reason be said, that our Judg-  
 “ ments about the same Things was always the  
 “ same : But since it is not so ; (for those Things we  
 “ make choice of we choose sometimes for the  
 “ Goodness, sometimes for the Pleasure, some-  
 “ times for the Profit of them, and these do not  
 “ produce the same Effects) it happens that we  
 “ sometimes prefer the Motives to that which is  
 “ good before all others ; again, at other times  
 “ our Judgment leads us to prefer that which is  
 “ pleasant or profitable. For as we seek for no  
 “ other Cause why the Earth is carried down-  
 “ ward according to its Gravity, and why Animals  
 “ act as they do by Appetite, than that each of  
 “ these has of itself an efficient Cause derived  
 “ from

ἕκαστον ἔτεται ταῖς ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ περιεσώσαις αἰτίαις, ἃ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἔχει  
 ἐπί τῶν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἔχειν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ αἰτίαν ἐν αὐτῷ, μηδὲ πέν-  
 τας ἔπειθε ταῖς περιεσώσαις ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ περὶ τῶν πρακ-  
 τῶν κινήσεων, πρὸς ἓνα γινωσκόμενον σκοπὸν, ἴσως εἶχε τινα λόγους τὸ εἶναι  
 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οἰκίας ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔχει ἕτως  
 ἔχει. (κινούμενα ἢ ἀκινούμενα, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὸ καλὸν τι, ποτὲ δὲ  
 διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, καὶ ἔ' αὐτὰ τῶν ποιητικῶν) ἐνδε-  
 χεται οὖν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν κινηθέντας ἡμᾶς τὰς τῶν περιεσώτων προ-  
 κείμενα, αὐτὴ δὲ ἄλλα, πρὸς τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, τὴν ἀναφορὰν τῆς  
 κινήσεως ποιούμενος. ὡς ἢ ἔ' ζητέμεν ἄλλως τινα αἰτίαν δι' ἣν κατὰ  
 βαρυτητα τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ γῆ φέρεται κάτω ἢ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἔ' πρῶτον το  
 ζῶον, πρῶτος καθ' ὅμιν, τῷ ταύτω ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ  
 πρὸς

“ from its Nature: so neither is there any other  
 “ Cause to be sought of those different Actions  
 “ which we do at different Times, in different  
 “ Circumstances, but only the Man himself.  
 “ For this is to be a Man, namely, to be the  
 “ Original and Cause of those Actions which are  
 “ done by him.

To which, on the same Argument, I shall add the Opinions of the two most learned Christian Philosophers, *Eusebius* and *Origen*.

*Eusebius* says; “ \* Altho’ a thousand external  
 “ fortuitous Obstacles oppose the Temper of our  
 “ Bodies, and the *voluntary* Desires of our Minds,  
 “ yet the *freely-exerted* Vertue of the Soul is able  
 “ to withstand them all; demonstrating that the  
 “ Power which we have within us of *choosing*  
 “ that which is good, is unmatchable and in-  
 “ vincible.

*Origen*’s Observation is as follows, *viz.*

πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα συντελεῖν, τοιοῦτον οὐ τὴν φύσιν, ἕτως οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν  
 ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἀλλὸ τ’ ἄλλως γινομένων ἐπὶ περιεσῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλω  
 τινὰ αἰτίαν ἀπαιτητέον, παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀνθρώπου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἀν-  
 θρώπου εἶναι, τὸ γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία εἶναι τῶν δι’ αὐτοῦ γινομένων πράξεων.  
 De Fat. p. 80, 83.

\* Καίτοι μισείων ἔξωθεν ἔμποδόν, τῇ τε τοῦ σώματος φύσει ταῖς  
 τι κατὰ προαιρεσιν ἰφ’ ἡμῖν ὄρμαῖς, κατὰ τι συμβεβηκὸς προσπι-  
 σόντων, ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀντέ-  
 χει, ἀμαχον καὶ ἀήττητον τὸ ἰφ’ ἡμῖν τῶν καλῶν τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐπιδεικ-  
 νόμενον. Πραρ. Evang. lib. 6. p. 252.

“ \* We confess (saith he) that many Things  
 “ which are *not in our Power*, are Causes of many  
 “ Things that are *in our Power*; without which,  
 “ namely, those Things which are *not in our*  
 “ *Power*, other Things, which are *in our Pow-*  
 “ *er*, would not be done. But those Things  
 “ which are *in our Power*, and are done conse-  
 “ quentially to *antecedent* Things, which are *not*  
 “ *in our Power*, are done so as that notwith-  
 “ standing these *antecedent* Things, we might  
 “ have done *otherwise*. But if any one would  
 “ have it, that our *Free-will* is wholly inde-  
 “ pendent of every Thing in the World, so as  
 “ that we do not *choose* to do some Things by  
 “ reason of certain (precedent) Accidents, he  
 “ forgets that he is a Part of the World, and  
 “ comprehended within humane Society, and  
 “ the circumambient Air.

Having thus shewn from the Reason of Things,  
 and the Arguments of the most rational Enquirers

\* Ὅτι μὲντοιγὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν αἰτία πλείστα τῶν οὐκ ἐφ'  
 ἡμῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογήσομεν ὅτι μὴ γενομένων, λέγω ἕ τῶν οὐκ  
 ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐκ ἂν τὰδε τινὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπράττετο. πράττει (lege  
 πράττεται, ut est in Philoc.) ἕ τὰδε τινὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἀπό-  
 λυθα τοῖς γ τοῖς προεργασμένοις (lege προγενομένοις, ut habet  
 MSS. & Philoc.) οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἐνδεχομένοις τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς  
 αὐτοῖς προεργασμένοις (lege iterum προγενομένοις, ut Philoc.)  
 καὶ ἕτερα πράξει παρ' ἡμῶν πρᾶττομεν· εἰ δέ τις ζητῆ τὸ ἐφ'  
 ἡμῶν ἀπολελυμένον εἶναι τοῦ πατὸς, ὡς μὴ διὰ τὰδε τινὰ συμβε-  
 βηκότα ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι τὰδε, ἐπιλέξασθαι κόσμῳ μέγῃ ἂν, καὶ ἐμ-  
 περιχόμενοι ἀνθρώπων κοινωνία καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος. Orig. τριῶν  
 Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib 6 p. 290. & Com in Gen 2 : 1

of former Ages, that there is not the grand Weight or Truth in the Argument which is insisted on against *Liberty*, and for the *Necessity* of humane Actions, namely, their being consequential to, directed and determined by *external Things* which are *not in our Power*: because that altho' many outward Events which are not in our Power may concur to excite the Mind to Actions, which, without them, it would not do; yet it is evident and plain that the Mind acts not by the *necessary* Impulse of *external Causes* or Motives, but by an *internal voluntary* Motion or Exertion: And tho' external Causes or Accidents determine the Mind to act, (as being Grounds which the Mind may think it reasonable to act upon) yet it is and can be determined to act only by its *Will*. And for a further direct Proof of this Point, I will offer one Argument more, namely,

It is evident, that after Reasons or Motives, not in Men's Power, are offered to them to act, and they cannot help thinking it right to act upon them, and are in their last Judgment determined to act upon them (and the Event shews that they do act upon them) they can yet *deliberate* with themselves before they act, and can *suspend* the *Action* without any *external* Motive whatsoever; which clearly shews that the *Action* proceeds from *Will* and *Choice*, and is *voluntary* not *necessary*.

*Cato* himself allows, that *Choice* and *Preference* imply *Doubt* and *Deliberation*; which tho'

not

not true, as I have shewn; yet, on the other side, it is true, that *Deliberation* and *Suspension* imply *Will* and *Choice*: For it is, I think, Demonstration, that if the Motives of acting are such as impel the Mind *necessarily* to act, *i. e.* to act not by *Will*, but by *Necessity*, then there can be no *Suspension* of Action; but the Moment that the Mind is impelled it must act just as a Balance moves the Instant that the Weight is hung upon it: *Necessity* has no Regard to *Time*, but, if it acts at all, acts equally in every Moment of Time; and, if it is the immediate *efficient* Cause or Power of Action, must act as soon as it takes place, or impells the Mind; and I would desire to be told what Power of the Mind it is (if it is not that which we call *Will*) which is able perpetually to resist, without the Assistance of any external Motive, the Operations of *Necessity* by *Suspension* of Actions. That this *Suspension* is caus'd by the *Will*, and consequently that the Action following is *voluntary*, may farther appear by there being no *Suspension* or *Deliberation*, where the Actions or Effects are not *voluntary*, as whether the *Pulse* or *Heart* should beat, and in the Case of the Actions of *Madmen*, of Men in a *Fever*, or under a violent *Surprise* or *Passion*; the more of *Necessity* there is, there is always the less of *Deliberation* and *Suspension*; and if the Motive *necessarily* produces the Action, it produces it also *instantaneously*. This Argument may be worth Consideration; and to it I shall subjoin the Opinion of the great *Aristotle*; who thus argues; “ De-

“ \* *Deliberation and Choice* is one and the same  
 “ Thing: for that which was *deliberated* upon  
 “ is the Matter of Choice. ——— Now the  
 “ *elective Faculty*, being *deliberative*, and that  
 “ which *desires* those Things which are *in our*  
 “ *Power*; the *Choice* itself is the *deliberative Desire*  
 “ of those Things which are *in our Power*: For  
 “ judging upon *Deliberation* we afterwards *de-*  
 “ *sire* what we *deliberated* upon.

And the learned *Alexander Aphrodisius* says;

“ † Certainly Man hath not the Power of  
 “ *Deliberation* in vain, as it must be if he acts  
 “ *by Necessity*. But it plainly appears that Man  
 “ alone hath by Nature this Power above the  
 “ rest of Animals, that he is not like them led  
 “ merely by *Sense*, but is endued with *Reason*,  
 “ whereby to judge of Objects. By which Reason  
 “ examining the Objects of *Sense*, if he finds them  
 “ to be really what at first they appear'd to be,  
 “ he

\* Βουλευτὸν ἢ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό ——— τὸ ᾧ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς  
 προκρίβει, προαιρετὸν ἐστὶ ——— ὅντι ἢ τὴ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ, ὀρεκ-  
 τοῦ πῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀν εἰν βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις πῶν ἐφ'  
 ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσαῶ ᾧ κείναιτες, ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βύλευσιν.  
 Ethic. lib. 3. c. 5.

† Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλευσαῶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ εἰς μᾶτην αὐτῷ ὑπάρ-  
 χει. ἢ δ' ἀν εἰς μᾶτην βουλευτικός, εἰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπραττε τὰ πρατ-  
 τόμενα· ἀλλ' ἐναργῶς φαίνεται πῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνος  
 τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔχει πλείον, τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις ταῖς φαν-  
 τασίαις ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τῶν προσιπτόντων κριτὴν τὸν λόγον. ᾧ χρώ-  
 μινος εἰ ᾧ ἐξεταζόμενα τὰ φαντασθέντα, οἷα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐφάνη, καὶ



“ he assents to the Evidence of his Senses, and  
 “ pursues the Objects of them. But if he finds  
 “ them different from what they appeared, he  
 “ does not continue in his first Conception of  
 “ them, being convinc’d by *Reason* upon Consi-  
 “ deration of the Falsity of them. Wherefore  
 “ we *deliberate* only about such Things as are *in*  
 “ *our Power* to do or *not*: And when we act  
 “ without *Deliberation*, we often repent and  
 “ blame our selves for our *Inconsideration*. Also,  
 “ if we see others act unadvisedly, we reprehend  
 “ them as guilty of a Fault, and the Ground of  
 “ our *Consultation* with others is, that Things are  
 “ *in our own Power*.

*Cato* proceeds; and argues next for the *Necessi-*  
*ty* of humane Actions from the Proceedings of  
 divine *Revelation*. *What* (says he) *can be meant*  
*by (God’s) offering Rewards and denouncing Punish-*  
*ments, but as Causes to produce the Effects design’d,*  
*i. e. to save those whom Almighty God in his deep*

ἐσι, συγκατατίθεται τῇ φαντασίᾳ, καὶ ἔτω μίττεισιν αὐτά· εἰ δὲ ἄλ-  
 λως φαίνεται, ἔκ ἔτι ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ τῆς προλήψεως, ἐλέγξαντο αὐτὰ  
 τοῦ λόγου, ἀφ’ ὃ το συμβεβηυσαῶς περὶ αὐτῶν. βελευόμεθα γοῦν περὶ  
 μόνων ἂν δινώμιθα πράττειν. εἰ δὲ ποτε μὴ βελευσάμενοι πράττοι-  
 μεν, πολλάκις μετανοοῦμεν καὶ μεμφόμεθα ἑαυτοῖς τῆς ἀβελίας.  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως ἰδαμεν ἀβελως πράττοντας, ἐγκαλοῦμεν ὡς ἀμαρ-  
 τήσαντας, ἀξιοῦμεν τε συμβέλοισ τῶσδε χρῆσθαι, ὡς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὄντων  
 πᾶν τοιούτων<sup>1</sup> Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 271, 272.  
 2 Aphrodis. lib. de Fato

*Wisdom has preordain'd to Bliss, and to be influenc'd by these Motives.* (p. 180.)

All this is reasonable and right upon the Supposition of *humane Liberty*, and Men's Actions being *voluntary*; but is very unreasonable and absurd upon the Hypothesis of *Necessity*. Supposing Men to be *rational* Creatures, and that their Actions are *in their own Power*; nothing is more reasonable, wise and good in God than to propose suitable *Rewards* and *Punishments*, i. e. *Happiness* and *Misery*, whether here or hereafter, as rational and persuasive Motives for the Mind of Man to exert its *Will* into Actions correspondent to the divine Will and Commands. A reasonable Mind cannot but think it reasonable to act upon these Motives; and they answer God's End in proposing them, as being in their Natures most effectual to procure a *willing* Obedience to his Laws, and leaving the Sinner without Excuse and self-condemned in refusing to comply with them. But now on the other Hand; supposing Men's Actions *necessary*; and these Motives of Rewards and Punishments to be proposed and design'd by God to procure in Men a *Necessity* of doing good Actions, and of avoiding evil ones, in order to their Salvation; then it is evident that God's Design is frustrated, by their not producing the Effects intended, and his Wisdom thereby falls to the Ground: because Men daily do resist these Motives, and even the best Men are not always influenc'd by them, and sometimes

act opposite to them; which they could not possibly do, if they were *necessary* Causes working *necessary* Effects; for if their Operations were *necessary*, all Men's Actions to whom they are propos'd, must be *necessarily* good.

Or if it is pretended, that all who are influenced by them are *necessarily* influenc'd;

First; This is not true, because if they were *necessarily* influenced, the Motives being always the same must have always the same Effects; but on the contrary the most vertuous Men are not always influenc'd by them, which proves that they are not *necessarily* influenc'd at all.

Secondly; To suppose *necessary* Means to influence *some* and not *others* of like Nature, and equal Capacities and Passions is a Contradiction; and yet it hath always been found true by Experience, not only that Men of the same Education, equal Abilities, and as far as can be discerned, like natural Passions, have been opposite to each other in their Actions; but also that Men of the very worst natural Dispositions and Practice have reform'd themselves, and become eminently vertuous and good by their own Care, and a diligent Use of their rational Faculties: And that others of naturally good Dispositions, and vertuous Behaviour, have, thro' Carelessness and Neglect of the Use of their Reason, been corrupted and become notoriously wicked.

Which

Which plainly shews that *Cato's necessary* Motives work only as Men's *Wills* permit them; and, contrary to their Natures oft-times have the *least* Effect on those Minds which are *least dispos'd* to resist them, and the *strongest* Effect on those which are *most inclin'd* to oppose them; which proves that there is a *Power* within every one's Breast, which is able to conquer the strongest Propensions of Nature, and the greatest Motives that can be offer'd either to *Vertue* or *Vice*; and which cannot be compelled or forc'd by any external Means or Causes whatsoever.

Thirdly; It is repugnant to the Notion of the *Wisdom* of God, for him to propose *necessary* Motives of Action to such as cannot possibly be influenc'd by them, or must *necessarily* act contrary to them: To propose equally to all, what he is suppos'd to know cou'd not possibly influence all, nay, and what was ordained by him, not to influence all, is contrary both to *Wisdom* and *Goodness*: And, no Doubt, had the Motives propos'd by God work'd as *necessary* Causes by Force and Compulsion, his *Wisdom* and *Goodness* would not have permitted him to have propos'd them to any *necessarily* in vain, *i. e.* to such as were incapable of being influenced by them.

Fourthly; How comes *Necessity* to make a Distinction betwixt one Man and another; and  
abso-

absolutely to *preordain* one to *Bliss*, and another to *Misery*? If Men are to be *saved* or *damned* by *Necessity*, without any Actions properly of *their own*, it is evident it must work equally on all, and *save all*, or *damn all*; just as *Mortality*, the *Light of the Sun*, the *Return of the Seasons*, and all other natural and necessary Effects are common equally to all. And they, who *erroneously* believe that some are *preordain'd* to *Bliss*, and others to *Misery*, by the absolute Power and Decrees of God, are not yet so absurd as to suppose these absolute Decrees to be the *necessary* Result of the divine Nature (*Necessity* not making any such Distinction and *Preference* of one Man to another) but they suppose them to proceed from the inscrutable divine *Will*. And as there is neither *Justice*, *Wisdom* or *Goodness* in *preordaining* some to *Salvation*, and some to *Destruction*; so it is plain there is no *Necessity* for such a *Preordination*, and consequently there can be no such Thing.

Therefore on the contrary to this Reasoning of *Cato*, the Motives of Rewards and Punishments being proposed by God indifferently to all, and being comply'd with by some, and rejected by others; it hence follows, that these Motives, or any other, which in their Nature must be less than these, do not *necessitate* the Mind to act, nor were intended by God to do so; but were proposed as *rational* Means only to a *rational* Mind, to excite, persuade or determine it to

act by its *Will*, correspondent to the divine Laws: and God thereupon *preordain'd* those to Bliss, who should *voluntarily* be led by those Motives to *do good*; and those to Misery, who should *wilfully* refuse to be directed by them, and suffer any others to lead them *into Evil*.

From the preceding Observation of the Methods of the divine Proceedings with Men, *Cato* thus concludes;

*What Sort of Reasoning then is this to say that Heaven gives to every Man sufficient Power and Motives to choose the best, which yet prove insufficient? That he has made every Man free to act or not to act by a Rule, and yet has plac'd him in such a Situation as to find a thousand Obstacles in his way to that Freedom; and that he has given him a Judgment capable to determine right, and Opportunities rightly to exercise that Judgment; and yet by making use of that Judgment and these Opportunities, he often judges directly contrary? And all this is to make good a System, as yet own'd but by a very small Part of Mankind, and for which I can find no Foundation in Reason and Scripture.*  
(p. 181.)

But (in Answer.) First; *What sort of Reasoning is this?* to suppose that Heaven has subjected every Man to two *opposite necessary* Principles or Causes, the one of *Vertue*, the other of *Vice*, which draw them *forcibly* by Turns into *Good and Evil, Happiness and Misery*.

To suppose God to be so *divided* with himself, as to have made it *necessary* for every Man to do both *Good* and *Evil*, to *obey* his *Laws* and to *disobey* them? Nay, *what sort of Reasoning is it* to suppose *Evil necessarily* to proceed from a *necessarily good* Nature; to suppose a *necessarily good and happy* God to lay a great Part of Men his *Creatures* under a *Necessity* of being \* *wicked* and *miserable*? But

Secondly; That the *Power* and *Motives* which Heaven gives to every Man to *chose the best*, are *sufficient*, is evident; because they do influence *many*; whereas, if they were in themselves *insufficient*, *none* would be influenced by them: and therefore their not influencing *all*, is an Argument against *Cato* that it is the Opposition of Men's *Will* to them, and nothing else, that renders them (not *insufficient*, but) tho' *sufficient*, yet *ineffectual*.

Thirdly; That there are *Obstacles* in Men's way to the right *Use* of their *Freedom*, is no Ar-

\* The Notion of *Necessity* directly makes God the Author of all *Sm* and *Evil*: And Men might justly alledge in Excuse of their *Wickedness* what *Homer* represents one saying,

————— Ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἰτιός εἰμι,

Ἄλλῃα Ζεὺς, καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἕσπερ' ἄϊταις Ἐρινός\*

Apud Ammon. Herm. p. 187

gument at all against Freedom, but only proves, that Men, who are capable of *Vice* as well as *Vertue*, have Motives to the *one* as well as to the *other*, which they *freely* comply with or *freely* reject.

Fourthly; That Men have *contrary* Judgments of Things at different Times, is nothing at all to the Purpose, whether Men's *Actions* be supposed *voluntary* or *necessary*; *judging* is one Thing (and not in our Power farther than the making use of the Means proper to form it) and *acting* is another Thing.

And that Men have a Power given them to choose the best, and are free to act or not to act by a Rule, which *Cato* endeavours here to expose as a strange sort of Reasoning, has been largely demonstrated to be just and true Reasoning, both (*a priori*) from the *Nature* and *Attributes* of God, and (*a posteriori*) from the *Works* of *Creation* and *Providence*; and from all the *Sense* and *Reason* of Mankind. And the System founded upon this Reasoning is attended with no Difficulties in the Thing itself, but only in the Explanation of the *Modus* of it. We do not know the *Manner* of the *Agency* of the Mind; or the *Manner* of God's *Forefight* of *future* and *contingent* Events; yet the Things themselves are very evident: nor do we know any more the *manner* how *necessary* Causes work *necessary* Effects, and how God foresees



foresees *them*. But on the other Hand we see very clearly from the Nature of Things, that God is a *Free-agent*, and has endued Man with *Freedom* of Action; and our own *Sense* and *Reason* as much convince us of the Certainty of this Liberty, as they do of the Existence of any Thing without us, of the Existence of even *Matter* itself.

I am not more sure, that when my Eyes are open to the Sun I must necessarily see Light, than that, by my mere *Will*, I can freely shut them, and hinder the Light from coming to them. But

I have also shown, that the System of *Necessity* is inconsistent with the *divine Perfections*, destroys God's *Power*, *Wisdom*, *Holiness*, *Goodness* and *Justice*, and all the *moral* Attributes of his Nature, and consequently his very *Being* and *Existence*. It besides manifestly overthrows the Notion of all *Religion* and *Morality*, and the Foundation of all *humane Society*. And for *Cato* to say that the System of *Liberty* is own'd but by a very small Part of Mankind, and has no Foundation in *Scripture*, is so very unreasonable and unaccountably *romantick*, (as may appear from the foregoing Observations) that one might think he had never read one Book of *Heathen* or *Jewish Philosophy*, or ever look'd into *Scripture* and the Writings of the *antient Christians*. But he proceeds;

*I must beg leave to think it very audacious in a small number of Men to determine the Workings of Providence by their own narrow Schemes, at the Expence too of condemning the Opinions and Reasonings of the greatest Part of the World in all Ages. All or most of the Sects of Philosophers in Greece and Rome held Fate or Necessity as the several Sects amongst the Jews did, except the Essenes, a very small Sect indeed, not exceeding few thousands. The Mahometans thro' the World hold Predestination; the Calvinists and some other Protestant Sects hold it now. (p. 181, 182.)*

Here *Cato* discovers the whole Weakness on which his Notion is founded; he had either heard or read of the Words *Fate* and *Necessity*, without at all knowing what they mean; and supposing them (without any Consideration at all of the Matter) to have been always apply'd to Men's *Actions*, and to be understood to be the *efficient* Causes of them, seems to have built his Scheme of *Necessity* on this Imagination, without enquiring into the Reason of Things, or the real Sentiments of any Sects of Philosophy whatsoever.

In order therefore to undeceive and convince the Reader of this fundamental Error, which, I hope, *Ignorance* and not *Design* had led our Author into: I will briefly (besides what has been already observ'd on this Head above) shew him,

First; Directly and distinctly, that the most celebrated Philosophers of all Sects (even the *Stoics* themselves) both amongst *Heathens* and *Jews*, as well as *Christians*, have ever held and maintain'd, both that God himself is a *Free-agent*, and that Men's *Actions* are in their own Power, and that they act with *Will* and *Choice*.

Secondly; I will shew him what the antient Philosophers meant by *Fate*; and that they thought it consistent with the *Freedom* of humane *Actions*.

First; That God is a *Free-agent*, I observed above (p. 16.) was the Opinion of the learned *Stoic Seneca* amongst the *Romans*: And *Epietetus* himself plainly was of the same Opinion: *Jupiter* is represented speaking thus to him, *viz.*

“ \* I have given to Thee a Part of myself,  
 “ *viz.* the Power of *desiring* and *rejecting*, of  
 “ *choosing* and *refusing*; and in short the Power of  
 “ making a right use of Objects.

And he had observed a little before, “ That  
 “ the Gods, as was fit, had † put alone *into our*  
 “ *Power*

\* Ἔδωκα μὲν σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τῆν ὀρεκτικὴν τε καὶ ἀφορμητικὴν, καὶ ἀρετικὴν τε καὶ ἐκκλητικὴν, καὶ ἀπλῶς τῆν χρηστικὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις. *Arrian. Epiet. lib. 1. p. 84.*

† Ὡσπερ ἂν ἦ ἄξιον, τὸ κράτιστος ἀπαντῶν καὶ κρείσσον, οἱ  
 (10.)

“ *Power* the right use of Objects, which is the  
 “ most excellent Endowment, and that which  
 “ governs every Thing besides.

*Philo*, the learned *Jew*, says, that \* *God is an active, not a passive, Being.* And again;  
 “ † That the Soul of Man alone, receiving from  
 “ God the Power of voluntary Motion (or Ex-  
 “ ertion) and being in this Respect made in the  
 “ *Likeness* of him, is set at Liberty, as far as  
 “ possible, from the grievous Tyranny of *Ne-*  
 “ *cessity*.

And indeed the Notion of God being a *Free-agent*, and doing all Things according to his *Will*, was so universally receiv'd among all Sects of Philosophers, that I do not find that even those *few* (for they were indeed but a *few*, and those chiefly *Astrologers* and *Genealogists*) who did hold the *Necessity* of humane Actions, did maintain, that the Actions of God were *necessary*.

The frequent Expressions, both amongst *Poets* and *Philosophers*, that *Jupiter* and the *Gods* were subject to *Fate*, and their stiling God sometimes *Necessity*, mean quite a different Thing

Θεοὶ μέγαν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐποίησαν τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς Φαντασίαις.  
 Ibid.

\* Δραστήριον ἢ τὸ ὄντως ὄν, ἢ πάχον ἀναγκαίως εἶναι. p. 184.

† Μὴν ἢ ἡ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ δεξαμένη (lege δεξαμένη) παρὰ Θεῶν τὴν ἐκείσιν κίνησιν, καὶ κατὰ τῆτο ὁμοιωθεῖσα αὐτῶν χαλεπῆς καὶ ἀργαλειωτάτης δεσποίνης τῆς ἀνάγκης, ὡς εἶν τε. ἐλευθερωθεῖσα, &c.  
 Lib. quod Deus fit immutab. p. 306.

from God being a *necessary* Agent, or the Effects of his Power being the *necessary* Results of his Nature (as I shall prove presently.) Whence I proceed to shew, that the Doctrine of the *Freedom* of humane Actions was the general receiv'd Opinion of the Philosophers of all Ages.

*A. Gellius*, speaking of the *Freedom* of humane Actions, observes, “ \* That *Homer*, the wisest and most antient Poet, says ;

“ O! how do mortal Men accuse us Gods ?

“ They say their Evils all proceed from us :

“ But they, not *Fate*, bring Mischief on themselves

“ Thro' their own voluntary Wickedness.

And \* *Diogenianus* the *Peripatetic*, shows from this Passage, that *Homer* did not hold the Notion of the *Necessity* of humane Actions, and that his Expressions about *Fate*, meant quite another Thing.

\* Primus autem Homerus sapientissimus & antiquissimus Poetarum dixit in hisce versibus ;

Ω πάτερ οἷον αἰ νό θεοὺς θεοὶ αἰτίανται.

Ἐξ ἡμῶν γὰρ φασὶ κακὰ ἕμμεναι αἱ ἢ καὶ αὐτοὶ

ἐφ' ἑστέ. ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μῆτρον ἄλγος ἔχουσιν.

† Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 8

And *Lucian* in the Person of *Triephton* sheweth that *Homer* taught a *conditional* Fate only; which varied according to the different Nature of Men's Actions. To *Critias*, who had asserted from *Homer* the Notion of *absolute* Fate, *Triephton* replies; “ \* How then does this same  
 “ Poet, good *Critias*, make Fate of a twofold  
 “ and ambiguous Nature, *viz.* That *one* Event  
 “ befalls a Man's doing *one* Action, and *another*  
 “ Event his doing *another* ?” Of which he produces Instances out of *Homer*.

That the ancient *Pythagoreans* were Maintainers of the *Freedom* of humane Actions has been shewn above (p. 104.) and may be farther concluded from their known Agreement with the *Platonists* afterwards, who, as I shall prove, were zealous Assertors of *Free-will*.

*Balbus*, the *Stoic*, in *Cicero* says; “ † Let us  
 “ hear *Plato*, a *God*, as it were, of Philosophers;  
 “ who teacheth that there are two sorts of  
 “ Motion, one that is properly *our own*, another  
 “ that is *external*; but that which *moves itself*  
 by

\* Καὶ πῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ποιητὴς, ὃν καλεῖ Κριτία, διττὴν ἐπιλέγει τὴν εἰμαρμένω και ἀμφίβολου, ὡς τὸ ἢ μὲν τι πράξαντι τοῖω δε τέλει συγκυρσαι. τοῖον ἢ ποιήσαντι ἑτέρω τέλει ἐπιτυχεῖν; In Philopat. p. 1123.

† Audiamus Platonem quasi quendam Deum Philosophorum: cui duos placet esse Motus, unum, *suum*; alterum, *externum*: esse autem divinius quod ipsum *ex se sua sponte* moveatur,

“ *by its own Choice*, is of a more divine Nature,  
 “ than that which is impelled by an *external*  
 “ *Force*. This *Self-motion* he placeth in the  
 “ *Mind* only, from which he thinks the *Be-*  
 “ *ginning of Motion* is derived.” This Testimo-  
 ny of *Plato's* Opinion is not only most clear and  
 strong in itself, but is more remarkable, as shew-  
 ing at the same Time the Sense of the *Stoics* to  
 agree with it, as I shall distinctly shew pre-  
 sently.

*Plutarch* in like manner tells us, that *Plato*  
 “ \* Demonstrated that the Soul is an intelligent  
 “ Substance endued with *Self-motion*.” Again,  
 “ † That it is always a *Self-moving* Being, and  
 “ the Fountain and Beginner of Motion.

*Xenocrates*, *Plato's* Scholar, “ † Taught, that  
 “ the Substance of the Soul was a *Self-moving*  
 “ Principle.

The famous *Platonic Hierocles* says; “ \*\* The  
 “ Action of humane Minds proceeds from a *free*

veatur, quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. Hunc autem motum  
 in solis animis esse ponit, ab hisque principium motus esse  
 ductum putat. *De Nat. Deo. Lib. 2.*

\* Ψυχὴν ἑστὴν κινητὴν ἀπεφώνηκε ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητὴν *De Placita.*  
*Philos. lib. 4. c. 2.*

† Ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν προσεῖπεν φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον αἰεὶ καὶ κινή-  
 σως πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν. *Idem de Anim. Procreat. p. 1013.*

‖ Ξενοκράτης τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἑστὴν, ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς κινῶ-  
 μενον ἀποφηνάμενος. *Ibid. p. 1012.*

\*\* Ἀθηναίων ἢ ψυχῶν ἐνέργεια ἢ αὐτοκίνητος προαίρεσις καὶ τὸ  
 δεγόμενον ἐφ' ἡμῶν. *De Fat. p. 28.*

“ *Self-moving* Principle ; and is that which is  
 “ properly said to be *in our own Power*.

Again ; “ \* Our Nature is *rational*, and there-  
 “ fore is endued with a Power of *Deliberation*,  
 “ and is led either to good or evil Counsels by  
 “ its own *free Choice*.

And that *Plato* and his Followers constantly maintained the *voluntary* Motion or Exertion of the Soul, and the *Freedom* of humane Actions is so indisputable and well known to all who are vers'd in the antient Gentile Theology, that I need not cite more Testimonies from Writers of this Sort : And, if any has the least Doubt in this Point, he may find abundant Satisfaction in † *Plotinus* and †† *Chalcidius*, &c.

*Leucippus*, *Democritus* and *Empedocles*, indeed the Founders of the *Epicurean* or *Atomical* System, *Heraclitus*, the Predecessor of the *Stoics*, and some others (whose Notions shall be distinctly considered hereafter) held *Fate* in the Sense of *Necessity*, as ††† *Cicero* informs us, and made the

---

\* Λογικῆς ἢ τῆς Φύσεως ἡμῶν ἕστις καὶ Δία τῆτο βελυτικῆς. ἀκεία  
 ἢ προαιρέσι πρὸς τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς βελύεσθαι προσαγομένης. In *Car.  
 Pyth.* p. 162.

† *Ennead.* 3. de *Fato & Provid.* Lib. 1. 2. 3.

†† In *Plat. Tim.* c. 7. *Fabric.* vol. 2.

‡ Ac mihi quidem videtur cum duæ sententiæ fuissent veterum Philosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id factum vim *Necessitatis* afferret, in qua sententia *Democritus*.



the Motion and Exertion of the Mind subject to it. But yet *Epicurus* and his Followers, and the most eminent of the *Stoical* Sect also rejected the Notion of *Necessity*, and held the *Motions* and *Actions* of Men's Minds to be *voluntary* and *free*.

“ \* *Epicurus* taught that there might be a  
 “ *voluntary* Motion (or Exertion) of the Mind.  
 Again; “ † *Epicurus* wrought and laboured the  
 “ Point to deliver the *voluntary* Agency of the  
 “ Mind from the eternal (necessary) Motion (of  
 “ his Atoms) that Wickedness might not be  
 “ left *unblameable*.

Again; “ † *Epicurus* taught that *our Power of*  
 “ *Action* was uncontrollable, the Consequence  
 “ of which was, that some Things were *blame-*  
 “ *able* and other Things *commendable*.

mocratus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit: altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum *motus voluntarius*. Lib. de Fat. p. 359.

\* Doceret (*Epicurus*) esse posse quendam animi motum voluntarium. Ibid. p. 352.

‡ Ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἐμυστήτως εὐφραίνεται καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ τῆς ἀδίκης κήσεως μηχανάριον· ἐλευθεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπολῦσθαι τὸ ἐκχρῆσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς μη καταλιπεῖν ἀεγκλήτων τὴν κακίαν. Plat. de Stoic. Repug. p. 1050.

† Τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀδέσποτον, ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παραβολεῖσθαι τιφικον. Apud. Diog. Laert. lib. 10. p. 659.

Lastly; the *Epicurean* Notion of *Liberty* is very elegantly describ'd by || *Lucretius*.

The antient *Stoics* also maintained the Freedom of humane Actions.

*Zeno*, the Father of the *Stoics* (as *Cicero* calls him) in his Letter to King *Antigonus* tells him;  
 “ \* It is manifest that you are not only by *Nature* inclin'd to Greatness of Mind, but by  
 “ *Choice* also.

Again; † That which is good is *eligible*, as  
 “ being that which is most worthy to be *chosen*.

It hath been already prov'd p. 104 — 108, and will be farther shewn hereafter that *Zeno's* famous Scholar *Chrysisippus* professed that humane Actions were in Men's own Power; whence it

|| Nec simile 'st, ut cum impulsi procedimus ictu,  
 Viribus alterius magnis, magnoque coactu.  
 Nam tum materiam totius corporis omnem  
 Perspicuum 'st nobis invitis ire, rapique,  
 Donecum eam refrenavit per membra *Voluntas*.  
 Jamne vides igitur, quanquam vis extima multos  
 Pellit & invitos cogit procedere sæpe,  
 Præcipiteisque rapit; tamen esse in pectore nostro  
 Quiddam quod contra pugnare, obstareque possit:  
 Quoius ad *arbitrium* quoque copia materiai  
 Cogitur interdum flecti per membra, per artus.  
 Et projecta refrenantur, retroque residit?

*De Rer. Nat. lib. 2.*

\* Αναγκῆς εἴ ἐ μόνον φύσει πρὸς εὐγενείαν κλίνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ προαιρέσει. *Diog. Laert. lib. 7. p. 370.*

† Ἀρετὴν ᾗ (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) ὅτι τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς εὐλόγως αὐτὸ αἰεῖται. *Ibid. p. 426.*

appears

appears that the learned Dr. *Cudworth*\* is mistaken, when he says, that *the antient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, asserted that God acted necessarily in the general Frame of Things in the World; from whence, by a Series of Causes (they thought) doth unavoidably result whatsoever is done in it. Which Fate is a Concatenation of Causes, all in themselves necessary.*

For which Opinion concerning these two most eminent *Stoics* the learned *Doctor* produceth not the least Evidence. That which deceived him, and hath also deceived others both *antients* (as *Cicero* and *Gellius* observe) and *moderns*; is their Notion of a Series and Concatenation of Causes; which Causes, tho' they were supposed *necessarily* to produce each other, yet they were not supposed to proceed *necessarily* from God, the *original* and *first Cause*, but to be derived from the perfect *Wisdom* of his Nature, and his *Will*, as *Seneca*, the *Stoic*, has informed us: And were not thought to be the *efficient Causes* of humane Actions, (which they expressly exempted from the Coercion of them) but were only understood to be *Motives* or *secondary Causes*; whilst they placed the *principal* and *efficient Cause* of Action within the Mind itself: So that the *Necessity* of this *Stoical Chain* of Causes was only supposed to operate in the Production

---

\* Intel. Syst. p. 4.

of external providential Events consequential to Men's Actions, which were taught to be *voluntary* and in their own Power. And it plainly appears from the Words of *Balbus*, the *Stoic*, alledg'd above (p. 130.) out of *Cicero*, that the *antient Stoics* agreed with the *Platonics* in asserting the *free* and *voluntary* Motion, Exertion or Agency of the humane Mind. To proceed therefore ;

The great *Stoic*, Philosopher, and Emperor *Marcus Antoninus* says; “ \* God hath put it  
“ altogether in *Man's Power* not to fall into real  
“ Evils.” (He means moral Evil or Sin.)

Again; he says; “ † The governing Princi-  
“ ple of the Soul is that which moves and  
“ turns itself, and makes itself what it *wills* to  
“ be, and makes also every Event which be-  
“ falls it appear to itself to be what it *wills*  
“ to be.

Again; “ † Whatsoever are the *Actions* of  
“ the Soul, are all in its *own Power*.

\* Τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀληθείαν κακοῖς, ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπ' αὐτῶ τὸ πᾶν ἔβεντο (Θεοί.) De Seip. lib. 2. Sect. 2.

† Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἐγείρον, καὶ τρέπον, καὶ ποιεῖν μὲν ἑαυτὸ οἷον ἂν καὶ θέλη; ποιοῦν δὲ ἑαυτῶ φαινεῖσθαι πᾶν τὸ συμβαίνειν οἷον αὐτὸ θέλει. Lib. 6. Sect. 8.

‡ Ὅσα αὐτῆς (Ψυχῆς) ἐστὶν ἐνεργήματα, ταῦτα πάντα ἐπ' αὐτῆ ἐστὶν. Ibid. Sect. 32.

Again; “ † The Good and Evil of a *rational*  
 “ and *political* Creature, consists not in *Passion*  
 “ but in *Action*: As neither does his *Virtue* and  
 “ *Vice* consist in *Passion* but in *Action*.

Again; “ \*It is the Property of the *rational*  
 “ Soul to make itself such as it *wills* to be.

Once more; “ † A Man ought to come to  
 “ the End of his Life with Purity, Quietness  
 “ and *Readiness*, submitting to his Fate *without*  
 “ *Compulsion*.

Nothing is more noted in ancient Philosophy  
 than that famous Aphorism of the *Stoic Epictetus*,  
 whereby he distinguisheth Things into two sorts,  
*viz.* “ || Those that are *in our Power*, and those  
 “ that are *not in our Power*. The Things *in our*  
 “ *Power* are our *Opinions, Appetites, Desires,*  
 “ *Aversions*, and, in one Word, *all our Actions*.  
 “ But the Things *not in our Power* are the *Body,*  
 “ *Possessions, Reputation, Authority*, and, in one  
 “ Word, whatsoever are *not our own Actions*.

‡ Οὐκ ἐν Πείσει, ἀλλ' ἐνεργεία, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ πολιτικοῦ, ζῶν  
 κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. ὡς περ ἐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐν πείσει ἀλλ'  
 ἐνεργεία. Ibid. lib. 9. sect. 16.

\* Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ——— ἐαυτὴν, ὅποιαν ἂν βέλεται  
 ποιεῖ. Lib. 2. §. 1.

† Ἐφ' ὃ (τὸ τέλος τοῦ βίου) δεῖ ἐλθεῖν καθαρὸν, ἡσύχιον, ἔυλυτον,  
 ἀβιάσας τῆ ἐαυτοῦ μοῖρᾳ σιωπηροσσομένην. Lib. 3. in fin.

|| Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν μὲν,  
 ὑπόληψις, ὄρμη, ἐρέξις, ἔκκλησις. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα.  
 καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, δὲ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, δόξαι, ἀρχαί, καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅσα  
 οὐκ ἡμέτερα ἔργα. Euchirid. c. 1.

On which Aphorism of *Epietetus*, *Simplicius* comments thus; *viz.* “ || Those Things, he  
 “ saith, are in our own Power which we can  
 “ command, and over which we have Power:  
 “ And those Things we say are in every one’s Power  
 “ which he receives not from another, and  
 “ which another cannot hinder. Such are the  
 “ internal Motions (or Exertions) of the Soul  
 “ proceeding from the Determination and Choice  
 “ of the Soul itself. For the Will cannot be  
 “ mov’d by an external Cause: and tho’ the  
 “ Thing chosen be an external Object, yet the  
 “ Choice itself, and the Exertion of the Soul to-  
 “ wards the Thing chosen, is internal.

Again; “ \* These are properly our own Acti-  
 “ ons, as being perform’d by our own free Choice  
 “ alone ——— to form our Opinions and De-  
 “ sires are our own proper Actions, and in our  
 own

|| Ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνα λέγει, ὧν κύριοί ἐσμεν, καὶ ὧν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχο-  
 μεν ταῦτα καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῶ ἐκάστω λέγομεν, ἀ μὴ παρ’ ἄλλης ἔχει,  
 μηδὲ ὑπ’ ἄλλης τινὸς ἐμποδίξεσθαι δύναται. τοιαῦτα δὲ εἰσι τὰ κινή-  
 ματα τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἐνδοθεν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς κλίσειν καὶ  
 αἴρεσιν γινόμενα· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἔξω κινεῖσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ  
 αἰρετὸν ἔξωθεν ἢ, ἢ αἴρεσις αὐτὴ καὶ ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ αἰρετῶν κινήσει ἐνδοθεν εἶσι.  
 Comment. in *Epiet.* p. 7.

\* Οἰκεῖα ἢ ἡμῶν ἔργα εἰσι ταῦτα, ὡς ὑφ’ ἡμῶν μόνων κατὰ τὴν  
 κριτέραν αἴρεσιν ἐνεργόμενα ——— τὸ ἢ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι  
 ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ ἴδια ἔργα εὐ τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κείμενα. διὸ καὶ  
 οὐ

“ own Power; wherefore the *Good* and *Evil* that  
 “ we do are *in our own Power*.

And the Expression [τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν] *the internal Agency of the Mind, or Power of Action*, so much noted and used by antient Philosophers of all sorts is thus interpreted by the learned *Alexander Aphrodisius*, viz. “ \* All who are not prejudic’d  
 “ in any particular Opinion understand the Ex-  
 “ pression, viz. *The Power of acting that is in*  
 “ *us*, to mean our having a Power to act or not  
 “ to act, without being *impell’d* by any external  
 “ Causes, or carried whithersoever they drive us.  
 “ And this *Choice* is the proper Action of Men.  
 “ For *Choice* is the Exertion (of the Mind) with  
 “ Desire towards that to which we were before  
 “ deliberately inclin’d. Wherefore there is no  
 “ *Choice* concerning those Things that are *necef-*  
 “ *sary*; nor about those Things, which, altho’  
 “ not *necessary*, are not yet done *by ourselves*;  
 “ nor even in respect of all Things which are  
 “ done *by ourselves*, but in those Things only  
 “ which

ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐστίν. Ibid. 28, 29.

\* Τούτο ἢ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν, πάντες ὅσοι μὴ θέσει τινι παρῆσταιται, πα-  
 ρειλήφασιν εἶναι, ἃ ἡμεῖς μὴ κτὶ τοῦ πραχθῆναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ πραχθῆναι  
 κύριοι, οὐκ ἐπόμενοι τισιν ἕξασιν ἡμᾶς παρισῶσιν αἰτίαις, οὐδὲ ἐνοδδύεις  
 αὐτὰς ἢ ἐκείνα ἀγει. καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
 περὶ ταῦτά. ἢ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ προκρινέν ἐκ τῆς βελῆς μτ’ ὀρέξεως ὀρμῆ,  
 προαίρεσις. διὸ ἐδέ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκάως γυρομένοις ἢ προαίρεσις, ἔτε ἐπὶ  
 τοῖς μὴ ἀναγκάως μ, εἰ μὴ δι’ ἡμῶν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς δι’  
 ἡμῶν.

“ which are so done *by ourselves*, that it is in our Power either *to do them* or *do them not*.

*Carneades*, the eminent Scholar of the *Stoic Chryseppus*, and the Founder of the *Academical* Sect, was a great Assertor of the *Freedom* of humane Actions, as \* *Cicero* tells us at large; in-  
somuch that he would not allow that Things *future*, which depended on humane Actions, could be † *foreknown*. And that *Cicero* himself was a Defender of the Doctrine of *Liberty*, has been shewn above (p. 108.) and his Book *concerning Fate* is an ample Proof of it, and is highly deserving the Perusal of all those who favour or maintain the Scheme of the *Necessity* of humane Actions.

Nothing remains to complete the Proof of the *Liberty* of humane Actions, being the general and receiv'd Opinion of all Sects of antient Gentile Philosophers, but the Consideration of the *Aristotelic* Doctrine in this Point.

*Cicero*, as hath been observ'd above (p. 133.) reckons *Aristotle* amongst those who held that humane Actions were subject to *Fate*, taken in the Sense of *Necessity*: But herein *Cicero* was certainly mistaken, for *Plutarch* in his Treatise of the Opi-

ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτοις τοῖς γινομένοις δι' ἡμῶν, ἂν ἡμεῖς τοῦ πράξαι, καὶ τοῦ μὴ πράξαι κύριοι. Lib. de Fat. p. 59, 60.

\* De Fato, p. 352 — 363.

† Ibid. p. 356.



nions of the antient Philosophers remarks no such Thing concerning *Aristotle*, tho' he does observe that *Democritus* and *Heraclitus* (to whom he adds *Parmenides*) were of that Opinion which *Cicero* ascribes to them; and had *Aristotle*, who was so much more eminent than the others, been of the same Opinion, he could hardly have neglected to have taken notice of it.

But farther, \* *Hierocles* expressly says that *Aristotle's* Philosophy agreed with *Plato's*, and that the most learned *Ammonius*, who perfectly understood the Philosophy of both of them, shew'd that they agreed together.

This Concurrence of the *Platonic* and *Aristotelian* Philosophy he again insists on, and speaks with † Contempt of those who pretended they disagreed: and in particular declares that they were of the same Opinion in the Notion of *Fate*, and that he himself agreed with them. “ || That it  
 “ was not the senseless *Necessity* of the *Fortune-*  
 “ *tellers*; nor the *Stoical* Compulsion ——— but  
 “ that it was the judicial Operation of the divine  
 “ Power, effecting Events according to the Laws  
 “ of

\* De Provid. p. 42.

† Ibid. p. 46.

|| 'Ουκ ἄλλην νομίζειν αὐτὸν εἰμαρμένην ἀλλ' ἢ Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτῳ νομίζειν εἰδέναι. τὴν τε γὰρ τῶν γενεθλιαλῶν ἀλόγισον ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ὅλως προσέεται, οὐδὲ τὴν Στοικῆν βίαν ——— ἐκείνη δ' ——— ἢ τις τῶν ἐκβαλλόντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς προείας θεσίων διακασθὲ τοῦ

δέναι

“ of Providence, and determining the Order and  
 “ Series of our Circumstances in the World ac-  
 “ cording to the *free* Purposes of our *voluntary*  
 “ Actions.

And *Aristotle* himself expressly asserts and explains at large the *Freedom of humane Actions*. He lays the Foundation of \* *Praise* and *Dispraise* in Men's *voluntary* Actions. He proves *Freedom* from † *Deliberation* and *Desire*, which he makes to be the same with *Choice*. He expressly declareth that our Actions are ‡ *voluntary* and by *Choice*; that the Practice of *Vertue* and *Vice* is in our own *Power*: And that this is evidently the Opinion not only of all *private Persons*, but

θείς ὑπάρχει ἐνέργεια, τάξει καὶ εἰρμῷ πρὸς τὰς προαιρετικὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν αὐτεξουσίαν ἔργων ἐπανορθωμένη τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς. Apud Phot. Bibliot. p. 552.

\* Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάνη τε καὶ πράξεις ἕσης· καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐκείνοις ἐπάνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀκείνοις, συγνάμης, &c. Ethic. lib. 3. c. 1.

† Βελευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό. — τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βελῆς προκρίεν, προαιρετὸν εἶσι· — οὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ, βελευτοῦ, ἄρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν· καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀν εἰς βελευτικὴ ἔρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἐκ τοῦ βελεύσατο, γὰρ κρίναντες ἀρεγοόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βέλευσιν. Ibid. c. 5. See above p. 78.

‡ Οὐτὸν δὲ βελητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους· βελευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶεν ἀν καὶ ἐκείνοι· αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαί, περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. — τοῖστίσι δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν. κολάζουσιν γὰρ καὶ τιμαροῦνται τὰς δρῶντας μοχθηρὰ ὅσοι μὴ βία, ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ μὴ αὐτοὶ αἰτίαι, τὰς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσας τιμᾶσιν. Ibid. c. 7. See above 57.

of Legislators themselves, who punish those who commit Evil, if they do it not thro' Compulsion or voluntary Ignorance; and reward those who do well. And the learned *Alexander Aphrodisius* and *Ammonius Hermias* have wrote each a Treatise to shew the Agreement of *Aristotle* with the Platonic Notion of *Fate* and humane *Liberty*.

Thus it appears (and I might add many more Testimonies to the same Purpose) that the most antient celebrated Philosophers of all Sects, even the *Stoics* themselves, unanimously taught the *Freedom* of humane Actions. And the principal Maintainers of absolute *Fate* or *Necessity* were the *Astrologers* and *Fortune-tellers* amongst the *Stoics*, who were condemned and despised by the truly learned in Philosophy of all Sects. And from hence I proceed to shew the Notion of the antient *Jews*.

*Philo* says, besides what has been already before-mentioned, (p. 96, 128.) “ \* The Author  
 “ of the Soul, who created it, hath given to  
 “ it alone the Privilege of *Freedom*, and hath  
 “ taken from it the Chains of *Necessity*, and set  
 “ it at *Liberty*; and hath endow'd it with the  
 “ Power of *Will*, to be a most suitable and pe-  
 “ culiar

---

\* Μόνον ἢ αὐτὴν (scilicet ψυχὴν) ὁ γενήσας πατὴρ ἐλευθερίας  
 ἔδωκε καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἀνεῖς δεσμῶν, ἄφετον εἴασε, δαρησάμενοι  
 αὐτῇ τῷ πρῶτω δέσαστε καὶ οἰκείῳ κλίματι αὐτῷ (lege αὐτῆ) τοῦ  
 ἐκείνου

“ peculiar Property of its own, which it was capable of receiving.

And with respect to the several *Sects* amongst the *Jews*, who all (*Cato* affirms) except the *Essenes*, held *Fate* or *Necessity*; *Josephus*, on the contrary informs us, that of the three *Sects*, the *Pharisees*, the *Sadduces* and the *Essenes*; “ \* The *Pharisees* ascribe some, not all Things to *Fate*; “ but say that some Things are in our Power, “ and may be or may not be.

Again; “ † The *Pharisees*, tho’ they ascribe “ all Things (all Events) to *Fate*, do not yet “ deny the free Exertion of the humane *Will*; “ supposing God to have so constituted Things, “ that Men advance in *Vertue* or *Vice*, partly “ by his Influence, and partly by their own “ Will.

ἑκαστὴ μοῖραν ἢν ἰδύνατο δέξασθαι. Quod Deus sit immutab.  
p. 300.

\* Ὅτι μὲν ἦν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἰμαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον. τινὰ δ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνει τε καὶ οὐ γίνεσθαι. Judaic. antiq. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 442.

† Πράσσεισθαι εἰμαρμένη τὰ πάντα ἀξιοῦντες (Φαρισαῖοι) ἕτε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ βεβλήμενον τῆς ἐπ’ αὐτῆς (forte legendo αὐτῶ) ὀρμῆς ἐφαιρούσται· δοκῆσαν (lege δοκῆσαντες) τῷ θεῷ κατὰσιν γίνεσθαι, καὶ τῷ ἐκείνου (forte legendo ἐκείνου) βεβλητηριῶ, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων θελήσαντι προχωρεῖν (forte προχωρεῖν) μὴ ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας. Antiq. Judaic. lib. 18. c. 2.

And this Notion of the *Pharisees* he more clearly explains elsewhere, *viz.* “ || The *Pharisees* “ ascribe all Things to Fate and God. But to “ *do right or not*, is (they teach) for the *most* “ *part* in Men’s Power: But that *Fate* also as- “ sists them in every Thing.

Whence their real Notion appears plainly to have been that *some Things*, i. e. outward Events which happen to Men proceeded from *Fate* or the divine *Providence*; but that Men’s *Actions*, their doing *Right* or *Wrong*, was *in their own Power*; yet so as *Fate*, or providential second Causes operated with them; concurring to their *Actions*, either as *Motives*, which *Chrysippus* in *Cicero* call’d (*adjuvantes Causee*) *assistant Causes*; or by their Influence; Providence ordering (they thought) external Events to befall them, according to their *Actions*. That this was the true Opinion of the *Pharisees*, and that they did not think Men’s *Actions* were subject to any absolute *Fate* or *Necessity*, appears further from the Notion of the *Sadducees*, who, he says, “ \* Wholly deny’d *Fate*, asserting there was no such Thing; “ and

|| Φαρισαῖοι μὴ ——— εἰμαρμένην τε καὶ θεῶν προσάπτουσι πάντα. καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν τὰ δίκαια, καὶ μὴ, κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κινᾶται. βοηθεῖν ὅς εἰς ἕκαστον καὶ τὴν εἰμαρμένην. De Bel. Jud. lib. 2. c. 12. p. 788.

† Σαδδουκαῖοι τὴν μὴ εἰμαρμένην ἀπαύρουσι· οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτης ἀξιούσης;

“ and that it was not the Cause of any Events  
 “ unto Men; and that all Things were *in our*  
 “ *own Power*, so that we ourselves were the  
 “ Causes of our own Happiness; and that Evils  
 “ befell us thro’ our own Folly.” To which he  
 adds,

“ \* It was their Opinion that God neither did  
 “ any Evil or regarded any; but they say that  
 “ Good and Evil is proposed to Men’s *Choice*,  
 “ and they indifferently befall every one accord-  
 “ ing to the Conduct of his own *Will*.” So  
 that the *Sadducees* not only attributed all Men’s  
*Actions* to their *Will* and *Choice*; but suppos’d  
 also that their good or bad Fortune in the World,  
 their outward Happiness or Misery, was not di-  
 rected by *Fate* or *Providence* at all, as the *Phari-*  
*sees* held, but was merely the Consequence of  
 their own *voluntary Doings*.

Thus it is prov’d, that the two great and nu-  
 merous Sects amongst the *Jews* agreed in the  
 Opinion of the *Freedom* of humane Actions;  
 and just on the direct contrary to *Cato’s* Relati-

ἀξιοῦντες. ἔτε κατ’ αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν ἅπαντα ἢ  
 ἐφ’ ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς πίνονται. ὡς καὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν αἰτίους ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς γι-  
 νομένους, καὶ τὰ χείρω ὡς ἡμετέραν ἀβουλίαν λαμβάνοντας. An-  
 tiq. Jud. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 442.

\* Σαδδουκαῖοι — ἢ Θεὸν ἔξω τῶ ὄραν τι κακὸν, ἢ ἐφορεῖν πί-  
 νονται φασὶ ἢ ἐφ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκλογῆ, τότε καλὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν προ-  
 κείσθαι, καὶ τὸ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκάστου τῶτων ἐκάτερον προσιέναι. De  
 Hel. Jud. lib. 2. c. 12. p. 788.

on of the Matter, it can only be alledged, that the small Sect of the *Essenes*, not much above four thousand in Number, as \* *Philo* and *Josephus* tell us, held the Opinion of *Fate* or *Necessity* in *Cato's* Sense; but neither does that at all certainly appear; for *Josephus* only says of them;

“ † The Sect of the *Essenes* make *Fate* to be the Director of all Things; and teach that nothing happens unto Men, but by the Decrees of it.

In which Words he does not say that they ascrib'd humane *Actions* to the over-ruling Power of *Fate*, or to *Necessity*; but only all outward *Events* which befel Mankind.

In which respect *Philo* explains their Notion to be; “ † That they thought God was the Author of all good Things, but of nothing that is evil.” So that their Opinion seems not to have been much different from that of the *Pharisees*: And they did not deny the Freedom of Men's *Actions*, but only ascrib'd all external *Events*, especially all good Things that befel them, to *Fate*, God, or divine Providence.

\* Πλῆθος ὑπὲρ τετρακιχίλις. p. 876. Ἄνδρες ὑπὲρ τετρακιχίλιοι τ' ἀριθμὸν ὄντες. *Joseph. Antiq. Jud. lib. 18.*

† Τὸ τῶν Ἐσσηαῶν γένος πάντων τῶν εἰμαρμένω κυρία δαφάνεται. καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο κατ' ἐκείτης ψῆφου ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾷ. *Antiq. Jud. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 442.*

‡ Τοῦ πάντων ἢ ἀρχῶν αἰτίας, κακῆ ἢ καλοῦ νομοῦ εἶναι. τὸ δεινόν. (iege vel τ' δεινόν vel το δεινόν.) p. 877

And accordingly \* *Josephus* tells us, that they agreed in Opinion with the *Pharisees* in all other Points, excepting what he had mentioned, *viz.* their not sacrificing in the Temple, and having a particular and more recluse way of living, and possessing all Things in common with each other.

Lastly; Nothing can be more unreasonable than *Cato's* pretending that the Doctrine of *humane Liberty* has no *Foundation in Scripture*; when, on the contrary, nothing can be more clear and certain, than that the whole *Scriptures*, both of the old and new Testament, are built upon, and presuppose, as well as expressly teach, that Men's Actions are *in their own Power*, and the Result of their *Will and Choice*. That God has propos'd to their *Choice, Good and Evil, Life and Death, Happiness and Misery*; and has not only commanded them to *choose* the one, and *refuse* the other, but has made all his Promises and Threatnings † *conditional*; which would be  
absurd,

\* Τὰ μὲ λοιπὰ πάντα γνώμη τῶν Φαρισαίων ὁμολογεῖσι. *Jud. Antiq.* lib. 18. c. 2.

† Hebræis quoque consilium datum est a Deo cum prædictione rerum futurarum, in istum modum: *Si præceptis meis parebitis, bona terrarum omnia penes vos erunt. Lac itaque et mellifluis fluctus non deerunt. Si contemseritis, pœnarum imminentium seriem divina vox profecuta est.* Quippe quod esset *dubium* id quod erat positum in *hominis potestate*, parere ve contemnere jussa cœlestia. Quod si *optionem* eorum præcederet decretum



absurd, if it was not in Men's Power to perform or not perform the *Conditions* proposed to them. And if *Cato* had had any regard for, or had ever read the Writings of the *primitive Christians*, he must have seen and own'd, that no Doctrine was more unanimously and universally insisted on, and inculcated by them than that of *humane Liberty*: And the contrary Doctrine of the *Necessity* of humane Actions was a principal Branch of the Error of the \**Valentians*, *Marcionites*, and *Manichees*, who, in consequence of it, led most † profligate and wicked Lives.

If the Reader has a mind to know the Notion of the antient Christians on this Subject, I would recommend to his Perusal two as learned Writers, and as well skill'd in the Philosophy of their times as any the World affords, namely *Origen* and *Eusebius*, who have treated this Argument at large, one in the first Chapter of his third Book of † *Principles*; and the other in the

decretum inevitabile, *necessarioque* contemnendum esset; abundaret prædictio, abundarent etiam promissa & minæ. *Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. p. 263.*

\* See Iren. contra Hæres. lib. 1. c. 7. p. 35. Tertul. contra Marc. lib. 2. c. 6. & de Anim. lib. c. 21. Orig. Philoc. c. 21. p. 54. & Huet. Origen. p. 106. August. Tom. 6. p. 24, &c.

† Iren. cont. Hæres. lib. 1. c. 6.

‡ Or Philocalia c. 21. where the *Greek* is extant.

sixth Book of his Præparatio Evangelica. But to alledge the Opinions of such ignorant *Enthusiasts* as the *Mahometans*, and some few rigid *Calvinists* Notion of *Predestination* (neither of which Notions are yet the same with this Author's Notion of *Necessity*, as might easily be proved, if it was any Thing to the Purpose) is below a Man of Sense in the Way of Reason and Argument.

I proceed in the next Place to shew what was the antient *philosophical* Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity*, and that it was thought to be consistent with the *Freedom of humane Actions*.

That there is such a Thing as \* *Fate*, and that many Events are effected by it, was the general Opinion of all Philosophers, † *Anaxagoras* amongst the Gentiles and the ‖ *Sadducees* amongst the *Jews* only excepted, who were both of Opinion that nothing was the Effect of *Fate*, and that it was a mere *empty Name*. And as these wholly deny'd *Fate* in every Sense, so it must be

\* Τὸ μὲ εἶναι ἡ τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι τινα κατ' αὐτὴν ἰκανῶς ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωίτησι πρόληψις. Alex. Aphrodis. de fato lib. p. 11.

† Αναξαγόρας ὁ κλαζμίνης, καὶ τοὶ τ' ἄλλα ὄν ἐν τοῖς τὴν φυσικὴν φιλοσοφίαν φιλοσοφήσαντι οὐκ ἀπερριμμένῳ, οὐκ ἀξιώπις ἀντιμαρτυρῶν τῇ κοινῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πίσει πρὸς εἰμαρμένης. λέγει γὰρ ἄλλός γε μὴδὲν τῶν γινόμενων γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ εἶναι κενὸν τῆτο γένημα.

‖ See above p. 146.

confessed that there were some others, who carried the Notion of it as far in the other Extreme, and taught that every Thing, all Events, and even *humane Actions* were effected by the impulsive *Necessity* of it. I shall therefore (to obviate the Cavils and Pretences of the *Fatalists*, and Assertors of the *Necessity* of humane Actions, who are apt, at random, and without having consider'd the Matter, to alledge the antient Philosophers for their Opinion) shew the Reader who those were who really held their Sentiments, and on what Reasons and Arguments their Notion of Fatality was founded; and then set forth distinctly and particularly that Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity*, which was the concurrent receiv'd Opinion of all Sects of Philosophers.

*Plutarch* tells us, that \* *Parmenides* and *Democritus* held, “ That all Things came to pass by “ *Necessity*; and that this *Necessity* was *Fate*, and “ *Justice* and *Providence*, and the *Maker* of the “ *World*.

† *Heraclitus* was of the same Opinion. To

\* Παρμενίδης ἔχ' Δημόκριτ' πάντα κατὰ ἀνάγκη· τὴν αὐτὴν ὅτιναι ἔχ' εἰμαρμένην, καὶ Δίκην, καὶ πρόνοιαν, καὶ κοσμοποιόν. De Placit. Philos. p. 884. And *Ænomaus* chargeth *Democritus* with making the humane Mind (ὄσλον) a Slave to *Necessity*. *Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.*

† Ἡράκλειτ' πάντα κατ' εἰμαρμένην, τὴν ὅτιν αὐτὴν ἐπάρχειν καὶ κρίνει. Ibid.

these *Cicero* joyns || *Empedocles*, and, by Mistake, \* *Aristotle*, as I prov'd above. It appears also from *Cicero*, that the antient † *Diodorus* was of the same Opinion, who maintain'd that all Truths in *Futurity*, as well as those which are *actual*, are *necessarily* such, and cannot but be.

These are the principal Assertors of the Doctrine of absolute *Fatality* that we know of; and they who followed their Opinion, all founded the Arguments and Reasons of it in the Supposition of the Truth of the *material System*, or that nothing existed but *Body* and *Matter*, which Notion our Author himself rejects.

First; Those of the *atomical Sect*, who followed the Opinion of *Democritus*, alledg'd, that all Things, even humane Actions, were effected by the eternal † necessary Motion, and perpendicular Impulse of self-existent corporeal Atoms, by whose fortuitous Concourse and Union all

|| De Fat. lib. p. 359.

\* See above p. 140, 141.

‡ Ille (*Diodorus*) id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut futurum sit verum: & quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse: & quicquid non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. *Lib. de Fato*, p. 346. and again p. 349.

† Id (scilicet quod atomus gravitate ferretur naturali & necessaria cum ita moveretur animus, ut atomorum motu cogere-  
retur) *Democritus* autor atomorum accipere maluit, necessitate omnia ferri, &c. *Ibid.* f. 352.

Things were form'd. But this Notion is almost too ridiculous even to be mentioned, and is particularly confuted by \* *Plotinus*, and, I think, is now univerfally exploded.

Secondly; Those amongst the *Stoics*, who adher'd to the Doctrine of *Heraclitus*, were of three feveral Opinions.

“ † Some derived all Things from the *first Cause*  
 “ of the Universe, which they said pervaded all  
 “ Things, and not only gave Motion to, but was  
 “ the *efficient Cause* of every Thing, stiling it *Fate*,  
 “ and the supreme Cause, and supposing it to be it  
 “ self all Things, and that not only all other Things  
 “ which exist, but even the inward Purposes of our  
 “ Minds also proceeded from the efficient Power  
 “ of it; as the Members of an Animal are not  
 “ mov'd of themselves, but by that governing  
 “ Principle, which is in every Animal.

This was making no Agent in the World but God only, and humane Actions to be nothing but the Operations of God in Men, actuating

\* *Ennead.* 3. lib. 1.

† Οἱ ἐπὶ τὴν τῆ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες, ἀπ' αὐτῆς κατὰ γένος πάντα, ἀπὸ πάντων φοιτήσασαν αἰτίαν, καὶ ταύτην μόνον ἔκινῶσαν ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιῶσαν ἕκαστα λέγοντες, εἰμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριατέτην αἰτίαν θέμενοι, αὐτῆς ἔσαν τὰ πάντα οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἀφροσύσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνης ἵνα κινηθῶσιν. ὅσον ζῶον μορῶν μὴ κινουμένων ἐκάστων ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἐκ ἧ τοῦ ἡγεμονοῦντος ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ζῶων. *Plotin. Ennead.* lib. 1. c. 3.

them and every Thing else as the Soul does the Body.

And \* *Plotinus* excellently argues against the precedent Notion, as being “ an Excess of Necessity.” And that in Consequence of it, “ We are neither our *own* Persons nor any Action is *our own*; neither is it *we* that purpose, but our Purposes are the the Purpose of another Person; neither do we *act at all*. ——— “ But (he concludes) every individual Thing ought to be *its own self*, and our Actions and Purposes be *our own*; and every one’s good and bad Actions to proceed from every one’s *self*; and we ought not to ascribe the doing of Evil to the universal first Cause.

Thirdly; “ Others thought that the Circumvolution of the Universe effected all Things by its Motion, and by the Positions and Appearances of the Planets and fix’d Stars with  
“ Respect

\* Το σφοδρὸν τὴν ἀνάγκης ——— ἕτε ἡμεῖς, ἡμεῖς, ἕτε ἡμέτερον ἔργον οὐδὲ λογιζόμεθα αὐτοὶ, ἀλλ’ ἕτερος λογισμὸς, τὰ ἡμέτερα βουλευμάτων. οὐδὲ πράττομεν ἡμεῖς· ἀλλὰ ᾧ δεῖ ἢ ἕκαστον, ἕκαστον εἶναι; καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας, καὶ ἀγνοίας ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὰς ἑκάστου καλὰς τε καὶ αἰχρὰς πράξεις παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ παντὶ τῶν γούν τῶν αἰχρῶν ποίησιν ἀναπέθειναι. Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 4.

† Ἄλλοι τὴν τοῦ παντός φορὰν περιέχουσαν, καὶ πάντα ποιούσαν τῇ κινήσει. καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄστρον πλαναμενῶν τε καὶ ἀπλανῶν ἡύεσι;

“ Respect to each other, and, founding upon  
 “ these the Art of Prognostication, would have  
 “ it that every Thing came to pass thereby.

This was the astrological Notion of Fate, founded upon mere Ignorance in Astronomy and natural Philosophy, and therefore was ridicul'd by the learned Antients, as it is by all truly learn'd Philosophers at this Day.

*Plotinus* observes concerning it, “ That it is  
 “ another way [*viz.* different from the *Stoics* be-  
 “ fore mentioned, who made God alone or the  
 “ first Cause act every Thing] of ascribing every  
 “ Thing we *do*, our Purposes and Passions, our  
 “ Wickedness and Appetites to the Universe  
 “ (or to God :) and attributing nothing to our-  
 “ selves, leaves us like Stones that are cast, and  
 “ not as Men, who *act of themselves*, and from  
 “ their own Nature:” Adding, “ But we  
 “ ought to ascribe that which is *our own* (*viz.*  
 “ our Actions) to *ourselves*; and making a Di-  
 “ stinction, *viz.* that we ourselves are the *effi-*  
 “ *cient Cause* of some Things, and that in some

X 2

“ Things

---

καὶ χηματισμοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλα, ἀπὸ τῶ ἐκ τῶτων πρόβησιν πιστέμενοι, ἕκαστα ἐντεῦθεν γίνεσθαι ἀξιούσι. *Ibid.* cap. 2. *Alex. Aphrodis.* represents their Opinion in like manner. p. 103, 104.

\* Οὐτὸ ἕτερον τρόπον ἐκείνοις ἀνατίθησι τὰ ἡμέτερα, βελίας καὶ πάθη, κακίας τε καὶ ὀφμιας. ἡμῶν οὐδὲν διδως, λίθοις φεραμένοις καταλείπει εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅσκι ἀνθρώποις, ἔρχοσι παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶ αὐτῶν φύσεως ἔρχον. — ἀλλὰ χρὴ δίδουαι μὴ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἡμῶν. — Δυσφόρμε-

“ also we are *passive* and under the Impulse of  
 “ *Necessity*, not ascribe all Things to the fore-  
 “ mentioned Causes.

Fourthly; Another Notion of Fatality was  
 “ founded in the Supposition of \* a mutual  
 “ eternal Concatenation and Chain of Causes,  
 “ whereby Things posterior always follow those  
 “ which are antecedent, and are resolved into them,  
 “ as existing by them, and having no Existence  
 “ without them; and are necessarily consequent  
 “ to those which precede them: This was ano-  
 “ ther way of asserting an absolute Fatality.”  
 And this was the most plausible and most insisted  
 on by the Maintainers of *Necessity*; and was  
 grounded on the Supposition that every Motion  
 was caused by an *external* Impulse of Matter,  
 and that there was no internal Principle or  
 Cause of Motion or Action in the Mind at all;  
 which the Opposers of this Fatality prov'd there  
 was by strong undeniable Evidence both of *Sense*  
 and *Reason*.

νον τίνα μὴ ἡμεῖς ἐργαζόμεθα, τίνα ἢ πάχομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ πάν-  
 τα ἐκείνοις ἀνασπέναι. Ibid. c. 5.

\* Τὴν σῶν αἰτίων ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ τὸν ἀνάσθεν εἰρημὸν,  
 καὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις αἰεὶ τὰ ὑστερα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἐκείνα αἰε-  
 τεῖν οἱ αὐτῶν γινόμενα, καὶ ἀνευ ἐκείνων σὸς ἂν γινόμενα, δελεῦν τε  
 τοῖς πρὸς (lege πρὸ) αὐτῶν τὰ ὑστερα. ταῦτα εἴ τις λέγει, εἰμαρμένην  
 ἔστιν τρόπον εἰσάγων φησὶται. Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 2.



Plotinus's Reply to the foregoing Opinion is  
 " \* That it is near akin to that which makes  
 " every *Affection* and *Exertion* of ours to proceed  
 " from the Soul of the Universe. And if any  
 " one who holds this Fatality is willing still to  
 " grant that we and every one of us have a  
 " Power of *acting from ourselves*, yet neverthe-  
 " less he holds an absolute *Necessity* of all Things;  
 " and since all Things are comprehended in this  
 " Chain of Causes, every Thing must be as it is:  
 " For since all Things are contain'd in this Fate,  
 " there is nothing to hinder, or make them to  
 " be otherwise than they are. And Things being  
 " thus impelled as by one universal Cause, no-  
 " thing will be left in our Power, but to be  
 " carried wheresoever they impel us: For our  
 " *Senses* will follow these antecedent Causes, and  
 " our *Desires* will be form'd according to them;  
 " and so our Power of Action will be only an  
 " empty Name." Whence, he adds, there will  
 " be

---

\* Εσι μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ δόξα ἐγγὺς ἐκείνης τῆ παῖσαν κατὰ (lege  
 καὶ) γέσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἡμετέραν ἐκ τῆ τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἡκεν λε-  
 γέσης. εἰ καὶ βέλτερά τις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκάστοις χαλεπέσθαι εἰς τὸ  
 πασι ἡμῖν ποιεῖν τι. ἔχει μὲν ἔν τὴν πάντως πάντων ἀνάγκην,  
 καὶ πάντων εἰλημμένων τῶν αἰτίων, ὅσα ἐσιν ἕκαστον μὴ ἐ γί-  
 νεσθῆ. ἐσὲν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ καλύσειν ἢ ἄλλως γίνεσθαι ποιῆσον εἰ πάντα εἰληπταί  
 ἐν τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ. τοιαῦτα ἢ ἔντα ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ἀρρημένα, ἡμῖν  
 ἐσὲν καταλείψει ἢ φέρεσθαι ὅτι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἄλλῃ. αἴτε γὰρ φαντασίαι τοῖς  
 προηρησαμένοις (subintelligitur ἐψονται) αἴτε ὄρμαι κατὰ ταύτας  
 ἴσονται. ὄνομά τε μῖνον τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔσαι, — οἷον καὶ τὸ τῶν  
 ἄλλων

be only a mere *spontaneous* Motion or Impetus in us, “ such as there is in other *Animals*, and in “ *Infants* and *Madmen*, who are acted upon by “ the blind Impulse of their Appetites.

*Cicero* agrees with *Plotinus*, that the \* *Notion of an eternal Chain of Causes deprives the Mind of Man of its free Will, and subjects it to a necessary Fatality*; which Opinion, he says, † *is not tolerable*.

*Plotinus* concludes his Arguments against the Fatalists by putting the Question; “ || What “ other *Cause* then besides these (forementioned) “ can be introduced, which will both solve the “ Difficulty of any thing being without a Cause, “ and preserve the Series and Order of Things, “ and allow something to be in our Power, and “ neither yet destroy Prognostication and Di- “ vination?” To which he answers; “ That “ we ought to admit the *Soul* to be another  
*principal*

ἄλλων ζῶων καὶ τὸ τῶν νηπίων καθ' ὁσμῶς τυφλῶς ἰόντων, καὶ τὸ τῶν μαννομένων, ὁσμῶσι ᾧ ἔσται. Ibid. §. 7.

\* At qui introducunt causarum feriem sempiternam, ii mentem hominis voluntate libera spoliata necessitate fati devinciunt. *Lib. de Fato* p. 350.

† Hæc (scilicet sententia omnia fato fieri) non est tolerabilis. Ibid. p. 351.

|| Τις ἔν ἄλλῃ αἰτία παρὰ ταύτας ἐπελθῶσα ἀναίτιόν τε ἔδεν ἐκταλείψει, ἀκολοθίαν τε τρέψει καὶ τάξει. ἡμᾶς τέ τι εἶναι συγχωροῦσι, προφῆσεις τε καὶ μαχητίας σοῦ ἢ ἀναίρεσις; ψυχὴν ἢ θεῶν ἀρχήν

“ *principal Cause* (of Action) ——— not only  
 “ the Soul of the Universe, but the Soul of  
 “ every particular Man also, as well as that  
 “ ——— and that it is a *primary efficient Cause.*”  
 And then he proceeds to shew at large wherein  
 the Freedom of the humane Soul consists.

Thus I have considered the several Opinions  
 of the antient *Fatalists*, which resolv'd into two;  
 the one made every Thing the necessary Effect of  
 the eternal Motion and Concourse of Atoms; the  
 Absurdity of which, as supposing an eternal  
 Chain of *Effects* without any original *Cause* or  
*Agent* at all, evidently appears; and which, by  
 inferring the Necessity of human Actions, and  
 thereby taking away the Foundation and distinc-  
 tion of *Virtue* and *Vice*, and the consequent  
*Praise* and *Dispraise* due unto them, was rejected  
 by \* *Epicurus* himself on this very Account.  
 The other made no *Agent* in the World but God,  
 who was suppos'd to be infus'd like a Soul thro'  
 the whole Universe, and to act in every Thing  
 by an eternal Chain of Causes, necessarily con-  
 nected with each other, and all derived from

χὴν ἔσαν ἄλλη — οὐ μόνον τὴν ὅλην παντός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑκάστη  
 μὲν ταύτης — πρῶτον αἰτίας ἔσης. Ibid. c. 8.

• Ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ὁμωρρέτως σέφεται καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ τὴν αἰσθη-  
 κινήσεως μηχανάμενος ἐλευθεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπλῶσαι τὸ ἐκούσιον ἕκασ-  
 τῷ μὴ κατακτιπῆν ἀνεγκλήτοι τῆς κακίας. Plutarch de Stoic.  
 Repug. p. 1050.

God (who was call'd Fate) as the original and supreme Cause of all.

This latter, tho' more plausible than the former, yet so plainly inferred (as both \* *Plotinus* and † *Cicero* observe) such a Fate as made Men's Actions *necessary*, whereby the Nature of *Virtue* and *Vice*, of *Rewards* and *Punishments* were so wholly destroy'd, that it made the Notion itself *intolerable*, as *Cicero* calls it; insomuch that the Defenders of it were forc'd to allow notwithstanding (tho' inconsistently with themselves) that there was a *Power of Action* or *free Agency* in Men's Minds; and durst not affirm that humane Actions were *necessary*: and the Opposers of it were so averse to it on this Account, as to recur to the other Extreme, and maintain that the § *voluntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind was not at all influenced by Fate, or antecedent Causes*. These two rigid opposite Tenents, as they were thought, made the famous \* *Chrysisippus*, and the most reasonable and learned of the Antients of all Sects, step in as Moderators betwixt these two Opinions, and come to an Agreement on all sides, that

\* Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 4. Cic. lib. de Fat. p. 350.

† Ibid. p. 351.

§ Cum duæ sententiæ fuissent veterum Philosophorum, una eorum qui censent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis afferret — altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, *ibid.* p. 359.

\* *Ibid.* p. 359, 360.

as on the one hand *Necessity* was to be excluded from *humane Actions*, that so the Distinction of *Virtue* and *Vice*, and the *Rewards* and *Punishments* both of divine and humane Laws founded upon them, might be preserv'd inviolated; so on the other hand *Fate*, even with respect to humane *Actions* (as well as to external Events consequent upon them, in which it was absolute and uncontrollable) was so far to be retain'd, as that it was to be allow'd that *antecedent Causes* were the Motives of acting, or influenc'd the Mind to act, tho' the *principal* and *efficient Cause* of Action was a *natural Power* and *free Exertion* of the Mind itself.

This Distinction of *Fate* and *Necessity*, and middle Opinion founded upon it, prevail'd amongst all sorts of Philosophers, *Stoics* as well as *Platonics*, &c; (excepting the ignorant *Astrologers* and *Fortunetellers* amongst the *Stoics*) accordingly we learn from *Plutarch* that \* *Plato* (the great Assertor of the Freedom of the Mind) " admitted " *Fate* with respect to the humane Soul and Life; " but adds withal, that the Cause (of Action) is " in ourselves. The *Stoics* in Agreement with

---

\* Πλάτων ἐγκρίνει μὲν τὴν εἰμαρμένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχῶν καὶ βίῳ, συνεισάγει δὲ καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῶν αἰτίαν· οἱ Στωϊκοὶ Πλάτωνος ἐμπερῶς καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνίκητόν φασιν αἰτίαν καὶ βιασικὴν. τὴν δὲ εἰμαρμένην, συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην, ἐν ἣ ἡ συμπλοκὴ ἢ ἔστω τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν, ὥστε τὰ μὲν εἰμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀνειμάρθαι, de Placit. Philos. p. 884, 885.

“ *Plato* say, that *Necessity* is an invincible and  
 “ compulsive Cause; but that *Fate* is the deter-  
 “ min’d Connection of Causes, in which Con-  
 “ nection our *Power of Action* is contain’d: so  
 “ that some things are destin’d, and others not.

And *Austin* says, “ \* That the *Stoics* distin-  
 “ guish’d the Causes of Things (into *antecedent*  
 “ and *efficient*, as hath been before observ’d) that  
 “ they might exempt some from *Necessity*, and  
 “ subject others to it: and amongst those which  
 “ they allow’d not to be *under Necessity*, they  
 “ plac’d our *Wills*; lest otherwise if subjected to  
 “ *Necessity*, they should not be *free*.

Hence it appears that there is no real Diffe-  
 rence betwixt the *Platonical* and *Stoical* Philoso-  
 phy in the Opinion of *Fate* and the *Freedom of*  
*humane Actions*; and that which hath led Men  
 thro’ Mistake to think that it was the constant  
 and settled Doctrine of the *Stoics*, that humane  
 Actions were subject to an absolute *Fatality* or  
*Necessity*, is their asserting in general Terms that  
*all* things were originally fix’d and determin’d by  
 the Laws or Decrees of *Fate*, and are carried on  
 and effected by an immutable Connection and

\* Unde nec illa *Necessitas* formidanda est, quam formidando  
 Stoici laboraverunt causas rerum ita distinguere, ut quasdam  
 subtraherent *Necessitati*, quasdam subderent: atque in his, quas  
 esse sub *Necessitate* noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras *voluntates*,  
 ne videlicet non essent libera; si subderentur *Necessitati*. De Ci-  
 vit. Det. lib. 5. c. 10.

Chain of Causes: whereas this *Fatality* or *Necessity* with respect to Men was only understood of *external* providential \* Events which were appointed consequential to the Nature of their Actions, presuppos'd to be *free* and *in their own Power*. For the most eminent and rigid *Stoics* plainly assert the Freedom of humane Actions, as hath been prov'd above; and the *Platonics*, who are known to be most zealous for the Cause of *Liberty*, do yet with the *Stoics* constantly maintain *Fate*, and a determin'd Order and Series of antecedent Causes.

From the preceding Observations then we learn what was the true Opinion in general both of the *Platonics* and *Stoics* concerning *Fate*; namely, that it was no other than the *Laws of Divine Providence*, whereby all Things are govern'd according to their *several Natures*; and therefore particularly in respect of Men, it was understood to be the *Rules and Decrees* of Divine Providence determining the Events of humane Life, and dispensing Rewards and Punishments according to the Nature of Mens *voluntary* Actions.

They thought that God govern'd the World by his sovereign *Will*, which they call'd *Providence*; by which he made fix'd and unalterable Laws for the Administration of the whole Universe; and that he determin'd Mens Conditions, and their

---

† "Οτι ἂν σοι συμβᾶινη, τῷτό σοι ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατεσκευάζετο, ἢ ἐπιπλοκὴ τῶν αἰτίων συνέκλωθε τὴν τε σὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐξ αἰδίου, ἢ τὴν τύτου σύμβασιν. M. Anton. lib. 10. sect. 5.

Happiness or Misery, whether here or hereafter, according as their *Actions* freely chosen, and done *voluntarily*, should be. So that *Fate* in reality was no other than \* *Providence*, or the immutable Law and Rule of God's Government of the World; and which was call'd *Necessity* (not as being suppos'd to effect *necessarily*, or to be the *necessary efficient Cause* of humane Actions, but) because it was the *necessary Law* of all Nature; and the external Effects of it, or the Events produc'd by it by a Series of antecedent Causes, in Consequence of Mens *voluntary Actions*, were unavoidable and necessary.

That this is the true antient Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity*, I shall further distinctly prove by a brief and indisputable Deduction of Particulars.

*Chrysisippus* says; “ † Fate is the Reason of the “ World, or the Law of Providence by which “ all things in the World are govern'd.” And *Gellius* tells us, that *Chrysisippus* held that the “ ‡ *Order and Reason and Necessity* of Fate was a “ Motive

\* Nonnulli putant præsumi differentiam providentiæ fatique, cum res una sit: quippe providentiam Dei esse voluntatem, voluntatem porro ejus seriem esse causarum — porro series causarum est fatum cognominatum. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. 237. edit. Fabric.

† Είμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τῷ κόσμῳ λόγος, ἢ νόμος τῶν ἐντῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίας δίκαιουμένων. apud Plutarc. de Placit. Philos. p. 885.

‡ Ordo & ratio & necessitas fati genera ipsa & principia causarum movet: impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum,



“ Motive of Action to the general and efficient  
 “ Causes of it; but that every ones own *Will*  
 “ and Dispositions directed the Exertion of our  
 “ Minds and Purposes, and the Actions of them.”  
 And *Diogenianus* the Peripatetic writing against  
*Chryfippus* says, “ \* It is manifest from the Di-  
 “ stinction which he (*Chryfippus*) makes, that  
 “ the Cause (of Action) which is in us, is ex-  
 “ empt from Fate.” And he cites *Chryfippus* as  
 declaring, “ † That it is evident that many things  
 “ are done by our own Power, but yet neverthe-  
 “ less that these things are connected with Fate,  
 “ by which the Universe is govern’d.

*Cicero* in the Person of *Velleius* represents the  
*Stoical* Notion of Fate to be, “ || That all Events  
 “ proceed from the eternal Truth and Connec-  
 “ tion of Causes.” *Diogenes Laertius* says it was  
 their Opinion, “ § That Fate is the Connection

rum, actionesque ipsas voluntas cujusque propria & animo-  
 rum ingenia moderantur. *Noc. Attic. lib. 6. p. 365, 366. See*  
*above p. 85.*

\* Ἐξ αὐτῆς ἢ τῆς διαστολῆς, ἢ ποιεῖται χρύσιππος, δῆλον γίνεσθαι  
 ἀποκελεύσθαι τὴν εἰμαρμένην τὴν παρ’ ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. *Apud Euseb. Præp.*  
*Evang. lib. 6. c. 8.*

† Φησὶν — τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, εὐδὲ ἢ  
 ἕττον συγκαθεμάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὅλων διακίήσει. *ibid.*

|| Εἰμαρμένην dicunt: ut quicquid accidat, id ex eterna veri-  
 tate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatur. *De Nat. Deo-  
 rum lib. 1.*

§ Ἔστι ἢ εἰμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρμήνη, ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν ὁ  
 κόσμος διέξογεται, *lib. 7. p. 459, 460.*

“ of the Causes of things, or that Reason by  
 “ which the World is govern'd.

*Seneca* (the *Stoic*) says; “ \* Fate is nothing  
 else but the Connection of Causes.

*Marcus Antoninus* † the Emperor and *Stoical*  
 Philosopher frequently expresses his Notion of  
 Fate in like manner. But that in this *Fate* or  
 Chain of Causes the *Power of Action* in Men was  
 contain'd, and was (ὕπὲρ μὲρον) exempt from the  
*Necessity of Fate*, we are assur'd (from *Plutarch* ||)  
 was the common Opinion of *Stoics* and *Platonists*.  
 And *Tacitus*, speaking of the *Stoics*, says;  
 “ ‡ They attribute indeed a *Fatality* unto Things,  
 “ but not as proceeding from the Motion of the  
 “ Planets (which was the *Astrological* Notion  
 “ only) but from the Principles and Connection  
 “ of natural Causes: And yet they leave the Con-  
 “ duct of our Life to our own *Choice*, which be-  
 “ ing chosen, a certain Order of Events (they  
 “ think) follow.

*Alcinous* sets forth *Plato's* Opinion of Fate in  
 the following Manner: “ § He understands Fate

to

\* *Fatum nihil aliud fit quam series implexa Causarum. De  
 Benef. lib. 4. c. 7.*

† *De Seip. lib. 5. §. 8. lib. 10. §. 5.*

|| *De Placit Phil. p. 884, 885. cited above.*

‡ *Fatum quidem congruere rebus putant; sed non è vagis  
 stellis, verum apud principia & nexus naturalium causarum: ac  
 tamen Electionem vitæ nobis relinquunt, quam ubi elegeris, cer-  
 tum imminentium ordinem. Annal. Lib. 6.*

§ *Εἰρωμμένη λέγει ὅτι εἴ τις ἀνέλεται ψυχὴ τοῦτον βίον*

“ be this; that if any Person choseth such a sort  
 “ of Life, and will do such and such Actions,  
 “ such and such Consequences will follow.  
 “ Wherefore the Soul is unrestrain'd, and hath  
 “ it in its own Power to act or not, and in this  
 “ Respect (of any particular Action) is not com-  
 “ pelled: But the Consequence of it's Action will  
 “ be effected by Fate: As for Example, if *Paris*  
 “ will carry away *Helen*, which it is in his Pow-  
 “ er to do or not, the Event will be, that the  
 “ *Grecians* will make War against the *Trojans*  
 “ for her.

*Hierocles* teacheth that “ \* Fate is the judici-  
 “ al Operation of the Deity, effecting Events ac-  
 “ cording to the Laws of Providence, and di-  
 “ recting humane Affairs in the Order and Course  
 “ that is suitable to their *free* Purposes and *volun-*  
 “ *tary* Actions.” The precedent Arguments up-  
 “ on which he builds his Notion are; *viz.*

“ † If (says he) bodily and external Events fall  
 “ out fortuitously and by Chance, what becomes  
 “ of

και τάδε τινα πράξει, τάδε τινα αὐτῇ ἔψεται. ἀδύσποτον ἔν ἡ ψυχῇ, καὶ  
 ἐπ' αὐτῇ μὲν τὸ πράξαι ἢ μὴ, καὶ ἐ κατανάγκασαι τῆτο τὸ ἔπιό-  
 μενον τῇ πράξει καθ' εἰμαρμένω συντελεσθήσεται. οἷον τῷ Πάρις ἀρ-  
 πάσει τὴν Ἑλένω, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὄντι, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ, πολεμήσασσι Τρά-  
 ιοσι περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης οἱ Ἕλληες. De Doc. Plat. c. 6.

\* Εἰμαρμένη ——— τῶν ἐνβαιόντων κατὰ τὸ τὴν προνοίας Θεοῦ  
 δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχει ἐνέργεια, τάξει καὶ εἰρμῶ πρὸς τὰς προαι-  
 ρητικὰς ὑποθέσεις πῶν αὐτεξούσιων ἔργων ἐπανορθωμένη τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς.  
 De Fat. p. 42.

† Πού ῥ' ἔτι ἢ ἔν τισι τῆς θείας κοίσεως καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἀξίαν Δι-  
 ρουί.

“ of the Superintendency of God, to judge and  
 “ recompense every one according to his De-  
 “ ferts? For we will not suppose these Things to  
 “ happen without Appointment, and say that  
 “ our just *Purposes*, and our *Judgments* and *De-*  
 “ *sires* proceed from an overruling *Necessity*: for  
 “ if so we should not impute Virtue and Vice  
 “ to *ourselves*, but to that *Necessity*. Nor is it  
 “ reasonable to suppose all Things to be the *ne-*  
 “ *cessary* Effects of them, I mean the Actions of  
 “ the Soul, as well as the Things that are with-  
 “ out us, and concern the Body. Nor ought we  
 “ to ascribe all Things to the unintelligent and  
 “ undirected Circumvolution of the Universe;  
 “ there being a Mind that presides over all  
 “ Things, and a God who is the Author of the  
 “ World. That which necessarily remains there-  
 “ fore is; that the *Choice* we make is *in our own*  
 “ *Power*, and that a righteous Recompense is  
 “ awarded according thereto by celestial Beings  
 “ and Judges appointed by God, and who have  
 “ the

ομῆς ἔσαι ἢ ἐπιμέλεια, πῶν ᾧ τὸ σῆμα, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τὸς εἰκῆ, καὶ  
 ὡς ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν συμπιπτόντων, ἔ ᾧ ταῦτα μὲν ἄτακτα καταλένφο-  
 μεν· τὰς ἢ οἴκῃ προαιρέσεις, καὶ κλίσεις, καὶ ὀρμὰς ἀπὸ κρείττον<sup>Θ</sup>  
 ἀνάγκῃς ἐξίνεσθ<sup>ς</sup> φήσομεν. ἔτω ᾧ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας σκῆ ἡμῶν  
 αὐτὰς ἀλλ' ἐκείνην αἰτιασάμεθα. οὐδὲ μὲν πάντα τῇ παρ' ἐκείνων  
 ἀνάγκῃ εὐλογον ἀνατιθέναι· τὰ τ' ψυχῆς λόγῳ, καὶ σώματι<sup>Θ</sup>, καὶ πῶν  
 ἐκτὸς. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πάντα ἀνεῖσθ<sup>ς</sup> ταῖς ἀλόγοις καὶ ἀνεπικρήτοις Φοραῖς.  
 τοῦ τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμένῳ καὶ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ὄντι<sup>Θ</sup> αἰτίε· ἀναγκαῖαι  
 ἢ τὸ λειπόμενον τὰς μὲν προαιρέσεις ἐφ' ἡμῶν, τὰς δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς προαιρέ-  
 σεσι δικαίας ἀμοιβῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς κινήσει<sup>ς</sup> καὶ ἰσθ<sup>ς</sup> καὶ ἰσθ<sup>ς</sup> Θεοῦ

the Care of us committed to them. —  
 And the Supposition of a Recompence, according to our Merit, immediately infers a Providence and *Fate* as the consequent of it, and judicial Providence, which orders the Events of humane Affairs, according to Right and Equity, depends upon the Principle of our *Will* and *Choice*: So that *Fate* is a Part of universal Providence, and the Rule of Judgment upon the Souls of Men.

To which he adds presently after; “ \* To *choose* is in the Power of the Mind; but the Events following the *Choice* are determined by a judicial Providence, recompensing the Purposes of the Soul, according to its Desert: and thence we are said both to *choose* our Condition of Life, and to have it destin’d to us. For the Recompence, ordain’d to follow our Works, both manifests the *free* Motion (or Operation) of our Mind, and the divine Su-  
 “ perin-

τελεγμέναις δικασαῖς καὶ πεφυκόσιν ἡμῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι — ἢ τε ἢ τε πρὸς ἀξίαν ὑπόθεσις πάντας συνιστάγει τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εἰρημύνην· καὶ ἡ προαιετική κρῖσις οἴκη ἔ νόμῳ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πάτησα, τῆς αὐτέξεσις ἡμῶν ἔ προαιετικῆς ἀρχῆς δεῖται. ἄσε μέρθ ἐστὶ τῆ ὄλης προνοίας εἰρημύνη, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀνθρώπιναις ψυχῶς δικαστικῆς ἀεμοζόμενον. Ibid. p. 26, 27.

\* Καὶ τὸ μὲ ἐλέσθαι ἐπ’ αὐτὴν (scilicet ψυχῆ) εἰπάται τὰ ἢ ἐπι συμβαίνοντα ταῖς αἰρέσει τε τῆς προνοίας κρῖσις ἀξίως, τὴν ἀξίαν ἀμνησμένη τὰς ψυχικὰς ἀφάσεις, καὶ ἔτσι αἰρέσει τε ἀμνηστικῶς τὸν αὐτὸν βίον διγμοσθε, καὶ ἢ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημύνησιν καὶ τεταγμένη ἀμνηστικῶς ἔ τὰ αὐτέξεσιν κρῖσις, καὶ τὴν θεοῦ ἐπιεραστικῶς

“ perintendency over us. So that it is evident  
 “ that the Motions (or Operations) of our  
 “ Minds from Beginning to End are *free* —  
 “ and that the Recompence of our Deserts is not  
 “ *without Appointment*, ——— as neither is *Fate*,  
 “ which is the Chain and Connection of the  
 “ *humane Will* with the divine Judgment: So  
 “ that we *choose* what we will thro’ an *unre-*  
 “ *strain’d Liberty*, but often suffer against our  
 “ Will, thro’ the unavoidable Power of Provi-  
 “ dence.

*Chalcidius* expresseth the *Platonic* Notion of  
*Fate* in like manner; *viz.* “ \* Such, (says he)  
 “ in my Opinion, is that heavenly Law, which  
 “ is call’d *Fate*, commanding Men that which is  
 “ right, and forbidding the contrary; but to  
 “ obey is *in our own Power*, and free from the  
 “ *Coercion of Fate*. To praise him that does  
 “ well is both agreeable to this Law and to the  
 “ common Judgment of all. ——— Moreover to  
*live*

εμφάνει ὡσεὶ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος αὐτεξουσίως ἔχειν ἡμᾶς τὰς κινήσεις  
 ——— ὡς ἀδεσπότως ἢ τὰς πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν αἰτιώσεις ———  
 ἢ τὴν εἰσαρμόστην πλέγμα ἔσαν ἢ συνδρομὴν ἀνθρώπινης προαιρέσεως  
 καὶ θείας κρίσεως. ὡσεὶ ἐλέσθ’ ἡμᾶς ἢ βεβλόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τ’ προαιρέ-  
 σεως ἀδύνατον, πάγειν ἢ πολλάκις ἢ μὴ βεβλόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς  
 προνοίας ἀφυκτον. *Ibid.* p. 31, 32,

\* Talis est, opinor, lex illa cœlestis, quæ *fatum* vocatur,  
 sciens hominibus honesta, prohibens contraria; sequi porro  
 nostrum est, & a fati jugo liberum: laudari vero agentem bene,  
 tam juxta legem quam juxta commune judicium. ——— male  
 porro

“ *live ill* is in the Power of Man, and therefore  
 “ Punishment proceeds from a *fatal Necessity*,  
 “ in consequence of the Law. All these Things  
 “ relate to the Mind of Man, which is *free*, and  
 “ *acts by its own Choice*.

Again; “ \* *Fate* is the Decree of Providence,  
 “ comprehending our *voluntary Actions*, as the  
 “ precedent Grounds of it: comprehending also  
 “ the Recompence of our Deserts. *Punishment*  
 “ and *Approbation*, which are by *Fatality*, and all  
 “ those Things which happen fortuitously or  
 “ by Chance, are the Consequents of it.

But in order to understand more fully and distinctly the antient philosophical or theological Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity* (the misunderstanding and misapplication of which has been the great Occasion of producing this monstrous Scheme of the *Necessity of humane Actions*, which our *Cato* maintains) we are to observe that it was distinguished into two *Senses* (tho' in Reality amounting to the same) in the one of which it was understood *substantially* to mean that *intelligent divine Being*

porro vitam disponere proprium est hominis, proptereaque puniri plane est ex necessitate fatali; utpote quod legem sequatur. Hæc porro omnia sedem habent in animis hominum; quæ anima libera est, & agit ex arbitrio suo. *In Plat. Tim. p. 271.*

\* Fatum providentiæ scitum est, continet autem ea quæ sunt in nostra potestate ut præcedentia: continet etiam meritorum collationem. Sequuntur animadversio & approbatio, quæ sunt fatalia; eaque omnia quæ casu fortunave fiant. *Ibid. p. 279.*

or Substance, which govern'd the World by the Administration of the Laws of Providence; in the other it was taken *abstractedly* or *virtually*, for the *Laws* or *Decrees* themselves of the divine Government of the World.

“ \* Fate (says the great Philosopher *Chalci-*  
 “ *dus*) was understood by *Plato* in a twofold  
 “ Sense, the one relating to its *Substance*; the  
 “ other to its *Energy* and *Power*.

Thus also † *Platarch* represents it.

*Fate*, in the Sense of *Operation* or *Power*, is call'd by *Plato*, “ in his † *Phædrus*, an unavoidable  
 “ Decree; in his *Timæus* the Laws which God  
 “ endited to † † *coelestial Beings* concerning the Na-  
 “ ture of the Universe.” The Sense of which he immediately explains; *viz.*

\* *Fatum*, juxta *Platonem*, dupliciter intelligitur & dicitur unum, cum substantiam ejus animo intuemur: alterum cum ex his quæ agit, & esse id, & cujusmodi vim habeat, recognoscimus. *Com. in Plat. Tim.* p. 236.

† Πρῶτον τάλισιν ἴδιον ὅτι εἰμαρμένη διχῶς, καὶ λέγεται, καὶ νοεῖται ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἢ ἡ οὐσία. *Lib. de Fat.*

‡ In *Phædro* quidem scitum inevitabile, in *Timæo*, leges quas *Deus* de universæ rei natura dixerit *coelestibus animis*. *Chalcid. ibid.* *Plutarch* expresses it; Νόμος ὃν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆ παιδὸς φύσει ὁ Θεὸς εἴτε ταῖς ἀθανάτοις ψυχαῖς. *De Fat.* p. 568.

|| *By coelestial Beings* *Chalcidius* seems to mean (*πρόνοια*) *Providence*, which he speaks of as the *second God*; and the (*ψυχή*) *Soul of the World*.



“ \* By unavoidable Decree we may understand  
 “ an irrevocable Law proceeding from an irre-  
 “ sistible Cause (*viz.* the supreme God) and by  
 “ the Laws which God endited to (cœlestial)  
 “ Beings concerning the Nature of the Universe,  
 “ the Law which is consequential to the Nature  
 “ of the World, and by which the Universe is  
 “ governed.

“ † *Fate*, in the Sense of Substance (he pro-  
 “ ceeds to tell us) is the *Soul of the World*.  
 Which *Plutarch* also informs us it was.

It was call'd *Lachesis* or (*ἀνάγκη*) *Necessity*; both  
 as being supposed to be *necessarily-existent*, and the  
*necessary Substratum* for the Formation of rational  
 Beings; as also because the *Laws* of it were fix'd and  
*immutable*, and to which they supposed God had  
 subjected all Beings, and even bound himself un-  
 der an irrevocable and *necessary* Obligation.

\* *Possumus ergo inevitabile quidem scitum interpretari legem  
 minime mutabilem ex inevitabili causa: leges vero quas de  
 universa natura dixit animis Deus, legem, quæ mundi naturam  
 sequitur, & qua reguntur mundana omnia. Ibid. § p. 237.*

In which Explanation he follows *Plutarch*, who calls the  
 one; Λέγοντες δὲ ἀπαράβατον δι' αἰτίαν ἀνεμπόδιστον. And the  
 other; Νέμοντες ἀκλόνητον τῇ τῷ παντός φύσει, καθ' ἣν διεξάγεται  
 τὰ γινόμενα. Lib. de Fat. p. 568. Again; Λέγοντες αἰδίον καὶ  
 νέμοντες αἰδίον τῆς τοῦ παντός φύσεως. De Placit. Philos. p. 885.

† In *Substantia* positum, *Fatum mundi anima est. Chalc. ibid.*  
*Plutarch* has it; εἰμαρμένη κατ' οὐσίαν ἕσκειν εἶναι σύμπασα ἢ τοῦ  
 κόσμου ψυχῆ. Lib. de Fat.

*Chalcidius* styles this *Lachesis* or *Necessity* “ || the  
 “ divine Law, by which Things future are con-  
 “ nected with Things past and present.

And it is, with Respect to the immutable  
 Laws of Providence, that † *Plotinus* calls God  
 “ the Necessity and Law of all Things.

*Cicero* † in like manner (speaking of the *Platonic* Philosophy) observes, that this *Fate* or  
*Soul* of the World, by whose *providential Wisdom* all Things, both in *Heaven* and *Earth*, are  
 governed, is call'd *Necessity*; because nothing can  
 happen otherwise than according to the Laws of it,  
 whereby the eternal Order of the Universe is immu-  
 tably preserved by *Fatality*.

The *Stoics* express their Notion of *Fate* (sub-  
 stantially) in Agreement with the *Platonists*.

“ \* *Heraclitus* styles the Substance of *Fate* that  
 “ Reason which pervades the Substance of the  
 “ Universe,

|| *Lachesis*, hoc est, necessitatis orationem, divinam legem, qua præteritis & item præsentibus connectuntur futura. p. 237.

† Ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄλλων καὶ νόμος. *Ennead.* 6. p. 743.

‡ Quam vim *animus* esse dicunt mundi: eandemque esse mentem, sapientiamque perfectam, quem *Deum* appellant, omniumque rerum quæ sunt ei subjectæ, quasi prudentiam quandam procurantem cœlestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quæ pertinent ad homines; quam interdum *necessitatem* appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum fit, inter quasi fatalem & immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni. *Academ. Quest. lib. 1.*

\* Ἡράκλειτος οὐσίαν εἰσαρµένης λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ παντός

“ Universe, the same (he adds) is an æthereal  
 “ Body, the generating Seed of the Universe.

*Euripides* expresses the *Stoical* Sense; “ \* *Ju-*  
 “ *piter*, or the Necessity of Nature, or the Rea-  
 “ son of Men. For *Necessity* and Mind is the  
 “ (substantial) Power which diffuseth itself thro’  
 “ the Universe.

“ *Velleius*, in *Cicero*, represents the Opinion  
 “ of the *Stoic Chryssippus*; “ † That he says;  
 “ that the Power of that perpetual and eternal  
 “ Law which is, as it were, the Guide of our  
 “ Life, and Director of our Duty, is *Jupiter*; the  
 “ same he also calls *Fate* and *Necessity*.” Again;  
 “ The || *Stoics* held a *Necessity* which they call’d  
 “ *Fate*.

Again; *Diogenes Laertius* tells us it was the  
*Stoical* Notion, “ \* That *God*, and *Mind*, and  
 “ *Fate*, and *Jupiter* was one and the same, to  
 “ which they gave many other Names also.

παντός δὴκοῦτα. αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον σῶμα, σπέρμα τῆς τοῦ πα-  
 τὸς γενέσεως. Plut. Placit. Phil. p. 885.

\* Ζεὺς ἐστὶ ἀνάγκη φύσεως, ἕτε νῆς βροτῶν.

καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη καὶ νοῦς ἔστι ἡ δὴκοῦτα ἀπὸ πάντων διακριῶν. Apud  
 Plut. de Anim. Procreat. p. 1026.

† Idemque etiam legis perpetuæ & æternæ vim, quæ quasi  
 dux vitæ & magistra officiorum sit, *Jovem* dicit esse, eandem-  
 que *fatalem necessitatem*, appellat. De Nat. Deor. lib. 1.

|| *Fatalem necessitatem*, quam εἰμαρμένην dicebant. *Ibid.*

\* Ἐν τε εἶναι θεόν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ εἰμαρμένον καὶ Δία, πάλαι τε  
 ἑτέροις ὀνομασίαις προσσημαζέσθαι. Lib. 7. p. 450.

*Alexander Aphrodisius* says; “ \* They (the  
“ *Stoics*) say that *Fate*, and *Nature*, and *Reason*,  
“ by which the Universe is governed, is *God*.

Lastly, *Seneca* the *Stoic* says; “ † What else  
“ is *Nature* but *God* and the divine *Reason* which  
“ is infused into the whole World and the Parts  
“ of it? ——— and if you call the same *Fate*  
“ you will not be mistaken.

There was no other Difference betwixt the *Platonic* and *Stoic* Notion of *Fate*, but only that the *Stoics* thought that *Fate* considered (*Substantia* or κατ' ἑστίαν) as a *substantial* divine Being which was the *Soul of the World*, was the (πρῶτον θεός) *supreme God*, whom they stil'd “ || The first Cause  
“ of the Universe;” and “ ‡ *Fate* and the *Necessity* (or *necessary Cause*) of Things:” Whereas the *Platonics* made *Fate* (ἰδίτερον θεόν, ἕτερον ὄν, secundam Mentem) a *second God*, a *second Mind*, inferior and subservient to the *supreme God*.

The preceding Observations will explain the Meaning of the strong poetical Expressions of the *Gods*, or even of *Jupiter* himself the *supreme*

\* Τὴν ἢ εἰμαρμένω αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸν λόγον καθ' ὃ  
δοικεῖται τὸ πᾶν, θεὸν εἶναι φασίν. Lib. de Fat. p. 107.

† Quid enim aliud est natura, quam Deus & divina ratio toti mundo & partibus ejus inserta? ——— eundemque & Fatum si dixeris, non mentieris. De Benefic. lib. 4. c. 7.

|| Τὴν τῆς παντὸς ἀρχὴν ——— εἰμαρμένην. Plotin. Ennead 3.  
lib. 1.

‡ Fatum & necessitatem rerum. Tertul. Apol. c. 21.

God, being *subject to Fate*; by which, agreeably to the *Platonical* and *Stoical* Philosophy, was understood, that all subordinate Beings, how divine soever, were subject to the *immutable Laws of Providence*, which were the *Will and Command* of the *supreme God*; and according to which God himself was determined *invariably* to act, and so was said to be bound by and to obey his own Laws, as being most *wise* and *perfect*.

With Respect to the Subjection of the inferior Deities to *Fate*, *Chalcidius* gives us *Plato's* Opinion:

“ \* The Command of God, which the subordinate Gods obey, is, I think, that Reason, call'd *Fate*, which contains the eternal Government of Things, and is derived from Providence.

To the same Purpose *Plato* himself cites *Pindar* saying, “ † That the Law (of Providence) rules over all, both mortal Men and the immortal Gods.

And *Simonides*; “ ‖ The Gods themselves do not resist *Necessity*,” i. e. the uncontrollable Laws of divine Providence.

\* Jussum Dei, cui parent Dii secundi, ratio est, opinor, continens ordinationem perpetuam, quæ fatum vocatur, idque tenet originem ex providentia. In *Plat. Tim.* p. 239.

† Νομοὶ εἶσι πάντων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων. Apud *Plat.* in *Gorg.*

‡ Ἀνάγκη οὐδὲ θεῶν ἴσχυει.

And *Seneca*; “ \* Whatsoever it is that commands us thus to live or die, it binds the Gods also under the same Necessity: an irrevocable Course (of Providence) carries on both human and divine Things; the very Maker and Governor of all Things wrote indeed the Fates, but also follows them; commanded once for all, and himself always observes what he; commanded.

*Lucan* † expresses the same Notion in a lively and poetical manner.

With Respect to God’s being unalterably determined to act according to the fix’d Laws of his Providence, and so to be, as it were, bound by them; *Seneca* styles God || *his own Necessity*.

And *Cicero* interprets a *Greek* Poet as saying; “ § That the supreme *Jupiter* cannot prevent that which is decreed to come to pass.

\* Quicquid est quod nos sic vivere iussit, sic mori, eadem necessitate & deos alligat: irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector, scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semel iussit. *De Provid. c. 5.*

† Fixit in æternum causas quâ cuncta coerces,  
Se quoque lege tenens; & secula iussa ferentem  
Fatorum immoto divisit limite mundum. *Lib. 2.*

|| Ipse (Deus) est necessitas sua. *Præf. ad Quest. Nat.*

§ Quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem;  
*Cic. de divinat. lib. 2. p. 275.*

And *Herodotus*\*; “ It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destin’d Fate.” And again; “ † God himself is a Servant of Necessity.

Which Passages do not mean as if there was thought to be any *Fate* or *Necessity* distinct from and really superior to the supreme God; but only that the Laws of divine Providence, as being the Result of *infinite* and *perfect Wisdom*, were the immutable Rule by which God was determined to order the Events of Things, and to act in the Government of the World. To proceed therefore;

*Fate* (κατ’ ἐνέργειαν) in the abstract Sense, as implying *Energy*, *Power*, or *Operation*, “ \* is “ the Laws (of Providence) with which the “ Soul of the World is invested for the good “ Government of the Universe.” Hence we see the Reason why the *Soul of the World* is call’d *Fate*, viz. as containing in it those Laws of Providence, which are that which is call’d *Fate*.

\* Τὴν πεπερασμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατά ἐστι δραπευεῖν καὶ τῷ θεῷ.  
Cudw. Intel. Syst. p. 5.

† Δεῦλον θεὸς ἀνάγκης. Cudw. ibid.

\* *Leges (scilicet Providentiæ) dictæ sunt fatum; idque divina Lex est mundi animæ insinuata, salubre rerum omnium regimen. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. p. 239.*

Again; “ † It is a Decree, existent Order, and  
 “ an all-comprehending Law, which derives its  
 “ precedent Causes *from our Deserts*, as the  
 “ Grounds (of the Events) of it: and the Events,  
 “ which proceed *necessarily* from it are the *confe-*  
 “ *quential* Effects of our *precedent* Merits, and  
 “ of the *Necessity* (or immutable Sanction) of  
 “ that Law.

*Chalcidius* goes on; “ \* The Foundation there-  
 “ fore of the divine Law, that is, of *Fate*, is *Pro-*  
 “ *vidence*: But it is call'd *Fate*, because it contains,  
 “ as in a *Decree*, the Duty of our Obedience, and  
 “ the Contumacy of our Disobedience to it. And  
 “ Punishments and Rewards proceed from it  
 “ according to our precedent Deserts. But our  
 “ precedent Deserts, whether good or bad, are  
 “ the Motion of our own Minds; and the Judg-  
 “ ment, Consent, Desire, and Aversion of them,  
 “ which are *in our own Power*; because the  
*Choice*

† Sanctio, ordinatio existens, & lex omnia complexa, cau-  
 sas præcedentes ex meritis nostris habet ut initia quædam, quæ  
 porro necessitatibus constricta proveniunt, juxta præcessionem,  
 necessitatemque ejus (*scilicet* legis) consequenter eveniunt.  
*Ibid.* p. 240.

\* Ergo initium divinæ legis, id est, Fati, Providentia. Fa-  
 rum vero quod & parendi sibi obsequium, & non parendi con-  
 tumaciam velut edicto complectitur. Animadvertiones porro vel  
 præmia oriuntur secundum collati meriti præcessionem. Collati  
 autem in alterutram partem meriti præcessio animarum nostrarum  
 motus est; judiciumque & consensus earum, & appetitus



“ Choice of these and their contraries is in our  
 “ own Power. — Therefore the Soul of the  
 “ World is *Fate*, as it signifies a *substantial* Be-  
 “ ing; and that *Law* also, with which it is in-  
 “ structed for the well governing of all Things,  
 “ is that *Fate* which consists in *Operation* and  
 “ *Act*, and the Order and Consequence of it is;  
 “ if we do *this*, *that* will follow: Therefore the  
 “ precedent Action is in our Power; the Event  
 “ that follows it, is the Decree of Fate; which  
 “ is otherwise call'd Fatal, and differs very much  
 “ from *Fate*. So that there are three Things,  
 “ viz. that which is in our own Power; and  
 “ *Fate* (or the Law of Providence) and the  
 “ Recompence of our Deserts according to the  
 “ Law of Fate.

*Cbalcidius* concludes the *Platonic* Notion of  
 Fate from many foregoing Arguments in these  
 Words, viz.

vel declinatio, quæ sunt in nobis posita, quoniam tam horum, quam  
 eorum quæ his contraria sunt, optio penes nos est. — Est igitur  
 universæ rei anima Fatum in *substantia* positum: est item data  
 huic informatio rem omnem recte gerendi lex, quæ in *mu-  
 nere* atque *actu* posita fatum vocatur, & habet textum & con-  
 sequentiam talem. Si hoc erit, sequetur illud: ergo quod ex  
 his præcedit, in nobis est; quod sequitur, secundum fatum.  
 Quos alio nomine *fatale* dicitur, a *Fato* plurimum differens  
 ut sint tria; quod in nobis positum est (*scilicet* ut apud Græ-  
 cos est, τὸ ἐφ' ἑμῶν) & ipsum Fatum, (*scilicet* ποῖνα, fati lex) &  
 quod secundum Fati legem pro meritis imminet (*scilicet* τὸ πόνυ-  
 σμα, fatalis pœna vel pœmium) *Ibid.* 242, 243.

“ \* That

“ \* That some Things are effected by *Fate* is  
 “ true; and that some Things are *in our own*  
 “ *Power*, has been prov'd to be true also.  
 “ Wherefore they who ascribe all *Things* to  
 “ *Fate*, are justly found fault with by those, who  
 “ prove that some Things are *in our own Power*.  
 “ Again; they who place every Thing *in our*  
 “ *Power*, and attribute *nothing* to *Fate*, are  
 “ plainly mistaken. For who knows not that  
 “ something is effected by *Fate*, and is not *in*  
 “ *in our Power*? Therefore that Reasoning alone  
 “ is true, and that Opinion firm and solid which  
 “ teacheth, that some Things happen by *Fate*,  
 “ and other Things proceed from the *Choice* and  
 “ *Will* of Men.

Thus, I think, it is clearly and indisputably  
 prov'd, that the *Freedom of human Actions* was  
 the general and prevailing, and almost unanimous  
 Doctrine, not only of the *antient Christians* (amongst  
 whom it was universally, and without any Contro-  
 versy receiv'd and maintain'd) but also of the most  
 eminent and numerous Sects of Philosophers,

---

\* *Fato* quædam agi, verum est; & quod quædam *in nostra*  
*potestate* sint, hoc quoque verum esse monstratum est. Quare  
 qui omnia *Fato* fieri dicunt, merito reprehenduntur ab iis qui  
 probant esse aliquid *in nostra potestate*. Demum, qui omnia *in*  
*nostra potestate* constituunt, nec quicquam *Fato* relinquunt, falli  
 deteguntur. Quis enim ignoret esse aliquid *in Fato*, & extra  
 nostram jus? Sola igitur vera illa ratio est, fixaque & stabilis  
 sententia, quæ docet quædam *Fato* fieri, alia porro ex homi-  
 num *arbitrio* & *Voluntate* proficisci. p. 279, 280.

both *Jewish* and *Heathen*: Particularly that it was the Doctrine of the two principal Sects amongst the *Jews*, the *Sadducees*, and *Pharisees*, and not improbably of the little Fraternity of the *Essenes* also; and that it was taught by the five great Sects amongst the Heathens, which comprehended all the Philosophy of *Greece* and *Rome*, namely, the *Epicureans*, *Stoics*, *Platonics*, *Aristotelians* and *Academics*; and that the Opposers of this Doctrine were chiefly *Leucippus*, *Empedocles*, and *Democritus*, the first Founders of the *Epicurean* Sect, but oppos'd herein by *Epicurus* and his Followers; *Heraclitus*, *Diodorus*, and some *Astrologers* and *Fortune-tellers* amongst the *Stoics*, which were greatly despised and condemned by the most learned of that Sect also. And I have also shewn distinctly, and at large, that the antient *Platonic* and *Stoical* Notion of *Fate* and *Necessity* agreed with each other, and was declar'd to be consistent with the *Liberty* of Men's Actions; and was not understood to be a *necessary efficient Cause* of human Actions at all, but only to be the determinate *Will* and *Decrees* of God, or the *Laws* of his *Providence*, by which the Universe was govern'd, and good and Evil was dispensed unto Men according to the *free* and *voluntary* Actions and Conduct of their Life.

And from the preceding Proofs of the *Freedom of human Actions*, as being the Sense and Opinion of the most *wise* and *learned*, as well as *greatest* Part of Mankind in all Ages, I beg leave

leave to make one Observation, namely, that upon the Supposition of the *Necessity* of Men's Actions, it must appear very extraordinary and directly absurd, that the Light of natural Reason should necessarily lead Mankind at all times to conclude their Actions to be *in their own Power* and *Choice*, and to be *voluntary* and *free*, if they are indeed *necessary*: that *Necessity* should form Men's Minds and Notions so opposite to its own Operations, and make them *necessarily* think their Actions are not *necessary* but *voluntary*. To which Purpose the learned *Ammonius Hermias* argues;

“ \* Does this Reason which (as they teach) *ne-*  
 “ *cessarily* effects all Things, make it necessary  
 “ for Men to affirm, either that all Things are  
 “ *necessary*, or that some Things are *in our Power*?  
 “ If the latter is true, then all Things are not  
 “ *necessary*; but if the former, how come many  
 “ to think the contrary, *viz.* that many Things  
 “ are *in our Power*? for it is altogether absurd to  
 “ suppose that Nature, which (they say) *neccessa-*  
 “ *rily* effects all Things, should move us against  
 “ Nature, to contradict the Truth of its own

---

\* Όλος ἔστι ὁ πάντα ἀναγκάζων λόγος, τότερον καὶ αὐτὸ τῆτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φησὶ, τὸ λέγειν ὅτι πάντα ἀνάγκασται, ἢ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείῳ τὰς περὶ τῆ τρόπου τῆς γενέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων δόξας; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ δεύτερον ἀληθές, ὅση ἄρα πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, εἰ ἔστι τὸ πρότερον, πῶς δόξασσι τινες τὸ αὐτικείμενον, ὅτι πολλὰ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν; τὸ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆ φύσεως τῆς πάντα ἀναγκάζουσης (ὡς ὁ ἰσχυρὸν λόγος) κειῳ φύσιν ἡμῶς ἐπὶ τὸ καταψήφισα τῶν ὑπὸ αὐτῆς γινομένων, παντελῶς ἄλογον. Com. in Aristot. p. 215.

“ Ορε-

“ Operations.” In like manner *Eusebius* before him hath remarked :

“ \* What sort of *Fate* is it that teacheth all Men that God is the Creator of the Universe ; and *forceth* them to declare that there is no such thing as (this pretended) *Fate*? And how comes *Fate* to compel Men both to think and say that she does not exist ?

---

\* Ποία δ' εἰμαρμένη θεῶν δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων πάντων, ἀνθρώποις κατὰ γένην, εἰμαρμένην ἢ μὴ εἶναι φάναι ἐξηγάγησθε ; καὶ πῶς ἢ εἰμαρμένη μὴ εἶναι ἑαυτὴν λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐβιάσατο ; ΠΡΑΞ. Evang. lib. 6. p. 253.





## LETTER III.



IN this Paper\* our *Cato* pursues very warmly the Defense of his Notion of the *Necessity of human Actions*. He introduceth it with some slight Censures on the Notions of *two very learned Men*, concerning the *Eternity*, and *Omnipresence* or *Immensity* of God; whereby he shews how little he had thought about these Matters, which, he pretends those eminent Men *knew nothing of*. I shall therefore briefly, by the way, take notice of his Observations.

First; He says, that *Duration is our Conception of the Continuance of Things* ——— *has certain Boundaries in our Imaginations, and we can multi-*

---

\* *Cato's Letters*, Vol. IV. p. 185, 56.

*ply this Conception backwards and forwards, without ever being able to come to the End of it, and so may be sure it is without End.* (p. 186, 187.)

*Duration* is not a mere *abstract Idea* of the Mind, as our Author seems here to suppose; and is in itself a distinct Thing from our *Conception of the Continuance* of Things: if every Thing which is the Object of our *Senses* or *Imagination* ceas'd to exist, *Duration* wou'd still exist, and be what it is, independent of our Ideas, and of every finite and created Thing whatsoever. And if *Cato* had thought closely upon the Matter, he would have found, that he could not *set Bounds to Duration* in his *Imagination* or *Understanding*, (*Duration* is not an Idea of the *Imagination*, but of the Intellect or *Understanding* only) he cou'd not suppose it to have any *Beginning* or that it can have any *End*; or to be dependent upon the Existence of any finite or sensible Beings. The Idea (if we continue to think of it) will force its *necessary Existence*, and its *past* and *future* Infinity upon us, whether we will or not. We may indeed think of a particular Portion of *Duration*, if we please, and no more; but this is not *setting Bounds* to it; for we cannot conceive this *Portion* to exist and no more, tho' we may actually think of no more; and, as we cannot conceive *Duration* not to exist, or not to have *always* existed, or not to continue to exist *always*, or to be *more* or *less* than it is, as we can other Things, it thence follows that it is something which is in itself *necessarily-existent*; and

which not only we *can* multiply, but which we *must* (if we think of it) multiply *backwards* and *forwards* to Infinity, and which cannot possibly have an *End*.

We borrow indeed the *Conception* from considering the *Succession of our own Ideas*, or the *Continuance of Things*, but still it evidently is not a mere *abstract Idea*; for if it was, we cou'd conceive it to be *more* or *less*, or even *cease* to be, as we can those *Things* from which we borrowed the *Idea*; but it has a necessary *Relation* to something *without us*, which is *eternal* and *infinite*; and not being itself a *Substance*, must be a *Property* of a *self-existent Being*.

Secondly; This Author says, that *Extension or Space is the Conception of the Existence and Immensity of Bodies*. (p. 187.) But this is by no means true; and the *Idea of Space or Extension*, tho' it may be taken from *Body*, (which yet is accidental) is very different from the *Idea of Body*. We can suppose *Body or Matter* not to exist; but yet *Space* will continue to exist, and we cannot, without a *Contradiction*, suppose it not to exist. We can suppose *Body* to be *more* or *less*, *finite* or *infinite*; as we can create it, so we can annihilate it in our *Imagination*; but we cannot conceive *Space or Extension* to be *more* or *less* than it really is *ad extra*; we cannot *take away* one *Inch* from it, or *add* one *Inch* to it in our *Thoughts*; but the *Infinity* of it necessarily



farly forceth itself upon us; which shews that *Space* or *Extension* has a *real* and *necessary* Existence distinct from *Body*; and not being a *Substance*, must be a \* *Property* of a *self-existent*, and *omnipresent* or *immense* Being.

Thirdly;

\* A very learned and excellent Author, in a late Book, entitled, *The Religion of Nature delineated*, says, that “ *Space* taken separately from the Things which possess and fill it, is but an empty Scene or *Vacuum*: and to say that infinite *Space* is God, or that God is infinite *Space*, is to say that he is an infinite *Vacuum*, than which nothing can be more *absurd* or *blasphemous*. How can *Space*, which is but a vast *Void*, rather the *Negation* of all Things than positively any *Thing*, a kind of *diffus'd Nothing*; how can this, I say, be the first Cause, &c. or indeed any Cause? What *Attributes*, beside *Penetrability* and *Extension*, what *Excellencies*, what *Perfections* is it capable of? p. 74, 75. (the same Notion he has of *Duration*.) *ibid*.

To which I reply, that *Space* (and the same is true of *Duration*) taken separately from the Things which fill it, is not a mere *abstract Idea*, as this learned Author seems to think, is already prov'd from the Arguments alledg'd against *Cato's* Notion of it. And they who make it to be something *real*, distinct from the *Extension* of *material*, sensible and finite Things, do not yet suppose it to be the *Substance* of God, but to be an *Attribute* of his Substance, viz. the *Property* of the divine *Immensity*. And if by calling *Space*, taken separately from the Things in it, an *empty Vacuum*, this learned Writer had meant only that it was an *Immensity* void of *Matter*, or an infinite immaterial Diffusion, it would neither have been *absurd* or *blasphemous* to say that it was a *Property* of God, or the divine *Omnipresence*, comprehending and containing all Things. But to suppose *Space*, abstracted from the Things in it, to have no *real* Existence, to be a mere *Nega-*

Thirdly; *Cato's* saying, that *in Infinity there is no whole nor consequential Parts*, (p. *ibid.*) is absurd; for *infinite Space and Duration* is as much *real Space and Duration* as *finite* is; and is as much a *Whole* consisting of *Parts or Constituents*: The Difference only is, the *Parts of finite Matter* are *partable*; but if it was necessarily *infinite* as *Space* is, they cou'd not be *partable*, but still wou'd be *Parts*, and the existent infinite *Body* would be a *real Being* or *whole Being*.

He proceeds to the Existence of God, and allows that he *must exist necessarily*, and be the *Cause of all other Things*; but, adds he, *by what Energy or Power he effects this* (i. e. the Existence of Things) *we are wholly ignorant*. (p. 189.)

*tion* or *diffus'd Nothing*, as he is pleas'd to stile it, is what I could not have expected from such a learned and rational Writer: as if any Things cou'd *possess* or *fill* a mere *Negation*, that which hath *no Existence*; as if a mere *Negation*, or mere *nothing* cou'd be *diffus'd*; as if a *Negation*, a mere *Nothing*, that which hath *no real Existence*, could have (as he owns *Space* has) the *positive* and *real Properties of Penetrability and Extension*, to which he might have added *Eternity and Self-existence*, which last is the highest *Excellence and Perfection*. But if *Penetrability* is any Thing; if *Extension, Eternity and Self-existence* are any Thing; if Things *possess* or *fill* any Thing; then surely that which is *penetrable, extended, eternal, and self-existent*, that which *contains and comprehends* all Things, is not a mere *Negation*, a mere *Nothing*; but is *something* and hath a *real Existence* separate from the Things which exist *in it*.

If so, why does our Author presume to assert and insist that *Necessity*, the *Necessity* of the divine Nature is the *Power* from which all Things result and are produc'd as *necessary* Effects?

To which he subjoins presently; *I do not see how a greater Absurdity can be put together in Words, than that one Being shall make another, create the Matter of which it was made, give it all the Faculties it has, all its Capacities of Reasoning, Powers of Action, Means of Thinking, and present it with all its Objects for Thinking, and yet leave it at Liberty to act against them; which I conceive is a downright Impossibility.* (p. 190.)

This is only a round about Way to tell us, that the Notion of *Liberty* is an *Absurdity* and *Impossibility*: for supposing *Liberty* possible, then all that is here put together, as implying *Impossibility*, is true by necessary Consequence: It necessarily follows from *Liberty*, that Man must be endued with a Power of *acting* or *not acting* in every Case, of *consenting* to or *rejecting* every Motive of Action. So that this Harangue is nothing but a mere begging of the Question. Besides, supposing Man a *necessary* or in reality *no Agent*, yet still the Evidence of Sense and Experience shews, that he *does act against* every Motive; and therefore if the *Absurdity* or *Impossibility* lies in his *acting against the Objects of his Thoughts*, it equally follows from his being suppos'd to be a *necessary*, as from his being a *Free-agent*; with the Addition of this Absurdity to

the former Supposition, the Consequence of which is, that a *reasonable* Being necessarily acts perpetually against *Reason*; an *intelligent* Being necessarily acts perpetually against *Sense* and *Understanding*: which, I think, is not only an *Absurdity* in itself, but a severe Reflection also upon the Author of our Being: Not to take notice, that upon the Supposition of the *Necessity* of the Existence of Things, and of *human Actions*, every Part of *Cato's Reasoning* in the foregoing Passage is direct *Nonsense*. For, upon this Hypothesis, nothing is *created* by God; the *Matter* and *Faculties* of every thing are as *necessarily-existent* as God is; neither can Man have *any Powers of Action*, or *Capacity of \* Reasoning*, both which necessarily imply *Will*, and *Choice*, and *Free-agency*.

He

\* Λογικῶς ἢ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἕστις, ἢ ἂν τῆτο βουλευτικῆς οὐκείας ἢ Προαιρέσει πρὸς τὸ εὖ, ἢ κακῶς βουλευαῖς προσαγομένης.

“ Our Nature is *rational* and therefore capable of *Deliberation*,  
 “ and of being led unto *good* or *evil* Counsels by *its own Choice*.

*Hiero. in Pyth. Carm. p. 162.*

And Origen. Ὅτι τοῖσιν θελοῦσιν μηδὲν εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἀναγκαίως κλιβιάτατον ἢ παραδέχονται. πρῶτων μὲν ὅτι ὅσα ἐσμὲν ζῶα, δεύτερον ὅτι ἐδὲ λογικά. ἀλλ' εἶον ὑπὸ ἕξωθεν κινουῦντο αὐτοὶ ἐδάμῳσιν κινούμενοι, ποιεῖν ἕα' ἐκείνους λογισμῶν, ἢ ποιεῖν νομιζόμενα. ἄλλως τε ἢ τοῖς ἰδίαις πάθεσιν ἐπιθήσας (lege ἐπιθήσας) τίς ἐράτω, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκῶσιν ἐστὶν, μὴ αὐτὸς θέλει, &c. “ They therefore who  
 “ would have it that nothing is *in our Power*, by necessary  
 “ Consequence admit the greatest Absurdity. For, first, it  
 “ hence follows that we are not *Animals*, and, secondly, that  
 “ we are not *rational* Animals; but being impelled, as it were,

“ by

He goes on; *A Pair of Scales, perfectly pois'd, cannot ponderate on either side, and a Man, who has no Motives to act, will not act at all.* (p. *ibid.*)

'Tis very true, that if the *Mind* was merely *passive*, like a *Pair of Scales*, and perfectly pois'd by equal *Motives* or *Weights*, it cou'd not ponderate or *Act*. But this is *begging the Question*, and supposing (when the Thing is to be *prov'd* not *suppos'd*) that the *Mind* has not *Will* and a *free Power of Action within itself*, and consequently can act by its *Will* merely, without any other *Motive*: And when a *Man* does not do any particular *Action*, because he has *no Motive* to act, his *not acting* is still *Matter of Choice*; and it was in his *Power* to have acted. I can

“ by an external Force, without any Motion *from ourselves*, are  
 “ thereby said to do those Things, which we *seem* to do.  
 “ Further, let any one who knows his own Affections consider,  
 “ whether it is not Impudence to affirm that he has not a  
 “ *Will*. *De Orat.* §. 20. See also *De Princip. lib. 3. c. 1.*  
 p. 712, 713.

And *Alex. Aphrodisius*. Τὸ ἕ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔχοντα τῶν γινωσκόμενων  
 ὡς αὐτῷ, ἰδίον αἰθεράτε· τῆτο γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι λογικῶ, τὸ  
 ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγον τῶν προσπιπτουσῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ὅλων τῶν  
 πρακτέων τε καὶ μὴ, κριτῆν τε καὶ εὐρετήν. “ It is the peculiar  
 “ Property of Man to have those Things which are done by  
 “ him in his own Power: for it is essential to him, as being a ra-  
 “ tional Agent, to have in him *Reason* to be the finder out  
 “ and *Judge* of sensitive Objects, and of all those Things  
 “ which are to be done or not done. *De Fat.* p. 75.

open and shut my Eyes and Mouth merely by the Motive of my *Will* to do so; and do ten \* thousand Actions, without any *external* Motive whatsoever.

I dare say *Cato* had done many Things in his Life-time by *Choice* merely, and when it was perfectly *indifferent* to him whether he did them or not, or without having, or being sensible of, any Reason or Motive for the doing of them. And suppose any one was to offer to me *two Guineas* so exactly alike as one could not be distinguished from the other, and to place them at

\* Οἷον τὸ κινήσασθαι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν, καὶ τὴν τυχεῖσαν τοῦ τραχήλου περιστροφὴν, καὶ τὴν τοῦ δακτύλου ἔκτασιν, καὶ τὸ ἐπάραι τὰ βλέφαρα, καὶ τὸ κλιβιζόμενον εἶησαι, καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἡρεμῆσαι, καὶ τὸ λαλῶντα σιγήσαι, καὶ ἐπὶ μυρίων εὐροι ὡς ἂν δύναμιν ἵνα ἐνυπάρχουσαν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικὴν, ἃ ὅσα ἂν γένοιτο ἐξ εἰμαρμένης· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔδέχεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ εἶσι τὸ ἐναντίον. “ Namely to move  
 “ any of ones Limbs, to turn one’s Neck this way or that,  
 “ to put forth the Finger, to lift up the Eyebrows, to stand  
 “ when one has been sitting, to give over walking, to hold  
 “ ones peace from talking; and in a thousand other Instances one  
 “ may observe a Power of acting *contrariwise*, which cannot  
 “ proceed from Fate (or Necessity); for what Things proceed  
 “ from that do not admit of *Contrariety*. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 271. & Alex. Aphrodis. de Fato, p. 43, 44.

*Plutarch* in like manner observes; Τὸ ἢ περιπατεῖν καὶ μὴ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἂν ἑκάτερον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνθρώπινῃ ὁρμῇ ὑποτέτακται, ὃ ἢ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγεται. De Fat. p. 571. “ To  
 “ walk or not, either of which is wholly in Man’s Power, is  
 “ that which is call’d *Choice* and the Power of Action that is  
 “ in us.

equal Distances from me, and then tell me I might take one of them if I pleas'd; does he think I should not have a *Power* of taking either of them?

He may try the Experiment if he has any Doubt of it: and yet 'tis evident there is no Motive to determine me to take *one* rather than the *other*, and so my taking one must be determin'd merely by my *Will*, without any other Motive whatsoever; and is a direct Proof of a *free* internal Power of Action. The only Shift which is left in such a Case is his saying, *that minute Causes may determine the Actions of Men, which neither others nor they themselves are sensible of.* (p. *ibid.*) But to suppose a Man to act by *Motives* and *Causes*, of which he is not conscious or sensible, is the same as to suppose him to act without any Reason or *Motive* at all; to act without *Understanding* and without *Intelligence*, which is something, if possible, more grossly absurd than any thing our Author had fallen into before; and if such Reasoning is to be allowed, I might with equal Reason argue against *Necessity*, that my *Heart* and *Pulse* beat by some imperceptible Direction of my *Will*, *which neither others nor my self are sensible of.*

It is plain that Men are in great Straits; when, in arguing that all Men's Actions are *necessary* Effects of impulsive Causes, they are forc'd to allow, that those impulsive Causes, which are so strong as to *force* the Mind into

Action, even against apparent Motives to the contrary (as in taking suppose *one* Guinea rather than *two*, when each are offered, which, no doubt is in every ones Power to do) and are able to put the Body into Motion, yet are so *minute* and imperceptible, that neither *others*, nor they who are by them impelled into Action, are sensible or conscious of any such impulsive Causes, but on the contrary cannot help thinking, that the Action wholly proceeds from *Will* and *Choice*.

If our *Senses* are deceived in our *Actions*, they may as well be deceived in every thing beside; and I think 'tis not clearer to the *Senses* or *Understanding* (nor indeed so clear and certain to the latter) that Matter or any external Object of the Senses exists at all, than that our *Actions* are the Result of an inward *self-moving* and *free* Power of the Mind: and I desire to be inform'd where the *Blunder* (as *Cato* calls it) is of supposing such a *self-moving Principle*.

Any one will find it as difficult to conceive and give an Account *how* one Thing is mov'd by another, as *how* the Mind moves itself or the Body; and yet it is evident that there is *Motion* in the World, and, I think, as evident that there is *Self-motion*.

The only Argument of *Cato* that remains to be consider'd, is; that he says, '*Tis ridiculous to say, that tho' the Mind has a Principle of Self-motion, yet other Causes cooperate to produce the Action;*

*for*



for if any other Cause makes it to do what it wou'd not otherwise do, that is the Cause or Co-cause of the Action produc'd to all the Purposes of this Argument. (p. 193.)

This is only arguing, that because the Mind, endued with *Reason*, does not chuse to *act*, but upon precedent *Reason* to do so, or upon the Inducements of what appears to it to be reasonable Motives of Action, rather than upon mere Humour and Wilfulness, therefore it does not *act at all*, or, what is all one, does not *act freely*. Because the Mind will not do many Things which it can do and has a Power to do, without some *Cause* to do them, or because it does not and will not always exercise its Power of Action, as Children do, in trifling and indifferent Things, and to no Purpose; because it acts generally upon precedent Motives, that is, acts *reasonably* rather than otherwise; therefore, according to this Author, it acts *necessarily*. Thus that very *Reason* of our Natures, which the most learned and thinking Men have thought to be an Argument and Proof of our *Liberty of Action*, is by this Gentleman made use of to infer on the direct contrary, that our Actions are *necessary*; and the Sum of his Reasoning is, that a *rational* Nature cannot act *voluntarily*; which, whether it be more *ridiculous* in *Cato* to assert, or in others to deny, I leave every intelligent Reader to consider.

In Conclusion; Our *Cato* replies to an Argument, which Dr. *Clarke* had made use of to shew, that the *Reasons and Motives upon which a Man acts*, are not the immediate and efficient Cause of the *Action*; because, if so; then either *abstract Notions* (as all *Reasons and Motives* are) are in themselves *Substances*, or else that which has no real *Subsistence* can put a *Body* into *Motion*.

*Cato's Reply* is; *We see and feel, that Desires and Fears, that abstract Notions or Images of the Brain, alter the Disposition of the whole Fa-  
brick, and often destroy the whole Contexture of it.*  
(p. 195.)

This is true, but nothing to the Purpose to shew, that *abstract Notions* are the immediate and efficient Cause of *Action* or active *Motion*, which is Dr. *Clarke's* Argument.

I grant that *abstract Notions*, such as *sudden Surprises, violent Passions, or Madness* will, by a forcible and irresistible *Impulse*, compel the *Mind* to move the *Body*; in such Cases, tho' the *abstract Notions* do not immediately themselves move the *Body*, yet, which is all one, they force the *Mind* to move it whether it will or no; but then this *Motion* (tho' call'd *Action*) is no more really or properly *Action*, than the *Motion* of a *Man*, who is driven by a *Storm* or *Whirlwind*, is an *Action*; or than the *Impression, made upon the Fætus by the Longings of Women*. (which is *Cato's* Instance) is the *Action* of the  
Women.

Women. If it shall be insisted on that every *Event* or *Effect*, howsoever produc'd, is an *Action*; then the *Motions* of *Ships* and *Clocks* are *Actions*, and all *Motion* is *Action*, and there will be no such Thing as *Passion* in Nature: and yet nevertheless there will appear to be as much Difference betwixt these *natural Motions* and *human Actions*, as between the Ideas of *Necessity* and *Freedom*. The Argument of *Cato* therefore proves no more, than that as the Mind may in some Instances be depriv'd of its *Memory* and *reasoning* Faculties, so it may also be depriv'd of its *Will*: but this is no more an Argument that the Mind rightly dispos'd has not a *Will*, than that it has not the Faculty of *Memory* or *Understanding*; and he might as well have argued that the Mind has no *Memory* or *Understanding*, because it *forgets* and does not *understand* many Things, as that it has no *Will*, because it cannot make use of it in some Cases. Therefore the Effects of *excessive Desires* and *Fears* are not *Actions* but *Passions*; but wherever the Mind has Power to \**reason*,  
*reflect*,

---

\* *Alex. Aphrodisius* makes a Distinction betwixt mere *Spontaneity* (which he ascribes to Beasts) and *voluntary Agency*; and supposeth no *Exertion* of the human Mind to be an *Action* and the Effect of *Choice*, but where the *Exertion* is preceded by *Reason* and a *deliberate Judgment* in the Agent. His Words are; Ὅτι μὲν ταῦτο τό τε ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν. ἐκούσιον μὲν ἦν, τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γινόμενον σὺν καταθέσει, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ γινόμενον μὲν τῆς κατὰ

*reflect* and *deliberate*, the Effect following is properly an *Action*, and is *voluntary* and *free*; and the *immediate and efficient Cause of the Action*, is not the *abstract Motives*, upon which the Mind acts, but the *voluntary Exertion of Power* in the Mind itself.

There is another Letter of *Cato* on the same Subject, which, containing no Argument that has not been already considered, needs not to be particularly reply'd to.

Thus I have examined every Argument which *Cato* hath offered *against* the *Freedom* of the *Actions* of both *God* and *Men*, and in *Defense* of the *Necessity* of them; and have, I think, fully shown the *Insufficiency* and *Weakness* of every one of

κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρείσιν συγκαταβίσεως. “ *Spontaneity* and the  
 “ *Agency* that is in us, is not one and the same; for that is  
 “ *spontaneous* which is done merely with an unforc'd *Assent*;  
 “ but *Agency* is when a Thing is done with *Assent* accompa-  
 “ nied with *Reason* and a *Power of judging* in the Agent.  
*De Fat.* p. 72.

Again; Τὰ ᾧ μόνον τῶν καθ' ὁρμῶν γινομένων τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔχει,  
 ὅσα κατὰ λογικὴν ὁρμὴν ἐνεργεῖται. λογικὴ ἢ εἰσιν ὁρμὴ ἐν τοῖς βε-  
 βαιατικοῖς καὶ προαιρετικοῖς γινομένη, ταῦτα εἰσιν ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅταν  
 ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνηται. “ Those *Exertions* of the Mind only are  
 “ properly *Agency*, which are the *Exertions* of a *rational*  
 “ Being; but the *Exertion* of a *rational Being* is that which  
 “ proceeds upon *Deliberation* and *Choice*, that is, such an *Exer-*  
 “ tion as is proper to Men. *Ibid.* p. 152.

them; and at the same time have prov'd on the one Hand that God is a *Free-agent*, and hath endued Man with a *free* and *self-moving* Power of Action; and on the other Hand, that the Scheme of *Necessity* is clearly inconsistent with the *Nature, Existence* and *Reason* of Things; and is not only the most *silly* but the most *wicked* Hypothesis that ever enter'd into the Thoughts of Men. Therefore as a Conclusion of the whole, I will briefly set before the Reader's View the different Nature and *Consequences* of the two Notions of *Liberty* and of *Necessity*.

I. The Notion of God's being a *Free-agent* represents him as having (besides the *natural* Perfections of *necessary Existence, Eternity, Immenfity, Omnipotency* and *Omnifciency*) the *moral* Perfections of *Wisdom, Holiness, Goodness* and *Justice*: That he is not only in himself most *perfect* and *independent*, but is properly the *first Cause*, and the *original Agent* and Author of all other Things; that the Existence of all other Beings depends upon his *Will*, by which *Will*, as the *immediate efficient Cause* of all his Actions, his *Power* and *Knowledge* are exercis'd in the Production of a wonderful Variety of *unintelligent* and *intelligent* Beings, endued by him with various *Properties, Faculties* and *Modes* of Existence, all most *wisely* contriv'd and adapted to the several *Ends* intended by them.

That the *unintelligent* Creation is wholly directed and governed without any *Agency of its own*, by those natural *Powers* and *Laws* of Motion which God originally impress'd upon it; by which it is supported and hinder'd from falling into Disorder and Confusion, and is continually subject to God's Power and Dominion; but that the *intelligent* and *rational* Part of the Creation is endued with *Liberty* and a Power of *Self-motion*, and of directing its own Actions; and is therefore governed by God, as being not a mere *efficient* but a *moral* Agent by the *eternal* and *immutable* Laws of *Reason*, which are propos'd to its *Choice*; and Obedience or Disobedience to which are attended with suitable *Rewards* and *Punishments*. Upon this Principle of *Free-agency* is founded the Nature and Original of *Good* and *Evil*; of all *Religion* and *Piety* towards *God*, and of all *Vertue* and *Righteousness* towards *Men*. God hereby renders himself an Object of *Worship*, and a *Rewarder* or *Punisher* of Men's Behaviour.

It is thro' the *free* Exercise of God's *providential* Power that he has made many *Events* to depend upon our *free* Actions, and thereon is founded the *Reason* and *Obligation* of our *Prayers* and *Praises* to him, and the Ground and Expectation of receiving *Mercies* and *Blessings* from him.

Upon this Principle also is founded the Notion of *natural Right* and *Property* among Men, of *Society* and *Government*, and the *Reason* of Laws for the Protection and Encouragement of those who *do well*, and for the Discouragement and Punishment of those who *do Evil*.

In short; the *Perfections* of God, all the Works of his *Nature* and *Providence*, all the Effects of his Power, and all the Proceedings and Actions of Men, and their Condition both here and hereafter, plainly presuppose *Liberty of Action*, and can be accounted for on no other Principle.

II. From the Notion of *Necessity* it demonstratively follows, that God has no *moral* Attributes or Perfections, is neither *wise*, *holy*, *just* or *good*; all which depend upon his being so, not by *Necessity* but by *Choice*; besides that the same is demonstrated from the Works of Creation and Providence, which, upon the Supposition of *Necessity*, cannot be reconcil'd to the Notion of a *wise*, *just*, or *good* Being.

It follows hence also, that God is not an *Agent* or *real Cause* at all of the *Existence* of any thing; that all the Effects of his Knowledge and Power in the Creation are no more properly *his Acts*, than the Existence of his own *Nature* and *Attributes* are his Acts; that either God is a *passive*

Being, and does not *act*, but is *acted* upon by a *coercive* Cause in the Works of Creation, or else that nothing is *created*, but *Matter* is *self-existent, eternal, immutable* and *infinite* as God himself is, and *independent* of him, both which are equally and infinitely absurd.

It follows also from the Notion of *Necessity*, that nothing could be *varied*, or exist in any other *Manner, Form, Time* and *Place* than it is, or be *different* in any *Mode* or *Circumstance* from what it is.

It follows again hence, that as God is not the proper and *efficient Cause*, and consequently not the *natural* Governor or Creator of the Universe; so hereby his *moral* Government is entirely excluded; for not being a *Free-agent* himself, he could not make Man to be so; the Consequence of which is, that as there are no *moral* Attributes in God, so there can be no *Morality* in Men: Upon this Principle therefore God cannot be an Object of Worship at all, or a Rewarder or Punisher of *Virtue* and *Vice, Good* and *Evil*; because the Essence of these Things depends upon their being Matters of *Choice*, and in our Power to do or not: So that all *Religion* and *Piety* towards God is fundamentally subverted by the Scheme of *Necessity*. And not only so, but the *Disposition* and Events of Things, if proceeding from *Necessity*, shew that the Nature whence they are derived is not  
only



only not *good* or *just*, but that it is *unjust* and *evil*.

By this Notion also the Difference of *Right* and *Wrong*, and of all *social* and *personal* Merit and Demerit amongst Men, and consequently the *Principles* and *Laws* of all Society and Government are wholly destroy'd; the Essence of these being founded on the Supposition of Men's having a Power over their own Actions, and *freely* doing Good and abstaining from doing Evil. In short, the Scheme of *Necessity* destroys the *Perfections*, and consequently the Being and Existence of God; it contradicts all our Knowledge of the Works of Nature and Providence; and all the Sense of our own Conduct and Behaviour here, and takes away the Ground of all our Hopes and Expectations hereafter.

And since this Doctrine so manifestly tends to corrupt Men's Natures, and their Notions of *God*, and of the Difference of *Good* and *Evil*; and can serve no End but to let Men loose to \*indulge their Lusts and Passions, without  
using

---

\* 'Εἰς ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, καὶ ἄλλα μέρη κακῶν παρορμηῶν, καὶ προτρέπει τὰτὶ τὸ δόγμα ἀνατροπὴν τῆ παντὸς βίης ἀβήτως κατεργαζόμενον.

“ This Opinion (of Necessity) is an Incentive and Encouragement to *Licentiousness*, *Injustice*, and a thousand other  
“ Evils

using their Endeavours to restrain them; and so to throw all Societies into Disorder and Confusion, and render the Communion of Men with each other more pernicious and mischievous than that of wild Beasts; leaving no Restraint to their worst Actions and greatest Enormities but the Terror of human Laws, taking away at the same time the *Reason* and Obligation of them; and supporting Men in the Practice of such Vices and Impieties as will make them miserable both here and hereafter.

Since all this, I think, is demonstratively the Consequence of the Notion of the *Necessity of human Actions*, it may well become the Defenders of this Opinion, who, I hope, are *serious Men*, to revise what they have written on this Subject, and to be well persuaded that there is no corrupt and immoral Prejudice in their Breasts which has engag'd them in Defense of so unhappy a Cause, so destructive of all *Piety, Virtue* and *Honour*: and in which therefore, I think, they ought (with all Men) to wish at least that they may be found to be mistaken; and to be both willing and ready upon their own Conviction to use their Endeavours to undeceive those of unthinking or corrupt Dispositions, who may

“ Evils, and directly tends to the Subversion of every Condition of Life. *Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 6. p. 243.*

have been misled by their fallacious but artful Methods of Reasoning, pleasing to Men's Lusts and Passions, into an Opinion so contrary to their *Reason* and *Understanding* as *Men*, to their true Interest and Property as Members of a *Community*; and above all to their future Happiness and Salvation, as Believers and Worshipers of the *true God*, and still more so, as Professors of the *Christian Religion*.

F I N I S.



Corrigenda.

**P**Age 57. line 26. read *cadere*. p. 73. l. 26. γ. γνώσκων.  
 p. 88. l. 22. γ. ἔχουσι. p. 116. l. pen. γ. ἔχειν. p. 154.  
 l. ult. γ. χείρασι. p. 165. l. 25. γ. διοικήσει. p. 172. l. 10. γ.  
*Plutarch*. p. 184. l. penult. γ. ἔκεινον.



*BOOKS Printed for J. NOON at  
the White Hart in Cheapſide near  
the Poultry.*

**A** Paraphraſe with Notes on *Coloſſians*, with an Appendix upon *Ephes. iv. 8.* being a Sequel of Mr. *Locke* on the Epistles. Price 2. s.

Sermons on ſeveral Subjects by the late reverend and learned Dr. *John Gale*. To which is prefixed an Account of his Life; in Two Volumes. Price bound 10 s.

The Peace and Happineſs of this World the immediate Deſign of Chriſtianity, a Diſcourſe on *Luke ix. 56.* With an Addreſs in the Cloſe to the Deiſts or thoſe who deny the Chriſtian Revelation. By *Thomas Bott*, Rector of *Winburg* in *Norfolk*. Price 1 s.

Remarks on Dr. *Waterland's* Second Deſenſe; with an Appendix, ſhewing the true Senſe of Creation, Eternity and Conſubſtantiality in a Letter to the Doctor, by *Philaethes Cantabrigienſis*. Price 1. s.

Farther Remarks on Dr. *Waterland's* Farther Vindication of Chriſt's Divinity, by *Philaethes Cantabrigienſis*. Price 1 s.

An Answer to Mr. *Watts* concerning the Trinity, being a ſober Appeal to a *Turk* or an *Indian*. Price 2. s.

*Now in the Preſs.*

A true Narrative of the Controverſy concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity, being a Reply to Dr. *Berriman's* hiſtorical Account, wherein the Partiality and Miſrepresentations of that Author are fully ſhewn by the Author of the Reply to Dr. *Waterland's* Deſences.



T270-A  
9



University of California  
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY  
405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388  
Return this material to the library  
from which it was borrowed.

---

1000 2001

111/WTU





3 1158 01046 3809

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA 000 088 204 3

U